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Timely
SUMMARY:

Petr challenges the CA3's holding that Resp was

denied his Sixth and Fourteenth Arndt right to trial by a fair and
impartial jury.
FACTS AND DECISIONS BELOW:

;g~/

Resp was convicted

i~f .~

first degree murder and rape in a Clearfield County, Pennsylvania, and was sentenced to life imprisonment.
~

On appeal, the Su-

prerne Court of Pennsylvania reversed the conviction and ordered a

~· ( 1\~ ~~ ~" \,~ ~~ ~~ '!'~"" ~~ ~\.~~ \Ml~ ~
~~jR~

new trial on the ground that Resp
warnings.
trial.)

ha~

not received his Miranda

(Miranda had been decided between Reps's arrest and

--·

Upon return to Clearfield for retrial in 1970, Resp
'-

moved for a change of venue.

He charged that the dissemination

of prejudicial information outside of evidence was so widespread
that an impartial jury could not be drawn.

The TC found that

after the initiation of Resp's appeal some four years earlier,
the media had merely publicized action in the courts "without
editorial comment of any kind."
tion.

It consequently denied the mo-

After the first jury panel was exhausted during voir dire,

Resp again moved for a change of venue.
denied.

Again the motion was

Th ~oted

on this occasion that it had been four
---....years since Resp's first trial and there had been little public
""-

/

discussion of the alleged murder between that trial and announcement of the new trial date: that there were no "unfair inferences
or prejudicial effects as to or against" Resp in the newspaper
accounts of the crime: that since commencement of the second set
11

•\

of proceedings, there had been fewer than four spectators in the

---

courtroom at any one time, a reflection of the general lack of

I

interest in the retrial: and that "almost all, if not all, jurors
seated had no prior or present fixed opinions" on Resp's guilt.
Trial was held.

Resp was

~ain

convicted of first degree

murder and sentenced to life imprisonment.
dropped the rape charge.)

(The prosecution had

Resp filed a post-conviction motion

for a new trial, arguing inter alia that the TC erred in denying
1-

his motions for a change in venue.

The motion was denied.

The

TC reiterated that there had been "practically no publicity" dur-

I

ing the four years between trial and retrial, and "practically no
public interest" shown in the second trial.

It explained that

voir dire had taken an / inordinate amount of time only

because ~

~

~~~~------~~------------------------~

Resp "raised so many questions and the court exercised its

dis-~

cretion to assure that there could be no complaint about the final jury empanelled."

Appeal was

This time, the State

tak~n.

Supreme Court affirmed.

______

tLSeven years___..
lat~r, Resp filed a habeas petition, alleging
---~

-

that his conviction had been obtained in violation of his Fifth
and Fourteenth Amdts right against self-incrimination (a claim
not in issue here), and his Sixth ana Fourteenth Amdts right to a
fair trial by

a~impartial

jury.

The federal magistrate conclud-

ed that the writ should issue because Resp had been denied a fair
and impartial jury due to pretrial publicity.
the magistrate's recommendation,
tition.

(Ziegler) denied the pe-

The DC emphasized at the outset that the factual find-

ings of the TC were
§2254(d).

the ~

Notwithstanding

~ esumptivel~- corr~

under 28

u.s.c.

He then went on to say that Resp had failed to carry

his burden of establishing that actual prejudice had rendered a
fair trial in Clearfield impossible.

There was "substantial

knowledge" of the case within the community to be sure, said the
DC, but most importantly,
-:;;;;?-

~ch

juror had stated that he or she

was able to set aside any preconceived notion about the case and
render a decision based upon the evidence presented.
The CA3 reversed the DC's holding that

(

trial by a fair and
421

u.s.

imp ~ial

jury.

Re ~ d

received

Citing to Murphy v. Florida,

794 (1975) and Irvin v. Dowd, 366

u.s.

712 (1961), the

court imposed the burden on Resp--as had the DC--to show from the
"totality of the circumstances" that there was such extensive
publicity as to "cause actual prejudice to a degree rendering a
fair trial impossible."

In particular reliance upon Irvin v.

Dowd, to determine whether Resp carried that burden, the CA3 cons idered ( 1) the extent and the content of the publicity; ( 2) the
opinions expressed by the prospective jurors and the difficulty
encountered in finding veniremen able to decide Resp's case impartially; and (3) the testimony of the jurors actually selected
to determine whether any pattern of community prejudice extended
to them.
It found that the publicity, while accurate and factual,

revealed ~rejudicial information that was never heard from the
witness stand in Resp's second trial.

The publicity disclosed,
..___.

-··----,

for instance, that the jury in the first trial had convicted Resp
not only of murder but of rape; that Resp had executed written
confessions to the murder; and finally, that Resp had pled temporary insanity at the first trial.

Through the repeated community

exposure provided by the newspaper coverage of both the appeal
and retrial, said the CA, these facts were kept in the forefront
of the public mind.

The court next determined that the actual

jurors' assurances of impartiality must be given little weight
because of the depth of the veniremen's sentiments; over threequarters of the veniremen admitted to a belief that Resp was
guilty.

'

Last, the CA found that the prejudice evident in the

voir dire and in the community was reflected in the testimony of
and two alternates selected.

All but one of the jurors were familiar with the case, ana several specifically recalled Resp's earlier conviction and confes-

formed an opinion as to

'

And even when asked wheth-

er they could set their opinions aside, some of the jurors provided ambiguous answers.

The CA concluded that in light of the

publicity, the difficulty of voir dire, and the testimony of the
jurors selected, and notwithstanding their asertions to the contrary, the jurors could not render a verdict based solely upon
the evidence presented.

Resp therefore had shown the actual

prejudice arising from the pretrial publicity necessary to establish a violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amdts.
CONTENTIONS:

Aside from the general charge that the CA3

erred in its finding of actual prejudice under the facts of this
case, Petr contends that the CA3 improperly applied in the
present case the the standards set forth in Marshall v. United
States, 360

u.s. 310 {1959).

DISCUSSION:

Petr's contention that the CA3 erred in finding

actual prejudice under the facts of this case is fact-bound.
While I am not entirely confident that the CA3 reached the correct decision on this point, it does not seem to be of sufficient
magnitude to warrant review by this Court.

The facts were pains-

takingly detailed and obviously carefully considered by the CA.
,_.

_.....

----

Petr does not elaborate on his assertion that the CA3
applied--and improperly so--the standards set forth in Marshall

I

v. United States.

But it appears that his argument is that a

federal court on habeas may not presume prejudice, despite juror

assurances of impartiality, simply from the fact that the jurors
have learned of potentially prejudicial information from the media.

And that this is what the CA3 did.

In Marshall, this Court

reversed a conviction and ordered a new trial for a federal offender where it was shown that seven jurors had been exposed to
news accounts of the defendant's prior crimes and arrests, even
though all of the jurors exposed to the accounts had informed the
trial judge that he or she would not be influenced by the accounts and would decide the case solely on the evidence presentea.

Petr is correct that Marshall was not intended to apply to

state courts; this was made explicit in Murphy v. Florida, supra.
at 797-798. YMarshall was but an exercise of the
s ~~

over the federal courts.

i-

However, there is nothing to

suggest that the CA3 applied the Marshall test in this case.

To

the contrary, the court recognized that,

/

[u]nlike a defendant seeking review of his federal conviction, [Respl cannot argue that simply because his
jury has read of extra-record facts with a high potential for prejudice, a federal court must presume that
the jury was prejudiced.
[Resp) must therefore
show "that the publicity has been so extreme as to
cause actual prejudice to a degree rendering a fair
trial impossible."

The CA3 thus

di ~ ea

any reliance upon Marshall.

The showing

required by the CA3, together with its insistence upon an evaluation on the basis of the "totality of the circumstances" is fully
consistent with this Court's decisions in Murphy v. Florida,
supra., ana Irvin v. Dowa, supra.
I recommend denial.
There is a response.
August 22, 1983

Luttig
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~Hu-~83~1~u-v
(Argument Date February 28, 1984)
Cammie R. Robinson

Patton v. Yount

February 26, 1984

~~~tion ~d ~ ~~

ze~IA-~vt-~~
t-o hJ ~
h' \.: .
~/fh
.
Has res pon~ent met IS uurden of proving t at pretrial

publicity caused actual prejudice in the jury selection such that
he was denied his 6th Amendment right to trial by an impartial
jury.

Facts & Decisions Below

CA3 rejected the state TC's finding that pretrial
publicity required a change of venue for respondent's retrial,
which was held 4 years after his original trial and conviction.
CA3 therefore ordered that a writ of habeas corpus should issue
unless the state granted a new trial within a specified period of
time.

Discussion

It is hard to find a certworthy issue in this
essentially factbound case.

I assume the issue is whether CA3

correctly applied the principles of Irvin v. Dowd, 366
(1961), and Murhpy v. Florida, 421

u.s.

u.s.

717

794 (1975), in

determining whether pretrial publicity denied respondent his
constitutional right to trial by an impartial jury.
In a habeas proceeding challenging a state court
conviction, this Court in Irvin considered under what
circumstances pretrial publicity may preclude a fair trial.

The

Court held that "the mere existence of any preconceived notion as
to the guilt or innoncence of an accused, without more, is [not]
sufficient to rebut the presumption of a prospective juror's
impartiality."

prospective juror
putting aside.

u.s., at 723. The defendant must show that
has an 1 ~ctual bia~ \that he is incapable of

366

Id.

a

Nevertheless, the Court held that the mere

statement by the juror during voir dire that he will be impartial

is not conclusive.
evidence.

In

~ in,

"Actual bias" may be shown from other
the Court found actual bias from the

following evidence:
(1) a pattern of community bias against the defendant was
revealed in the

- ------·----.,.
media, 366 u.s., at

725;

(2) that pattern was repeated in the voir dire testimony of
90% of those questioned, id., at 726;
(3) thus, the court should discount proclamations of
impartiality by those actually seated: "Where so many, so many
times, admitted prejudice, such a statement of impartiality can
be given little weight."

~

'

Id., at 728.

CIf 3

CA3 found "actual bias" in the case on precisely the

~

_______.

same evidence:

(l)"The publicity preceding petitioner's trial was extensive ~
and had great potential for prejudice."

Cert. Pet., at 25a

This

-

created a pattern of community bias.
(2) Voir dire testimony reflected this pattern -- 126 of theJ
163 veniremen questioned (77%) admitted to prejudicial bias that
they were incapable of setting aside.

Cert. Pet., at 28a.

(3) Because of this, the proclamations of impartiality by the
12 seated jurors should be discounted and respondent has met his
burden of proving actual bias.
CA3's application of

Cert. Pet., at 30a.
~~~

Irvin analysis is troubling

because it seems to ignore §2254(d).

CA3's determination that

there was extensive pretrial publicity directly contradicts the
TC's finding that "there had been 'practically no publicity'
during the four years between trial and retrial, and 'practical

2~
~

no public interest' shown at the second trial."

But see Cert.

Pet. at 26a, n.21 (TC's finding that there was no pretrial
publicity not substantially supported by the record -- an
exception to §2254(d)).
4

Although Irvin had held that the

--------

question whether a juror's opinion is sufficiently strong to
constitute unconstitutional bias is a mixed question of law and
fact that the federal court is required to evaluate
independently, the question of the existence and extent of
pretrial publicity in a community is a pure question of fact and
is best resolved by the TC.

Thus, application of the Irvin

analysis in this case is problematic.
Since Irvin, this Court has made clear that in habeas
actions the petitioner must show that jurors had an "actual
prejudice" against him.

Murphy v. Florida, 421

u.s.

794 (1975).

In the interest of comity, the Court thereby refused to extend to
state court convictions the rule employed in federal courts that
"persons who have learned from news sources of a defendant's
prior criminal record are presumed to be prejudiced."

Id., at

798 (referring to the rule of Marshall v. United States, 360
310 (1959)).

u.s.

Murphy did not repudiate, however, the rule of

Irvin that actual prejudice may be shown from evidence other than
the testimony of the impaneled jurors in cases "where most
veniremen will admit to a disqualifying prejudice."

Id., at 803.

The Court held in Murphy, however, that where only 20 of 78
veniremen admitted to a disqualifying prejudice, it would not
disregard the testimony of those jurors who had stated that they
could be impartial.

Contrary to petr's assertion, CA3 did not violate the
principles announced in Murphy.

Where on the spectrum between

Murphy and Irvin this case falls is a (close
essentially factbound.

c!!J

and is

Nevertheless, the case points out a

troubling aspect of the Irvin analysis that is exaggerated by
CA3's application in this case.
Irvin looks to the testimony of all veniremen to
determine whether those actually seated as jurors have an "actual
prejudice" against the defendant despite their testimony to the
contrary.

The principle is "[w]here so many, so many times,

admitted prejudice," statements of impartiality by the twelve
seated jurors should be given little weight.

The problem with

that principle is that it repudiates the very purpose of voir

--

dire.

2r-~
5

As Judge Garth's concurring opinion points out: "A

thoroughly and skillfully conducted voir dire should be adequate
to identify juror bias, even in a community saturated with
publicity adverse to the defendant." Cert. Pet., at 47a.

There

has been no allegation here that the voir dire was skimpy or
procedurally unfair.

To the contrary, CA3 expressly acknowledged

that the TC "extend[ed] great leniency to petitioner in his
questioning of the veniremen.
Cert. Pet., at 28a n. 23.

Such leniency was commendable."

Thus, it is not manifestly c.lear that

the court should presume, without specific evidence, that the

l

voir dire was ineffective.

Irvin~lows

That is, however, precisely what

and what CA3 did in this case.

1::::1

~
~

~

~

~

On the other hand, I do not think that this Court
reject Irvin altogether.

tJwt:rt-r
~

In rare cases of extreme pretrial

sh~

publicity, the Irvin analysis may be necessary
was such a case.

Irvin itself

However, the analysis should be used sparingly.

I think that Judge Garth's concurring opinion presents a
compelling argument that the Court need not decide whether
application of the Irvin presumption is proper in this case.

'----·----------------=--------------------------Briefly, his argument runs as

Cert. Pet., at 45a-53a.

See

follows:

(1) a defendant proves denial of his 6th Amendment right to
trial by an impartial jury if he demonstrates the actual
existence o ~reju~i se attributable to pretrial publicity on the
part of one or more jurors, Irvin, 366

u.s.,

at 723.

(2) a defendant may establish by means of a seated juror's
voir dire testimony that he had a preconceived opinion of
defendant's guilt that he was incapable of setting aside.
(3) Yount has demonstrated in this case the actual existence
of prejudice on the part of ~ of the sea ted jurors -- Hr in.

l~

~

)1 ~1-

Hrin's voir dire testimony indicated that he "would require X,Qunt bfOJA....(...
to produce evidence before [he] would abandon his -preconceived
opinion of Yount's guilt."
(4)

Cert. Pet., at Sla.

this was sufficient to meet Yount's burden of proving

that pretrial publicity resulted in the selection of one or more
jurors who had "actual bias" as required by Murphy.

Cert. Pet.,

at 5la.
Judge Garth's analysis is preferrable both because it is
narrow and because it avoids the §2254(d) problem encountered by
the majority opinion.

~

Under Irvin, a determination whether a

juror has an unconstitutionally

b~on

is a mixed

?

question of law and fact for the federal court to decide.

u.s.,

366

at 723.
I recommend that this Court affirm for the reasons

articualted by Judge Garth.

Under that rationale, the Court need

not decide whether the Constitution required the state TC to
grant a change of venue.

It need only address the question

whether respondent has met his burden of proving that pretrial
publicity resulted in the selection of a juror who harbored an
"actual bias."
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

March 2, 1984

No. 83-95, Patton v. Yount
Dear Lewis,
Forgive me for sending you another letter. You have
enough to read without this added burden. I write because you
are always willing to listen and because it seems most
unfortunate to resolve this case by an equally divided Court.
You qualified your vote to affirm as being "tentative" and I hope
you might be persuaded to consider a reversal.
I take it from your discussion of the case that you were
not persuaded to affirm on the basis of Judge Hunter's conclusion
that juror bias should be implied from the pre-trial puqlicity.
You spoke instead of Judge Garth's opinion concerning "actual
bias" of Juror Hrin. I respect Judge Garth very much. He sat
with me recently on the National Moot Court Finals. He is a fine
judge, but I believe he is in error in this case.

~

The question of juror Hrin's bias was not properly raised
for Judge Garth's review, I believe. The habeas petition
includes only a vague reference that "two [jurors] stated they
would require [respondent] to prove his innocence." App. 302a.
1 In contrast to Judge Garth, I believe this reference was to
{ jurors 2 and 10 (Clair Clapsaddle and Albert Undercoffer), both
of whom expressed confusion concerning whether respondent had the
• burden of proof or not. Possibly, the reference could be to
jurors 3 and 12, the two other seated jurors that respondent
challenged for cause. The District Court certainly did not
believe the issue of juror ifri'n' "actual bias 11 was raised, for
i £_ assessed"' cause chaileriges to six specific jurors, and did not
eyen men1;~on , ju~ror Hr in. The issue of juror Hr in's "actual bias"
certainly was not •iset forth [as a] specific groun [d] upon which
relief [was available]. 28 u.s.c. foll. §§2254 (Rule 2(c)
governing habeas petitions).

s

Second, I do not think Judge Garth properly applied the
presumption of correctness required by the habeas statute, 28
u.s.c. §2254(d). Irvin v. Dowd characterized the issue of
legally "implied" bias as a "question of mixed law and fact," and
deference on that issue is therefore not required. But a
question of "actual bias," based solely on the answers given at
the voir dire, is a "question of historical fact" for which the
presumption of correctness applies. See Smith v. Phillips, 455
U.S. 209, 216-218 (1982); Rushen v. Spain,
U.S.
,
(1983). Judge Garth should have deferred to the trial judge's
findings, which certainly find "fair support" in the record.

L.

Finally, like you, I have carefuliy reviewed the entire
colloquy between juror Hrin and respondent's trial counsel. In
many ways, it was like colloquy I heard when I was a state court
judge. Prospective jurors are not lawyers, and they take their
temporary roles in the legal system with great seriousness and
sincerity. Lawyers sometimes confuse them with hypotheticals,
and they answers questions in ways that, looking at a cold
record, might seem unusual. They do not watch for the legal
nuances of their utterances. But all we are looking for is an
opel) mind, and I believe j ur,or Ig.,in ad t at. --Juror :Hr ln openly
and honestly admitted that he had read about respondent in the
newspaper. He admitted that he had an opinion. But he also
insisted, repeatedly, that he would not be inflexible, that he
would follow the judge's instructions, and that he would hear the
case with an open mind. Juror Hrin was a chemist, a man trained
in and proud of scientific objectivity. He promised to judge the
case on the facts presented, and that is all the Sixth Amendment
requires. It is easy for us, fourteen years later, to pour over
that colloquy and detect awkward statements that indicate
inflexible bias. But we were not in that courtroom; we have no
ability to judge his credibility and veracity. The trial judge,
however, was there and could. That judge expressly denied the
challenge for cause because he believe what juror Hrin said; he
concluded that Hrin "could disregard [his opinion] and be guided
by the law and evidence." App. 87a. Indeed, respondent's trial
counsel may ultimately have concurred in that assessment, for
after further questioning he accepted juror Hrin, did not renew
his challen~e for cause, and did not challenge juror Hrin on a
peremptory basis although he had some peremptory challenges
remaining.
Actual juror bias is a "question of historical fact" to
which the presumption of correctness applies. Perhaps juror Hrin
should have been dismissed, and perhaps venue should have been
changed. But can we, fourteen years later, be so sure that
respondent did not have a trial by an impartial jury when the
state trial judge, the state supreme court, and the Federal
habeas court all thought he had?
Thank you for taking the time to consider this. Having
had to face many such questions on the bench I feel it would be
very helpful if we could write an opinion in this case reversing
the Court of Appeals.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell

err 03/06/84
March 6, 1984

RE: No. 83-95, Patton v. Yount

TO: Justice PowelL

(

FRa-1 : Ca mrn i e

On reexamination,
to the soundness of Judge

I am beginning to have some doubts as
Garth~s

analysis.

He has made the dis-

tinction between a finding of "actual bias," which concededly is

a

"question of

historical

_____

fact" governed

by §2254 (d),

-

and

the

legal determination
whether a juror's opinion is such as to raise
____.
the presumption of partiality, which is not governed by §2254(d).
The distinction applies Irvin v. Dowd correctly.
an individual juror,

however,

When applied to

it is a distinction that seems to

be one that is based more on semantics than reality.

In the end,

Judge Garth's analysis may have the undesirable effect of making
it easier for habeas courts to second guess the voir dire rulings
of trial courts than would the majority's analysis.
Irvin v. Dowd sets forth an analysis that should be used
only
cases,

in

rare

cases

of

extreme

pretrial

publicity.

In

those

the question is whether the pretrial publicity is such as

to create a presumption of partiality on the part of any or all
the jurors.

According to Irvin, that question is a legal one and

is . not governed by §2254(d).

However, its use easily may be lim-

ited to cases of extreme pretrial publicity.
v.

Florida,

421

u.s.

794

(1975).

See, e.g., Murphy

Under Judge Garth's analysis,

--

the determination that one juror's voir dire testimony creates a
presumption of partiality seems to be nothing more than a repudi~.._,

ation of the trial judge's credibility
assessment.
I

Because Judge

_

Garth relied solely on Hrin's voir dire testimony,
and not on the
__,
L

extensive

- pretrial publicity

crucial to the majority's analysis,

his analysis is not as easily limited to those rare cases of extreme publicity.

--

Because Judge Hunter makes it clear that this

is an unusual case in which 126 of the 163 veniremen (77%) admitted bias,

the majority's opinion may be the narrower of the two.

I am afraid this is something I had not thought of on first analysis.

.iuvnw <lj:llltrt d tqt ,nittb .ihdt-«
Jla,gfri:ngton, ~. <!J:. 2ll~'!!,1
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

March 8, 1984

No. 83-95

Patton v. Yount

Dear Lewis,
I am absolutely delighted to read your memo
in this case. If the other votes remain as before, we
should be able to decide it by a useful opinion clarifying
the points made in your memo.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell

.hprtmt Q1&mrt of tift ~b .tbdt•

•••Jrtnlton. ~. Q1.

20~"''

CHAM ltERS 0,.

JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL , JR .

March 8, 1984

83-95 Patton v. Yount

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
In view of the evenly divided Court, this case was
carried forward to be considered further at our next Conference. Although I was unpersuaded by CA3's majority opinion,
I voted at Conference to affirm on the grounds announced in
Judge Garth's concurring opinion. That vote was tentative,
as I stated.
Judge Garth relied on language in Irvin v. Dowd to
find that juror Hrin's ambiguous voir dire testimony
"raise{d] the presumption of partiality.• 366 u.s., at 723.
Again relying on Irvin, Judge Garth characterized that determination as a question of law rather than a question of
historical fact. Cert. Pet., at 52a. Bearing in mind that
this case is here on federal habeas corpus, and after a further review of Irvin, Judge Garth's opinion, and other relevant cases, I now question the soundness of that characterization. Whether Hrin's voir dire testimony evidences "actual bias" is a credibility determination and seems more a
question of fact than a mixed question of law and fact. See
Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 216-218 (198 2) (existence
of "actual biasn on part of a juror is a question of historical fact the resolution of which is entitled on federal
habeas to a presumption of correctness under S2254(d))J
Rushen v. Spain,
u.s.
(1983) (same).
There is language in Irvin that supports Judge
Garth's view that federal habeas courts may find a •presumption of partiality" as a matter of law. See 366 u.s., at
723. On further reflection, however, I am inclined to think
that Judge Garth's reliance on that language is misplaced.
The pertinent language in Irvin suggests that extreme pretrial publicity may create, as a matter of law, a "presumption of prejudice" with respect to the jury panel. It does
not suggest, however, that in habeas corpus proceedings fed~
eral courts may rely exclusively on voir dire testimony to
repudiate assessments of juror bias made by state trial
courts. Thus, I believe that under S2254(d), Judge Garth

.
'

2.

was required to presume the correctness of the state courts'
assessment of Hrin's "actual bias."
Attached hereto are portions of Hrin's voir dire
testimony that in my view support the conclusions reached by
three of the four courts that have considered Hrin's eligibility to sit as a juror. As indictated in these pages,
after defense counsel recorded his "challenge for cause,•
the trial court held that Hrin's ambiguous responses did not
reflect a "fixed opinion.• This prompted defense counsel
again to ask Hrin whether he could enter the jury box with
an open mind. Hrin responded:
"I think I could enter it [the "jury box"]
with a very open mind. I think I could very
easily. To say this is a requirement for
some of the things you have to do every day."
J.A. 89a.
Defense counsel asked no further questions relevant to bias.
Nor did he renew his prior challenge for cause. This testimony s~pports the trial court's determination that Hrin was
prepared to render an impartial verdict.
If we were to affirm CA3 on the reasoning of Judge
Garth, we would invite federal courts on habeas to make factual judgments as to juror bias whenever a federal judge
thought an error had been made. Of the many "judgment
calls" that trial judges must make, not many depend as much
on the judge's discretion as whether a juror is qualified to
sit. Jurors vary widely in experience, education, sophistication, and -- under the pressure of examination by opposing
counsel -- frequently will give ambiguous answers as to
their preconceived opinions. The scope and extent of the
voir dire also vary widely, and inform the judge who oversees it. A trial judge, observing the questioning and the
demeanor of the prospective jurors, is in a far better position than appellate judges to determine juror fitness.
In sum, I conclude that the "presumption of prejudice" envoked in Irvin v. Dowd is not applicable to the
facts of this case, and that the "actual bias" of juror Hrin
is a question of historical fact to be resolved by the state
court and entitled to a presumption of correctness under
S2254(d) --a presumption that Judge Garth did not engage.
I therefore would reverse.

~.J.i7.

L.F.P., Jr.

]ames F. Hrin- Voir J)ire

86a

A. Since there's nothing else in my mind except
what I originally read, right. The fact that there has
been a new trial re-scheduled may cause some doubt
as to the original facts.

Q.

But it hasn't changed your opinion?

A.

Well the opinion isn't as solid as it originally

Q.

But it still is solid-not as solid-but solid?

A.

Right.

was.

[443] Q.
A.

Spoken like a true engineer.

Not an engineer-I'm a chemist.
BY MR. KING:
We would challenge for cause.
BY . MR. FENNELL:

We would answer the challenge before the
Court's ruling. He has already declared he could
decide the verdict solely upon the evidence and
law presented and he definitely said he could.
BY MR. SABINO:
Your Honor, I think we went through this
matter yesterday.
BY THE COURT:
I don't think his answer is that he could not
enter the jury box with an open mind. He said he
could go in with an open mind and therefore I
deny the challenge for cause. I deny the challenge
for cause because he declared he could go in there
with an open mind; and Commonwealth against

}ames F. Hrin- Voir Dire

88a

Q. But you would still require evidence to be
presented before you could in fact change your opinion- is that what you said?
A. The fact that the trial has been reopened indicates that there may be something left unopened. I
said my opinion is not as solid and possibly I could
enter the box with an open mind. I think I do this
every day. You try out processes that you're sure are
going to work and you definitely change your mind. I
don't know if that's the answer you want.

Q. Regardless whether it's the answer we want,
we are just trying to get an answer too so we can
judge you and decide upon you.
A. It's rather difficult to live in DuBois and get
the paper and find out what the people are talking
about- at least the local [445] people without having
some opinion or at least reserving some opinion.

Q. That's very true. And you do have and have
had an opinion?
A.

I had an opinion, right.

Q. The question now is then Mr. Hrin, is
whether or not you can set that opinion aside before
hearing any of the facts or evidence- set it aside
before you enter the jury box; not after, but before.
Can you do that?
A. The opinion isn't as solid- to completely
wipe-or forget what I had heard previously about
the case-

Q.

You still remember that?

7rin- Voir Dire

]ames F. Hrin- Voir Dire

still require evidence to be
tld in fact change your opin.
lid?
1e trial has been reopened in•e something left unopened. I
as solid and possibly I could
>pen mind. I think I do this
processes that you're sure are
lefinitely change your mind. I
answer you want.
ther it's the answer we want , .
et an answer too so we can _.

>On you.

"~.

~ult to live in DuBois and get ~

what the people are talking ~
[445] people without having ·
reserving some opinion.
~.

And you do have and have

m, right.
now is then Mr. Hrin, is
set that opinion aside before
~ts or evidence- set it aside
y box; not after, but before.

·'=

89a

A. I remember reports about it or talking about
it_ to be honest with you · I didn't really read all the
articles in the paper because I know they were
possibly played up a little. I didn't particularly like
the man that wrote the article so I didn't take too
much time. Everybody is entitled to their own views
on personalities, but when I started to read it, it
sounded like a fiction story and I don't care to read
fiction.
Q. Mr. Hrin, I have to come back to the question that- can you put aside whatever opinion you
had -solid, unsolid or however you want to describe it
-can you set it aside before you go into the jury box
or would you need some evidence before you could
change your mind? Now think about it for a second.
A.

I have to.

Q.

Give me yes or no?

A. I think I could enter it with a very open
mind. I think I could [446] very easily. To say this is a
requirement for some of the things you have to do
every day.
.,
Q. Then let me ask you one more question Mr.
Hrin - we have asked you a number of questions and
we try to find things here, but do you know of any
reason that I may not have touched upon why you
should not be a juror in this case?

;n't as solid- to completely
had heard previously about

A. Outside of the fact that you'd be locked up
for three weeks which wouldn't be a very pleasant experience.

Jber that?

Q. Does the thought of that effect you in such a
way that you feel you could not be a juror?

jlu.prtm.t afouri of tltt ~h .itatt•

.a&Jlfin¢&tn. J. <q.

2llp'l~
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CHAMI!II!:R8 0,.

THE CHIEF' .JUSTICE

March 12, 1984

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re:

83-95- Patton v. Yount

In light of Lewis' memorandum of March 8, 1984,
this case now stands reversed and is assigned to Lewis for
opinion •

.. ·,,

lfp/ss 03/14/84
MEMORANDUM
DATE:

TO:

Joe

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

March 14, 1984

83-95 Patton v. Yount
In reading Bose Corp., 82-1246, I note that Justice Stevens speaks of the "special deference [to] be given
to a trial judge's credibility determination".

P. 13.

In

Patton, although voir dire is not precisely comparable to
oral testimony it does require a determination by the trial
1

judge of credibility in light of the facts and circumstances.

See my memorandum to the Conference resulting in

our being assigned the case.
Of course, there is nothing new or special about
according deference to a trial court's credibility determinations.

I mention this only because it is a current

statement.

~p
L.F.P., Jr.
ss

lfp/ss 03/14/84
MF.MORAl\lOUM
DATE:

TO:

~Joe

FROM:

Lewis F. PowelJ, Jr.

March 14 , 19 8 4

83-95 Patton v. Yount
In reading Bose Corp., 82-1246, I note that Justice Stevens speaks of the "special deference [to] be given
to a trial judge's credibility determination".

P. 13.

In

Patton, although _voir dire is not precisely comparable to
oral testimony it does require a determination by the trial
judge of credibility in light of the facts and circumstances.

See my memorandum to the Conference resulting in

our being assigned the case.
Of course, there is nothing new or special about
according deference to a trial court's credibility determinations.

I

mention this onlv because it is a current

statement.

r... F.P., Jr.
ss

83-95

Patton v. Yount

1st Draft

04/06/84

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.

This

case

brings

before

. publicity so infected a

us

a

claim

that

pretrial

state criminal trial as to deny

the defendant his Sixth Amendment right to an "impartial
jury."

I

On Apr i 1 28,

1966,

the body of Pamela Rimer, an 18-

year-old high school student, was found in a wooded area
near

her

home

Pennsylvania.

in

Luthersburg,

Clearfield

County,

There were numerous wounds about her head,

apparently caused by a blunt instrument.

There were also

cuts caused by a sharp instrument on her throat and neck.
One of her stockings was knotted and tied around her neck.
An autopsy

revealed

blood

her

from

wounds

autopsy showed no
assaulted.

that she died of strangulation when
was

drawn

into

her

lungs.

The

indication that she had been sexually

2.

At about 5:45 a.m.
Yount appeared
DuBois.

at

the following morning, respondent

the State Police Substation in nearby

An officer opened the door.

the man you are looking for."

Yount stated, "I am

The officer asked whether
You~

he was referring to "the incident in Luthersburg."
responded that he was.

A detective was alerted, and he and Yount
went into a smaller adjacent office.
"Why are we looking
that girl."

for you?"

Yount replied,

"I killed

"What girl?" the detective asked,

and Yount

responded, "Pamela Rimer."
did you kill this girl?"
with

a

The detective asked,

wrench

and

I

The detective then asked, "How
Yount answered,

choked

The

her."

"I struck her
detective

then

advised Yount of his rights, and Yount subsequently gave
full

oral

and

Yount

written confessions.

victim's high school mathematics teacher.
""""' 19~ tD}
At his trial, these confessions were

had

been the

admitted

into

t1

evidence.

Yount

took

the

stand

and

claimed

temporary

insanity.

The jury convicted him of first degree murder

and rape, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment.
direct

appeal

the

Pennsylvania

Supreme Court determined

that under Miranda v. Arizona, 384
had

given

Yount

inadequate

On

u.s.

notice

of

436 (1966), police
his

right

to

an

3.

attorney prior to his confession.
a new trial.

Commonwealth v. Yount, 435 Pa. 276, 256 A.2d

464 (1969}, cert. denied, 397
Prior

to

the

second

suppression

ordered

The court remanded for

confessions,

u.s.

trial

of

in 1970,

Yount's

and of the question

girl?" and its answer.

925 (1970}.
the

trial court
and

oral

written

"How did you kill this

The prosecution dismissed the rape

charge.

There followed an extensive voir dire that is now

at

heart

the

N:>vember

4,

of

1970,

this

case.

Jury

selection

and took ten days,

the

voir

dire.

dissemination

of

He

Yount moved

and several times during,

argued

prejudicial

on

seven jury panels,

292 veniremen, and 1186 pages of testimony.
for a change of venue before,

began

that

the

information

widespread

could

not

be

eradicated from the minds of potential jurors, and cited
in support the difficulty of the voir dire and numerous
newspaper and other articles about the case.
were

denied.

The

trial

court

noted

that

The motions
the

articles

merely reported events without editorial comment; that the
length of the voir dire resulted in part from the court's
leniency

in allowing examinations and challenges of

jurors; that "almost all,

the

if not all," the jurors seated

had "no prior or present fixed opinion";

that there had

4.

~~e... ~~~ 4-J..j

•

been "practically no publicity given to th1s matter;; and
"little,

if any,

an.Q-.t.Q.at ~e

talk

in public" between the two trialsrr '
~
second trialAhad been~ sparsely attended.

Ultimately,
seated.

twelve

jurors

and

two

alternates

were

At the second trial, Yount did not take the stand

and did not claim temporary insanity.

Instead he relied

upon

witnesses,

cross-examination

and

character

in

attempt to undermine the State's proof of his intent.
jury convicted
was

him again of

resentenced

to

life

first-degree murder,

imprisonment.

The

an
The

and he

trial

court

denied a motion for a new trial, finding that practically
no publicity had been given to the case between the two

~

p£ae~call~ ~
1\

trials, and that

during the second trial.

public interest was shown

In addition, the court concluded

that the jury was without bias.

The Pennsylvania Supreme

Court

and

affirmed

findings.

the

conviction

Commonwealth

v.

Yount,

the

455

Pa.

trial
303,

court's
---,

314

A.2d 242,--- (1974).
In January 1981, Yount filed a petition for a writ of
habeas

corpus

in

United

States

District

Court.

He

claimed, inter alia, that his conviction had been obtained
in violation of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right
to

a

fair

trial

by

an

impartial

jury.

The

case

was

5.

assigned

to

a

magistrate,

who

conducted

a

recommended that the petition be granted.

hearing

and

The magistrate

examined the voir dire testimony and found that the jury
at Yount's
decide

second

the

case

trial was

on the evidence before

magistrate concluded,
to

prove

his

not capable and wi 11 ing

the

innocence

it:

rather,

to
the

jury would have required Yount
or

overcome

strong

preconceived

rejected

the

magistrate's

notions of guilt.
'Ihe

District

recommendation.

Court
537

F.

Supp.

873

(W.D.

Pa.

It

1982).

held that the pretrial publicity was neither vicious nor
excessive, and that the jurors were able to set aside any
preconceived

notions.

It

noted

that

the

percentage

of

jurors excused for cause, at least as to the first panel,
was "not remarkable to anyone familiar with the difficulty
of selecting a homicide jury in Pennsylvania."
~

~

at --

Finally, the court reviewed the instances in which the

~~ trial

court had denied a challenge for cause, and upheld

the trial court's view that the jury was impartial.
The Court of Appeals for
710

F. 2d

9 56

( 19 8 3) •

the Third Circuit reversed.

Judge

Hunter,

joined

by

Judge

Footnote(s) 1 will appear on following pages.

6.

Stern 1 , relied primarily on the analysis set out in Irvin
v.

Dowd,

trial

u.s.

366

was

not

(1961),

fundamentally

App=~ amined

the trial.

712

in

finding

fair.

First,

that
the

Yount's
Court

of

the nature of the publicity surrounding

It found that that publicity revealed Yount's

i\

prior conviction for murder, his confession, and his prior
plea

of

temporary

admitted

into

insanity,

evidence

at

information
trial.

that

While

was
the

not
court

recognized that "[t]he passage of time may work to erase
highly

unfavorable

community,"

710

publicity

F.2d,

at

969,

from
it

the
found

memory
that

of

the

newspaper

coverage of the appeal and retrial, and the intensity of
the

initial

publicity,

served

to

poison

the

general

atmosphere during the second trial. 2

1 Judge Stern, a United States District Judge for
District of New Jersey, was sitting by designation.
2 The

the

Court of Appeals rejected as without fair
support in the record the trial court's conclusion that
there was practically no publicity given to the case
between the first and second trials.
See 710 F.2d, at
969, n. 21.
The federal court noted that the trial court
record contained at least 17 front-page articles published
d,u£il"t~ #at
time in the Clearfield County papers.
The
record on the habeas petition indicated that 66 fro t-page
articles were published covering the appeal and the second
trial as a whole.
Footnote continued on next page.

7.

'Ihe

court

then

examined

the

evidence of community sentiment.
the

testimony,

the

q.Jestioned

about

heard

the

of

admitted

court

the

case

found

case, 3 all
from

the

voir

dire

for

further

Independently examining
that

of

163

but

two

said

media,

they would carry an opinion

and

veniremen

126,

into the

they

had

or

77%,

jury box.

One hundred seventeen, 72%, were excused on challenges for
cause.

m
268

The court compared these statistics to the numbers

Irvin.
of

There,

430

the trial court had dismissed for cause

veniremen,

or

62%,

because

they

opinions concerning the petitioner's guilt.
t.-k.... ~

those examined

"'\
addition,

entert ~some

had

fixed

Almost 90% of

opinion as to guilt.

In

the court noted testimony at the voir dire that

The Court of Appeals also suggested that the trial
court's
view that
there was little talk
in public
concerning the second trial was undermined by the voir
dire testimony that there had been public discussion of
the case, particularly in the last weeks before retrial.
~ at 969, n.
22.
The ~Ea.l court discounted >as of
limited significance , the tr1al court's point that few
spectators had attended the trial, since Yount did not
allege prejudice arising from the "'circus atmosphere'" in
the courtroom.
Ibid.

3one
hundred
twenty-five
of
the
original
292
veniremen were excused because they had not been chosen
properly.
Four others were dismissed for cause before
they were questioned on the case.

<ftC

,;.,~

8.

parishoners had

tried

to

influence a minister

1

S

wife to

vote guilty, and testimony at the habeas hearing that one
venireman apparently veiled his strong feelings about the
case when testifying.

{Neither was seated.}

~f.vJ
t ~~
d

. 11 y, th e ~a3~lt~-e£lrnTned t h e vo1r
. d'1re test1mony
.
F1na

"

of those

jurors eventually seated.

It found that "[t]he

prejudice permeating the voir dire and the community was
reflected in the voir dire testimony of the majority" of
the

jurors and alternates.

Id.,

at

It noted

971.

that

all but one of the jurors were familiar with the case, and
several

explicitly

confessions.

recalled

Eight

out

petitioner 1 s
of

the

conviction

fourteen

jurors

and
and

alternates admitted that they had formed an opinion as to
Yount 1 s

~u,.,J~ct-3'$'
gui 1 t. 4 ~ The- .ms.Jg~ thought

equivocal

responses

when

asked

whether

;i1 "CJS~:;_~----that

many)\ gave

they

could

set

aside their opinions and forget what they had heard, and
that one juror, a Mr. Hrin, and both alternates would have
required evidence to overcome their beliefs.
"conclude[d]

that

despite

their

The

1

~

assurances

4 The Court of Appeals noted that in Irvin
twelve jurors had formed opinions of guilt.

of

9.

impartiality,

the

jurors

could

not

set

aside

their

opinions and render a verdict based solely on the evidence
n...t-~f'
presented." Id., at 972 • .lot held that pretrial publicity
1

made a fair trial impossible in Clearfield County. 5
Judge Garth concurred in the judgment.

He declined to

join the majority's view that actual prejudice on the part
of the jury might be inferred from pretrial publicity and
the answers at voir dire of veniremen not selected for the
jury.

He

wrote

that

"(a]

thorough

and

skillfully

conducted voir dire should be adequate to identify juror
bias, even in a community saturated with publicity adverse
to

the

defendant."

at

979. 6

Judge

Garth

5 Judge

Stern wrote a separate concurring op1n1on in
which he suggested that "the constitutional standard which
for 175 years has guided the lower courts" in this area be
rejected.
710
F. 2d,
at
972.
Rather
than
hinge
disqualification of a juror on whether he has a fixed
opinion of guilt that he cannot lay aside, Judge Stern
would bar any juror who admitted any opinion as to guilt.
Moreover, no jury could be empanelled where more than 25%
of the veniremen
state
that
they
held
an opinion
concerning the defendant's guilt.
This would raise such
doubts as to the sincerity of those who claimed no opinion
as to suggest ~~n bias, Judge Stern wrote.
1\

6 Judge
Garth
thought
Irvin
was
distinguishable,
because there "the trial court {which itself questioned
the jurors challenged for cause) did not engage in a
searching and thorough voir dire."
710 F. 2d, at 979.
Footnote continued on next page.

10.

nevertheless

concurred

because

in

his

view

juror

Hrin

stated at voir dire that he would have required evidence
to change his mind about Yount's guilt.

This stripped the

defendant of the presumption of innocence. 7

~

u.s.

(1983), and we now

{reverse.

II

As

noted,

the

Court

of

Appeals

rested

its

decision

19/.:JI

that the jury was not impartial on this Court's decision
1\

in Irvin v.

Dowd,

supra.

because Irvin is factually distinguishable

Rather, it merely credited the jurors' subjective opinions
that
each
could
render
an
impartial
verdict
notwithstanding his or her opinion.
Judge Garth also
noted that Yount challenged for cause only three of the
actual jurors.
7Judge

Garth stated that whether juror Hrin was
unconstitutionally biased was a mixed question of law and
fact under Irvin.
710 F.2d, at 981.
He therefore did not
apply the presumption of correctness that is applicable to
the factual findings of a state court in a federal habeas
corpus proceeding, 28 u.s.c. §2254(d).

lfp/ss 04/06/84

Rider A, p. 10 (Yount)
'

We granted certiorari,

--u.s.

( 1983) , to

consider, in the context of this case, the problem of
pervasive media publicity that now arises so frequently in
the trial of sensational criminal cases.
judgment of the Court of Appeals.

We reverse the
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/""(---- That decision, a leading one at the time, is
certainly relevant.

We do not view it as controlling.

There are significant distinctions between Irvin and this

fTrtcase.

Here, the

s~Q

~~· tb..J} ~~ .J-.,.1. Q

juryAwas chosen four years after

the first trial when the great volume of publicity had
occurred and feeling in the community was at its height.

<

•

---~
. - ~~------------~
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We granted certiorari,

--u.s.

( 1983) , to

consider, in the context of this case, the problem of

11.

is that here when the second jury
years

had
In

that

it was

preceding

during

trial

the

that

Irvin

six or

the

Court

seven months

immediately

"a barrage of newspaper

headlines,

articles, cartoons and pictures was unleashed against [the
defendant.]"
the

great

~antity

366
bulk

u.s.,
of

at 725.

the

Here, on the other hand,

prejudicial

publicity--both

in

and in the harshness of its tone--occurred prior

to and during the first trial, four years before the jury
was chosen in this case.
'lbe record available to us

reveals that

in the year

before the start of the second voir dire each of the two
Clearfield County daily newspapers published less than one
article per month.
P-2.

App. 649a-657a: Ex. Pl-z to Pl-kk: Ex.

More important, many of these were extremely brief

announcements

of

the

trial dates and scheduling such as

are common in rural newspapers.
Pl-jj.

E.g • ,

Ex • P 1- f f ,

The transcript of the voir dire contains numerous

references

to

the

sparse

publicity

interest prior to the second trial.

and
~

minimal

that during

public

App. 43a, 98a,

100a: Tr. 18, 27-28, 90, 191, 384, 711, 829, 1142.

true

P 1- i i ,

It is

the voir dire the newspapers published

12.

articles

on

an

almost

daily

basis,

but

these

too were

purely factual articles discussing not the crime or prior
prosecution, but the prolonged process of jury selection.
App. 658a-67la.
months

In short, the record of publicity in the
, ~ A--f ~ .j......c.-c.t..(. ~ ,
preceding the second trial does not reveal the
1\

"barrage of
trial,"

,.. t

l~·~··
~/A)~

%9

inflammatory

Murphy

v.

Florida,

amounting to a "huge
supra, at 728, that
The voir
time

had

a

dire

publicity
421

immediately prior

u.s.

794,

798

to

(1975),

• • • wave of public pass ion," Irvin,

/'1...1- ~

~

found in Irvin.

testimony

profound

effect

revealed that this lapse in
on

the

community

and,

more

~
~, ::;r:::::e::n,th:f j~:::s:~ :~:;:;i::t o:h:f:::~:glsop:fni:::
~~ 9,..#"'--

case slip from their mind.

~

App. 194a; Tr. 33, 284,

~r~~~.

541-544, 991.

~;

of jurors and veniremen testified that at one time they

i

r~

had

lA>

had

In addition, while it is true that a number

opinions,

for

many,

time

eliminated any conviction they had had.

had

weakened

or

The testimony of

juror number seven, Martin Karetski, during examination by
defense counsel illustrates this process:
"Q.
You have heard the matter discussed
011er the years?
"A.
In the past few years I haven't heard
too much about it.

13.

In 1966 when the matter came up before
you knew about it then?
"A. Yes sir.
"Q. And just recently when this matter was
coming up again, I presume?
"A. What I have read in the paper again.
"Q.
And you have heard other people discuss
it?
"A. Not too many so far.
"Q.
You have heard other people expree:;
opinions about it?
"A.
Not too many of those so far too.
"Q. Back around '66, did you?
"A. Yes in '66.

/ / "Q.

,/
(

"Q.
I assume you had an opinion as to
[Mr. Yount's] guilt or innocence?
"A.
I had an opinion yes.
"Q.
Do you have a opinion today as to h~
guilt or innocence?
"A.
It's been a long time ago and I'm not
sure now.
It was in the paper he plead [sic]
not guilty.

I.
"Q.
Let me ask you this then.
In case you
do have an opinion, could you wipe it out of
your mind--erase it out of your mind before you
would take a seat in the jury box and hear
whatever evidence you might hear?
"A.
As it is right now I have no opinim
now--four or five years ago I probably did but
right now I don't.

"Q.
What happened Mr. Karetski, between
then and now to eliminate that opinion if you
can tell me?
"A.
Well, as far as I'm concerned there
wasn't much in the paper about it and it sort of
slipped away from thought." App. 98a-100a.

14.

Other jurors testified to the same effect.

See App. 128a

(juror

(juror number

10) .

number
And

reveals

8) ;

the
that

see also App.

transcript
the

of

opinions

164a-166a

the
of

voir
a

dire

fair

as

portion

community generally underwent the same process.
384-385,
1144.

398-399,

831,

897

(semble),

a

1075-1076

whole
of

the

~

Tr.

(semble),

The same is true of the testimony of the jurors and

veniremen

who

therefore

were

were

seated

subjected

to

late
some

in
of

broadcasts disseminated daily during

the

process

and

articles

and

the voir dire:

the

the

record suggests that their passions had not been inflamed
nor

their

thoughts

~

biased by the publicity.

App.

176a-177a, 150a-15la; Tr. 771, 959, 1027.
That

time soothes

and erases

phenomenon, familiar to all.
552, 561 (CA7 1959)

is a perfectly natural

See Irvin v. Dowd, 271 F.2d

(Duffy, J., dissenting)

(A continuance

should have been granted because "[t]he passage of time is
a

great

healer,"

"subsid[ed]."),

and

rev'd,

might

have

see

also

u.s.

541,

and were disqualified.

But

public
366

u.s.

prejudice
7l,Y (1962);

Murphy, supra, at 802; Beck v. Washington, 369
556 (1962).

retained

Not

Si'l.lb3 ece to

~~~~

~l-~r.e:t-_, ... :,t.J ~

~z;;,_,~ .~~ ~ v.,.i-r ~.; L

15.

the

testimony

select~hose

suggests
who

persuaded again. 8

that

could

the

forget

voir
or

dire
would

It is significant in this

need

to

be

~·-t::.-T
r~§aFd

that

Yount's counsel were relatively satisfied with the jurors
they were getting,
three

of

the

since

jurors

and

they challenged for
both

alternates. 9

cause only
In

sum,

we

think that the passage of time rebuts any presumption of
partiality that might arise from the initial publicity in
this case under Irvin.

8 As

noted,
the
voir
dire
in
this
case
was
particularly extensive.
It took 10 days to pick 14 jurors
from 167 veniremen.
In Irvin it took 8 days to pick 14
jurors from 430 veniremen.
Contrary to Judge Garth's surmise, 710 F.2d, at 979,
however,
the
voir
dire
interviews
quoted
in
the
petitioner's
brief
in
Irvin
do
not
appear
to
be
significantly less probing than those here. See Brief for
Petitioner in Irvin v. Dowd, O.T. 1960, No. 41, pp. 18-59.
It should also be noted that the voir dire in Irvin, like
that here, was conducted largely by counsel for each side,
rather than the judge. The only significant difference in
the procedures followed here and in Irvin is that the
veniremen here were brought into the courtroom alone for
questioning, while it appears that those in Irvin were
questioned in front of all those remaining in the panel.
'!his is not an insubstantial distinction, as the Court
suggested in Irvin, supra, at 728, but we do not find it
controlling.
9 In Irvin, the defendant challenged each of his
twelve jurors for cause.
Irvin v. Dowd, 359 u.s. 394, 398
(1959).

16.

The
that

majority~ court

the ~ ma;ority

showed

that

time

of veniremen "remembered the case"

had

not

unfavorable publicity from
710 F.2d,

at 969.

below thought that the fact

The

served

"to

erase

highly

the memory of the community."

court ~~that

the original publicity and th:

the intensity of

~~~:O::::.t"'~he' k::,

case firmly implanted the case in local memories.
~s.Q -.-wi...t;:), ""'"t: Ae:!le

is

not

~JeH~a-11;-,

whether
but

eenclcrsie~.

the

~e;b~

j~
9rs 4 ~unt's

~

7

I

not

unusual

case J

trial . had

r~~~~~

such fixed opinions that they co 1cf' not judgeJ\~
on the evidence presented.

Irvin, supra, at 723.

that one's recollection of

the

{

l rt is

fact

notorious crime was committed lingers long after feel in

f{

and

/

years ordinarily is time enough.

judgment and detailed knowledge have departed.

was here.

The record shows

There was fair, even abundant, support

7.or

the

.,..j..~~

trial court's findings that between the two {rials A.there
had

been

-

The relevant question

community

whether. the

We do ;;;1

"practically no publicity given to this matter

through the news media," and that there had not been "any
great effect created by any publicity."

App. 268a, 265a.
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~-------- It is not unusual that one's recollection of the

· ~

fact that a notorious crime was committed lingers long .
after the feelings of revulsion that create prejudice have

~r4
passed.

It would be fruitless to identify any particular
~

lapse of time that in itself would distinguished the
sitaution that existed in Irvin.

The passage of time

between a first and a second trial can be a highly
relevant fact.

In the circumstances of this case, we hold

that it clearly rebuts any presumption of partiality or
prejudice that existed at the time of the initial trial.

17.

III

Yount briefly argues here that juror Hrin, as well as
the

two

alternates,

were

challenges for cause.
substantial

doubt

erroneously

seated

over

Brief for Respondent 32.

whether

Yount

properly

his

There is

raised

in his

petition for habeas corpus the claim that the trial court
erroneously denied his challenge for cause to juror Hrin.
Compare 710 F.2d, at 966, n. 18, with id., at 977, and n.

4 (Garth, J., concurring).
the

alternate

jurors,

And there is no evidence that

who

did

not

sit

in

judgment,

actually talked with the other jurors during the four-day
Jezu; : ..... c...
trial.
But Judge Garth in the court below based his
would have required
~h-e~·~,..~ -4J
Yount to produce evidence to overcome his e~i~i ogp th~A the ~
concurrence

on

the

accused was guilty,

view

and

that

Hrin

;{X.... /I~

the majority ,.. below thought that

the sustained association between the alternates and the
other

jurors "operate [d]

to subvert the requirement that

the jury's verdict be based on evidence developed from the
witness stand,"

id.,

that the question

~

at

971,

n.

25.

.

Therefore,

whether jurors have

we

~h

\

I

I

\

18.

disqualify them is a mixed quest ion of law and fact·
L.r~
See 710 F. 2d, at 968, n. 29, 981.
Thus, ~ concluded

~

=}

1\

that the presumption of correctness
factual findings

r-.4- 28 .4-at_
u.s.c.

due ~

§2254(d)

a state court's
did not apply.

'!he opinions below relied for this proposition on Irvin v.
c::l.4' ~/.d. ~J ~-~- ~~
Dowd, supra, at 723. ~oasQ decided four years before the

,.,

relevant language was added to the federal habeas corpus
of what we have said in Part II supra,
not consider whether the language of Irvin is in
need of amendment when it is applied, as
determination of the

in Irvin,

to a

p~rtiality of the jury as a whole. 1

But we are certain that it can not be extended to a habea
corpus case in which the partiality of an individual jure
is placed in issue.

The question then is plainly one o

historical fact: did a juror swear that he could set aside

10 It may be that the result under Irvin would be no
different than under §2254 (d).
In · Irvin, the Court held
that the trial court's findings on whether a juror could
lay aside his opinion "'ought not be set aside by a
reviewing court, unless the error is manifest.'"
366
u.s., at 723 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 u.s.
145, 156
(1879)).
It may be that there is little
practical difference between the "manifest error" standard
of Irvin and the "fairly supported by the record" standard
of 2 8 u. S • c . § 12 54 ( d ) ( 8) •
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In view of what we have said in Part II, supra, we need
not consider whether the amendment of §2254(d), if it had
.been in effect at the time, would have required a

P. 10.

But we are convinced that where

the partiality of an individual juror is placed in issue
in a federal habeas corpus case, the question is not one
of mixed law and fact.

Rather, it is plainly one of

19.

any

opinion

evidence,

he

and

~partiality

u.s.

might

hold

should

and

the

decide

juror's

have been believed.
__

(slip

op.

at

the

case on the

protestation

of

Cf. Rushen v. Spain,
6)

(1983)

(state

court

determination that jury's deliberations were not biased by
ex parte communications is a finding of fact). 11
There

are

good

reasons

to

apply

the

statutory

presumption of correctness to the trial court's resolution
of

these

nade

questions.

only

after

an

First,
often

the

determination

extended

voir

dire

has

been

proceeding

.
. .
~b'
d veniremen.
.
designed
spec1f1cally
to L~
weee...suf
~ laSe

It lS
.

fair to assume that the method we have relied on since the
beginning, e.g., United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 51
(C.C.D.

Va.

1807)

(Marshall,

C.J.),

usually

works. 12

11 There

are, of course, factual and legal questions
to be considered in deciding whether a juror is qualified.
The constitutional standard that a juror is impartial only
if he can lay aside his opinion and render a verdict based
on the evidence presented in court is a question of
federal law, see Irvin, supra, at 723: whether a juror can
in fact do that is a determination to which habeas courts
owe special deference.
Cf. Marshall v. Lonberger, supra,
at __ (849) (similar analysis as to whether a guilty plea
was voluntary) •
See also Reynolds v. United States, 98
u.s. 145, 156 (1879).
Footnote(s) 12 will appear on following pages.

20.

Second,

the

determination

is

essentially

one

of

~411l ....., .~~ ~

credibility, and therefore o f d ek

anor.

1\

on
such

numerous

occasions,

questions

is

"special deference."

the

trial

entitled,

even

As we have said

court's
on

resolution of

direct

appeal,

to

E.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union

of u.s., Inc., _ _ u.s.

--I

__

(1984)

(slip op. at 14).

~.· /e:L•'4c.~

The respect paid such findings in a habeas proceeding 4 can
be no less.

See Marshall v. Lonberger,

(103 s.ct. 843, 851)

u.s.

_/

--

(1983). 13

12 Accord In re Application of National Broadcasting
~, 653 F.2d 609, 617 (CADC 1981)
("[V]oir dire has long
been recognized as an effective method of rooting out such
bias,
especially
when
conducted
in
a
careful and
thoroughgoing manner."); United States v. Duncan, 598 F.2d
839, 865 (CA4), cert. denied, 444 u.s. 871 (1979); Calley
v. Callaway, 519 F. 2d 184, 209, n. 45 (CAS 197 5) (en bane)
(citing cases), cert. denied, 425 u.s. 911 (1976) . ...... ,._,~
A sensitively conducted voir dire 1• almo.&t aJ.wars..('~
adequate
to
uncover
juror
bias caused
by pretrial ~
publicity.
Cf. Smith v. Phillips, 455 u.s. 209, 222, and
n.
* (1982) (0 'CONNOR, J. , concurring) (describing
situations in which state procedures are inadequate to
uncover bias); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 u.s. 723 (1963)
(same).
13 In

addition to the fact that a large part of
determining
whether
a
jury
is
biased
depends
on
credibility, demeanor plays a fundamental role in simply
understanding what a potential juror is saying.
Any
complicated voir dire calls upon laymen to think and
express themselves in unfamiliar terms, as a reading of
any transcript of such a proceeding wi 11 reveal.
The
Footnote continued on next page.
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YOUNT21 SALLY-POW
This is not unusually on voir dire examination,
particularly in a highly publicized criminal case.

It is

well to remember that the lay persons on the panel may
never have been subjected to the experience of the type of
leading questions and cross examination tactics that
frequently are routine, and that were
case.

eviden~

in this

Unlike witnesses, prospective jurors have no

~

briefing by lawyers prior to taking the stand# the
~

education and experience of jurors representing a cross

•

section of the community vary widely, and
h

~t

be

expected invariably to express themselves carefully or
even consistently.

Every trial judge understands this,

and under our system it is the

~1

judge who is best

2.

~ew

of the demeanor of

persistency and type of examination by

counse~

--4:fle

~~~~
competency to

ser~~

iffip«rtlally.

The voir dire examination of juror Hrin was

P~~:~scrutiniz~as

he was a member of the jury

~ ~ ~. Lb,,..*-f-c..d...
that convicted the defendant.

We think that the trial

'\

judge's decision to seat Hrin, despite early ambiguity in
his testimony, was confirmed after he initially denied the
challenge for cause.

Defense counsel sought and obtained

permission to resume cross examination.
question whether Hrin could set his

In response to a

21.

Thus the question is whether there is fair support in
the

record

for

the

state

courts'

jurors here would be impartial.

conclusion

See 28

u.s.c.

tRe cali.e of each of the&e- three i\ jurors

ambiguous

and

at

times

contradictory.

that

the

§2254(d).

the testimony

~~~=-~~~~~~--~~

6n

the othe

jurors appear to have been subjected to leadin
questions

and

cross-examination

dislodge casually held views.

tactics
designed
~Ld't~
That &Rey gav ~a variety o

answers is not surprising, given that they were unprepare
discuss the topic and had not, as witnesses often have,

jurors are asked whether they have formed an "opinion" on
a subject; on what basis it was formed; how fixed it is;
and, most important, what the effect of it would be on
their ability to judge a proceeding of which they have
only the vaguest understanding.
See generally Irvin v.
Dowd, 366 u.s., at 722-723.
They will often be confused
about what information is being sought, and how to find
and articulate it. Moreover, they may be required swiftly
to understand and apply legal standards and presumptions
that
are
new
to
them--such
as
the
presumption of
innocence, or the rule that a defendant may not be
penalized for exercise of his right not to testify.
The
result often is a record rife with awkward utterances that
can appear in print to be contradictory or to have
meanings or legal nuances not intended.
Dealing with such
a record at the appellate or habeas level requires unusual
sensitivity to the role of the trial judge.
Demeanor,
inflection,
the
flow of
the conversation can speak
volumes, and it may be that only those present can fully
understand what the juror means.

22.

thought their "stories" through.

In addition, they appear

to have seen little reason to choose their words carefully
and ensure that their remarks were consistent.

See also

note 13 supra.

The trial judge properly chose to believe

the statements

that

were

the

most

fully

articulated

that appeared to have been least influenced by leading.
In the case of juror Hrin,

the

or

j

judge's understanding

of the ambiguous testimony appears to have been confirmed
after

he

denied

defense

~op1nion

the challenge

counsel's

question

for

cause.

whether

Hr in

In answer
could

aside before entering the jury box or

evidence

to

change

forthrightly stated,

his

mind,

juror

his

would ~:{;"' t
clearly

and

"I think I could enter it [the jury

box] with a very open mind.
To say this

the

set

to

I think I could very easily.

is a requirement for

have to do every day."

some of the things you
t:Jt~~~-t~~
App. 89a • ...\ )(efense counsel did not
~

renew their challenge for cause.

Similarly,

in the case

of alternate juror Pyott, we cannot fault the trial judge
for crediting her

earliest

testimony,

in which she said

that she could put her opinion aside "if

[she]

had to,"

rather than the later testimony in which defense counsel
persuaded her

that

logically she would need evidence to

discard any opinion she might have.

App. 246a, 250a-252a.

23.

-L

IU~
AAfllror

Chincharick's

~

bQc~ ~

testimony

is

the

most

ambiguous,
L

t

he appears to have answered "yes" to almost

question put to him.

~
any ~

It is here that the federal court's

deference must operate, for while the cold record arouses
some concern,

only

the trial

judge could tell which of

these answers was said with the greatest comprehension and
certainty.

IV

We

conclude

that

the

voir

dire

testimony

and

the

record of publicity do not reveal the kind of "wave of
public

passion"

impossible

that

~fo~~the

would

have

made

a

fair

trial

jury as a whole that was empanelled.

We also conclude""" that the ambiguity in the testimony of
the

cited

insufficient

jurors

who

to overcome

were
the

challenged

for

cause

is

presumption of correctness

owed to the trial court's findings.

We therefore reverse.

It is so ordered.

JUSTICE MARSHALL took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.

•
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MEMORANDUM
DATE:

TO:

Joe

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

April 6, 1984

83-95 Patton v. Yount
I commend you on an excellent draft opinion.
My editing,

including the several riders, does

not significantly change your analysis.
I

think,

It is important,

not to rest the case entirely on the four year

interval.

Our

opinion

should be written

in a

way

that

affords guidance in cases where there have not been second
trials.
I

have

read

merits a footnote.
795-796 of

Murphy

v.

Florida,

and

think

it

As pointed out particularly on pages

the opinion,

it is not easy to think of any

more pervasive and damaging publicity than what preceded
~e

trial of "Murph the Surf".

as we have agreed,

The principal distinction,

is that a much smaller percentage of

the original panel was excused,

and ~mbers of the
~ ~~e.~

that were collected apparently were less ambiguous.
t1

jury

.:::ac.c.-44• 4fi""S. •
But

see WJB's dissent.
You will not be surprised to have me say that I
wish the draft were no so long.

I have not identified any

2.
f

specific part
draft,

bear

marginal

that
in

should

mind

language

-

the

be omitted.
desirability

particularly

in

the

In reworking the
of

eliminating

footnotes.

example, what you have said in footnote 13 is true.
marginal,

however,

and

either

should

reduced or omitted.

L.F.P., Jr.

ss

be

For
It is

substantially

....

·.

'

...

,.

..,

"

.
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MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL
From:

Re:

Joe
83-95 Patton v. Yount

~~~~

Here is a second draft of the opinion in this case.
made one significant substantive change

(p.

16-17)

I have

and a number

of stylistic and condensing revisions.
Pp. 1-8--I have considerably shortened the discussion of the
facts.
The primary changes are ( 1) I deleted, as you suggested,
the detailed description of Yount's appearance at the police station (pp. 1-2--I also added a new sentence about the police refusal to divulge the confession), and (2) I condensed the description of the Court of Appeals decision (pp. 5-7).
P. 9,

~

1--I edited your rider slightly.

P. 11, .n. 7--In addition to movil'!9 into a note the extended quotation of juror Karetski 's testimOny (as ' you suggested}, I have
cut it s~stant ~ally.
I did so wit? some misgivings, ~owev~r,
since the deleted part of the quotat1on supports our bas1c po1nt
that the publicity and public 1nterest were minimal at the time
of the second trial.
The first draft of the opinion with the
full quote on p. 13 is attached so you can compare the two.
P. 12, n. 8--This note is also new.

q~

P. 13, ,f 1--At the end of the carryover
tence that "the passage of time rebuts
tiality."
This statement of the holding
14, last sentence, so I have deleted the

paragraph I had a senany presumption of parnow is repeated on page
one here.

P. 13, ~ 2--This paragraph previously began, "The majority opinion below thought ••• " I altered it b~cause opiniop~ csm 't think_....

1 L

~ ~ A!/1-Pf.~ ~~~r ·~ ~~ ..

P. 14, 1. 2--Can we delete the word "vividly"? It seems to cut
the wrong way for us. Hew aee~::It' ~~e"~JebeaEil-2
P. 14, n. 11--Here is the new footnote on Murphy. ~~~~
Pp. 16-17 & n. 12--In addition to some stylistic editing, I have
deleted all reference to the amendment of §2254 in 1966.
I have
given the question some more thought, and done some more research
in the area.
The 1966 amendments essentially codified the detailed guidelines this Court provided in Townsend v. Sain, 372
u.s. 293 (1963). See Brewer v. Williams, 430 u.s. 387, 395
(1977).
Townsend of course also came after Irvin, but it does
not appear to have changed prior law on how one tells whether a
question is one of fact or law, and on the general question of

--------~--------------~--------------------------------~--------~~~page

z.

t+~~ftY

;~t:f~boi~

deference to state court determinatio s of factual findings.
These appear to have been embedded in the law since at least
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
11 that the 1966 amendments might be said to have done is to n ve clarified and emphasized a preexisting doctrine.
In short, it seems unlikely that
the Court could rely on those amendments o abandon Irvin's view
iliat federal courts independently examine
ir dire testimony.

tJ1<)

~
·
Nevertheless, I still think that CA3~6¥~~~~~~~wrong
1n
not defering to the trial court's finding that the jury as a
whole was impartial.
I think the best way to make this point is
to suggest that CA3 may have misinterpreted Irvin.
CA3 largely
ignored the language in Irvin about the 'manifest error" standard
of review.
366 u.s., at 723. While it fs true, ~ believe, that
the Court in Irvin does not mention that standard again in discussing the facts of the case before it, it plainly stated that
the trial court's determination as to whether firm opinions could
be set aside were to be reviewed under that standard.
At any
rate, the basic thrust of footnote 12 in this draft is to suggest
that the federal courts give aeference to all state cou"~-rndimpartla 1 ty,
se
1rect:e
at a particular
o
no hold this at this point, however, primarily
b=cause I am not sure that the "group bias" question should be
termed a question of fact. ;Jt.c:;.-y- ~ J, ~ 1..T t.••~ ~~-£- ~
a.... k,..,U& ~ ~
If you disagree with the above and wls~ ~- have some reference to the 1966 amendments, I have suggested in the a~~~he9
rider language to add to the beginning of note 12. ~ ~ ~~J

l

I

~-~- ~n.u,. ?LI)

P. 17, n. 13--I have added a parenthetical to the Reynolds cite.
P. 18, n. 14--In the first draft we had the following sentence
preceding the cite to Phillips:
"A sensitively conducted voir
dire should be adequate to uncover juror bias caused by pretrial
publicity."
I deleted the sentence because I think it merely
repeated what was already said in text.
In addition, I made the
signal "But cf." instead of "Cf."
P. 19, n. 15--I have condensed this footnote.

Fp. 19-20--In addition to stylistic editing and some rearrange/ ment of sentences, I added the final sentence of the carryover
· ~ paragraph. Also, I have done some stylistic editing of the first
sentence of the following paragraph.
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Insert to

ote 12--Patton v. Yount

Irvin w s decided five years before the relevant
language was added to the federal habeas corpus statute,
see Pub. L. 89-711, 80 Stat. 1105, and before this Court's
opinion in T wnsend v. Sain, 372 u.s. 293 (1963), provided
the guideli s that were later codified.
In view of what
we have said in Part II, su
we RQQQ ROt consider
whether the ~~ develoPt of t e law of habeas corpus
would have r quired a di erent result in Irvin.
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MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL
From:
Re:

d.•'"<.

~J;;;_.(...

Joe
No. -83-95 Patton v. Yount

Cammie has now cite-checked this opinion, and David and Rob
have

had

a

look

at

Aside

it.

from

minor

stylistic

or

citechecking alterations, the changes are as follows:
P. 1--David thought the marked sentence was somewhat gruesome and
irrelevant.
I included it only to suggest why it might have been
that the authorities lodged a charge of rape.
Perhaps David is
right.

5-6-~ob

suggested that we emphasize the "manifest error"
standard of review here, briefly describe Irvin, and clearly
state our holding.
Cammie likewise suggested that footnote 12,
which in essence discusses the standard of review to be used in
part II, seemed out of place at the beginning of part III.
Finally, David suggested that instead of merely distinguishing
Irvin we suggest that the Court of Appeals applied that case too
mechanistically--rather than look at the totality of the circumstances, it looked only to the three factors considered at length
in Irvin.
These suggestions seem sound to me.
I propose that
the beginning of this paragraph be rewritten as follows:
Pp.

INSERT "A"
As noted,

the Court of Appeals rested its decision

that the jury was not impartial on this Court's decision in Irvin v. Dowd, supra.

That decision, a leading

one at the time, held that adverse pretrial publicity
can create such a presumption of prejudice in a community that the jurors' claims that they can be impartial
should not be believed.
number of factors
of

in determining whether the totality

the circumstances

Court noted,

The Court in Irvin reviewed a

however,

raised

such

a

presumption.

The

that the trial court's findings

~

~

page 2.

of impartiality might be overturned only for "manifest ...J..
dA.d., ~ ~ ~,. '--terror."
366 u.s., at 723.
The Court of Appeals.t\ ~
~

this

aspect of

the court below,
cussed

at

length

the

Irvin decision. 7

Moreover,

in concentrating on the factors disin

Irvin,

failed

to

give

adequate

weight to other significant circumstances in this case.
In Irvin, the Court noted that it was during the six or

., -

seven months •.••
The next three sentences would be as they appear in the current chambers draft (they have been somewhat rewritten for style
and clarity). Then the following sentence would be inserted:
INSERT "B"
In

these circumstances,

we hold

that the trial court

did not commit manifest error in finding that the jury
as a whole was impartial.

The current footnote 12 would be moved to here, rewritten as
follows:
INSERT "C"
7The Court of Appeals appears to have thought that
two statements in Irvin--that a federal court must "independently evaluate" the voir dire testimony, and that
the question of juror partiality is a mixed question of
law and fact, 366 u.s., at 723--meant that there is no
presumption of correctness owed to the trial court's
finding that a jury as a whole is impartial.
We note
that Irvin was decided five years before Congress added
to the habeas corpus statute an explicit presumption of
correctness for state court factual findings, see Pub.
L. 89-711, 80 Stat. 1105-1106, and two years before
this Court's opinion in Townsend v. Sain, 372 u.s. 293
(1963) , provided the guidelines that were later codified.
It may be that there is little practical difference between the Irvin "manifest error" standard and
the "fairly supported by the record" standard of the
amended habeas statute.
See 28 u.s.c. §2254(d).
In
any case, we do not think the habeas standard is any
less stringent.
Since we uphold the state court's
findings in this case under Irvin's "manifest error"

'

.

~

.

.

..
page 3.

standard, we do not need to determine whether the subsequent development of the law of habeas corpus might
have required a different analysis or result in that

case~

Pp. 8-9--I wonder how persuasive the point made in the carryover~~
sentence is.
Cammie pointed out that Yount's counsel evidently ~
were not satisfied, oecause they continued to seek changes of
~
venue during and after voir dire.
P. 9, ,I 2--The second sentence of
"The court noted that the intensity
the subsequent references to the
local memories."
Cammie tho~_9ht
agreed.
I have deleted it. t)f\

this paragraph used to read,
of the original publicity and
case firmly implanted it in
this was repetitious, and I

In the seventh sentence of this paragraph I had the printer
set a version that Cammie suggested.
In view of the changes I
suggest on pages 5-6 above, I think the original language was
better, so I have written back in what we had before.
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To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice .White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
From:

Justice Powell
APR 12 1984

Circulated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
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1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No . 83-95

ERNEST S. PATTON, SUPERINTENDENT, SCI-CAMP
HILL AND LEROY S. ZIMMERMAN, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF PENNSYLVANIA, PETITIONERS v.
JON E. YOUNT
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
[April -

, 1984]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case brings before us a claim that pretrial publicity so
infected a state criminal trial as to deny the defendant his
Sixth Amendment right to an "impartial jury."
I
On April 28, 1966, the body of Pamela Rimer, an 18-yearold high school student, was found in a wooded area near her
home in Luthersburg, Clearfield County, Pennsylvania.
There were numerous wounds about her head and cuts on her
throat and neck. An autopsy revealed that she died of strangulation when blood from her wounds was drawn into her
lungs. The autopsy showed no indication that she had been
sexually assaulted.
At about 5:45 a. m. the following morning, respondent
Yount appeared at the State Police Substation in nearby DuBois. Yount, who had been the victim's high school mathematics teacher, proceeded to give the police oral and written
confessions to the murder. The police refused to release the
confession to the press, and it was not published until after it
was read at Yount's arraignment three days later. Ex.
P1-a, P1-d. At his trial in 1966, the confessions were admitted into evidence. Yount took the stand and claimed tempo-
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rary insanity. The jury convicted him of first-degree murder and rape, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment.
On direct appeal the Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined that under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966),
police had given Yount inadequate notice of his right to an
attorney prior to his confession. The court remanded for a
new trial. Commonwealth v. Yount, 435 Pa. 276, 256 A. 2d
464 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U. S. 925 (1970).
Prior to the second trial in 1970, the trial court ordered
suppression of Yount's written confessions and that portion
of the oral confession that was obtained after he was legally
in custody. The prosecution dismissed the rape charge.
There followed an extensive voir dire that is now at the heart
of this case. Jury selection began on November 4, 1970, and
took ten days, seven jury panels, 292 veniremen, and 1186
pages of testimony. Yount moved for a change of venue before, and several times during, the voir dire. He argued
that the widespread dissemination of prejudicial information
could not be eradicated from the minds of potential jurors,
and cited in support the difficulty of the voir dire and numerous newspaper and other articles about the case. The motions were denied. The trial court noted that the articles
merely reported events without editorial comment; that the
length of the voir dire resulted in part from the court's leniency in allowing examinations and challenges of the jurors;
that "almost all, if not all," the jurors seated had "no prior or
present fixed opinion"; and that there had been "little, if any,
talk in public" between the two trials. The court also observed that the voir dire of the second trial had been sparsely
attended.
Ultimately, twelve jurors and two alternates were seated.
At the second trial, Yount did not take the stand and did not
claim temporary insanity. Instead .he relied upon crossexamination and character witnesses in an attempt to undermine the State's proof of his intent. The jury convicted him
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again of first-degree murder, and he was resentenced to life
imprisonment. The trial court denied a motion for a new
trial, finding that practically no publicity had been given to
the case between the two trials, and that little public interest
was shown during the second trial. In addition, the court
concluded that the jury was without bias. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court affii.nled the conviction and the trial court's
findings. Commonwealth v. Yount, 455 Pa. 303, 311-314,
314 A. 2d 242, 247-248 (1974).
In January 1981, Yount filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in United States District Court. He claimed, inter
alia, that his conviction had been obtained in violation of his
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial by an
impartial jury. The case was assigned to a magistrate, who
conducted a hearing and recommended that the petition be
granted. The District Court rejected the magistrate's recommendation. 537 F. Supp. 873 (W. D. Pa. 1982). It held
that the pretrial publicity was not vicious, excessive, nor officially sponsored, and that the jurors were able to set aside
any preconceived notions of guilt. It noted that the percentage of jurors excused for cause was "not remarkable to anyone familiar with the difficulty in selecting a homicide jury in
Pennsylvania." I d., at 882. In addition, the court reviewed
the instances in which the state trial court had denied a challenge for cause, and upheld the trial court's view that the
jury was impartial.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. 710
F. 2d 956 (1983). The court relied primarily on the analysis
set out in Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U. S. 717 (1961), and found that
pretrial publicity had made a fair trial impossible in
Clearfield County. It independently examined the nature of
the publicity surrounding the second trial, the testimony at
voir dire of the venire as a whole, and the voir dire testimony
of the jurors eventually seated. The publicity revealed
Yount's prior conviction for murder, his confession, and his
prior plea of temporary insanity, information not admitted
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into evidence at trial. 1 The voir dire showed that all but two
of 163 veniremen questioned about the case 2 had heard of it,
and that, 126, or 77%, admitted they would carry an opinion
into the jury box. This was a higher percentage than in
Irvin, where 62% of the 430 veniremen were dismissed for
cause becaus~ they had fixed opinions concerning the petitioner's guilt. FinallY, the Court of Appeals found that eight
of the fourteen jurors and alternates actually seated admitted
that they at some time had formed an opinion as to Yount's
guilt. 3 The court thought that many of the jurors had given
equivocal responses when asked whether they could set aside
these opinions, and that one juror, a Mr. Hrin, and both alternates would have required evidence to overcome their beliefs. The court concluded that "despite their assurances of
impartiality, the jurors could not set aside their opinions and
render a verdict based solely on the evidence presented."
710 F. 2d, at 972. •
'The Court of Appeals rejected as without fair support in the record the
trial court's conclusion that there was practically no publicity given to the
case between the first and second trials. See 710 F. 2d, at 969, n. 21.
The federal court suggested that the record on habeas of the publicity after
the first trial and during the second was more complete than the record
considered by the trial court. Ibid.
The Court of Appeals also suggested that the trial court's view that
there was little talk in public concerning the second trial was undermined
by the voir dire testimony that there had been public discussion of the case,
particularly in the last weeks before retrial. I d. , at 969, n. 22. The court
discounted, as of limited significance, the trial court's point that few spectators had attended the trial, since Yount did not allege prejudice arising
from the "'circus atmosphere' " in the courtroom. Ibid.
2
One hundred twenty-five of the original 292 veniremen were excused
because they had not been chosen properly. Four others were dismissed
for cause before they were questioned on the case.
a The Court of Appeals noted that in Irvin eight of twelve jurors had
formed opinions of guilt.
•Judge Stern wrote a separate concurring opinion in which he suggested
that "the constitutional standard which for 175 years has guided the lower
courts" in this area be rejected. 710 F. 2d, at 972. Rather than hinge
disqualification of a juror on whether he has a fixed opinion of guilt that he
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Judge Garth concurred in the judgment. He declined to
join the court's view that actual prejudice on the part of the
jury might be inferred from pretrial publicity and the answers at voir dire of veniremen not selected for the jury. He
wrote that "[a] thorough and skillfully conducted voir dire
should be adequate to identify juror bias, even in a community saturated with puolicity adverse to the defendant." /d.,
at 979. 5 Judge Garth nevertheless concurred because in his
view juror Hrin stated at voir dire that he would have required evidence to change his mind about Yount's guilt.
This stripped the defendant of the presumption of
innocence. 6
We granted certiorari,-- U. S. - - (1983), to consider,
in the context of this case, the problem of pervasive media
publicity that now arises so frequently in the trial of sensational criminal cases. We reverse the judgment of the Court
of Appeals.
II

As noted, the Court of Appeals rested its decision that the
jury was not impartial on this Court's decision in Irvin v.
cannot lay aside, Judge Stern would bar any juror who admitted any opinion as to guilt. Moreover, no jury could be empanelled where more than
25% of the veniremen state that they held an opinion concerning the defendant's guilt. This would raise such doubts as to the sincerity of those
who claimed no opinion as to suggest concealed bias, Judge Stern wrote.
6
Judge Garth thought Irvin was distinguishable, because there ''the
trial court (which itself questioned the jurors challenged for cause) did not
engage in a searching and thorough voir dire." 710 F. 2d, at 979.
Rather, it merely credited the jurors' subjective opinions that each could
render an impartial verdict notwithstanding his or her opinion. Judge
Garth also noted that Yount challenged for cause only three of the actual
jurors. In Irvin, the defendant challenged each of his twelve jurors for
cause. Irvin v. Dowd, 359 U. S. 394, 398 (1959).
•Judge Garth stated that whether juror Hrin was unconstitutionally biased was a mixed question of law and fact under Irvin. 710 F. 2d, at 981.
He therefore did not apply the presumption of correctness that is applicable to the factual findings of a state court in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d).
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Dowd, supra.

That decision, a leading one at the time, held
that adverse pretrial publicity can create such a presumption
of prejudice in a community that the jurors' claims that they
can be impartial should not be believed. The Court in Irvin
reviewed a number of factors in determining whether the totality of the circumstances raised such a presumption. The
Court noted, however, that the trial court's findings of
impartiality might be overturned only for "manifest error."
366 U. S., at 723. The Court of Appeals did not address this
aspect of the Irvin decision. 7 Moreover, the court below, in
concentrating on the factors discussed at length in Irvin,
failed to give adequate weight to other significant circumstances in this case. In Irvin, the Court observed that it
was during the six or seven months immediately preceding
trial that "a barrage of newspaper headlines, articles, cartoons and pictures was unleashed against [the defendant]."
366 U. S., at 725: In this case, the extensive adverse publicity and the community's sense of outrage were at their height
prior to Yount's first trial in 1966. The jury selection for
Yount's second trial, at issue here, did not occur until four
years later, at a time when prejudicial publicity was greatly
7
The Court of Appeals appears to have thought that two statements in
/rtrin--that a federal court must "independently evaluate" the voir dire
testimony, and that the question of juror partiality is a mixed question of
law and fact, 366 U. S., at 723-meant that there is no presumption of correctness owed to the trial court's finding that a jury as a whole is impartial.
We note that Irtrin was decided five years before Congress added to the
habeas corpus statute an explicit presumption of correctness for state court
factual findings, see Pub. L. 89-711, 80 Stat. 1105-1106, and two years before this Court's opinion in Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293 (1963), provided the guidelines that were later codified. It may be that there is little
practical difference between the Irtrin ''manifest error" standard and the
''fairly supported by the record" standard of the amended habeas statute.
See 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d). In any case, we do not think the habeas standard is any less stringent. Since we uphold the state court's findings in this
case under Irtrin's ''manifest error" standard, we do not need to determine
whether the subsequent development of the law of habeas corpus might
have required a different analysis or result in that case.

·'
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diminished and community sentiment had softened. In
these circumstances, we hold that the trial court did not commit manifest error in finding that the jury as a whole was
impartial.
The record reveals that in the year and a half from the reversal of the first conviction to .the start of the second voir
dire each of the two ·etearfield County daily newspapers published an average of less than one article per month. App.
642a--657a; Ex. P1-v to P1-kk, P-2. More important, many
of these were extremely brief announcements of the trial
dates and scheduling such as are common in rural newspapers. E. g., Ex. P1-ff, P1-ii, P1-jj. The transcript of the
voir dire contains numerous references to the sparse publicity and minimal public interest prior to the second trial.
E. g., App. 43a, 98a, 100a; Tr. 27-28, 90, 191, 384, 771, 829,
1142. It is true that during the voir dire the newspapers
published articles on an almost daily basis, but these too were
purely factual articles generally discussing not the crime or
prior prosecution, but the prolonged process of jury selection. App. 658a--671a. In short, the record of publicity in
the months preceding, and at the time of, the second trial
does not reveal the "barrage of inflammatory publicity immediately prior to trial," Murphy v. Florida, 421 U. S. 794, 798
(1975), amounting to a "huge ... wave of public passion,"
Irvin, supra, at 728, that the Court found in Irvin.
The voir dire testimony revealed that this lapse in time had
a profound effect on the community and, more important, on
the jury, in softening or effacing opinion. Many veniremen,
of course, simply had let the details of the case slip from their
mind. E. g., App. 194a; Tr. 33,284, 541-544, 991. In addition, while it is true that a number of jurors and veniremen
testified that at one time they had held opinions, for many,
time had weakened or eliminated any conviction they had
had. See, e. g., App. 98a-100a (juror number 7), 128a (juror
number 8); Tr. 384--385, 398-399, 831, 897 (semble),

·'
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1075-1076, 1144; see also App. 164a-166a (juror number 10). 8
The same is true of the testimony of the jurors and veniremen who were seated late in the process and therefore were
subjected to some of the articles and broadcasts disseminated
daily during the voir dire 9: the record suggests that their
passions had not be~n_inflamed nor their thoughts biased by
8

The testimony of juror number seven, Martin Karetski, during examination by defense counsel is illustrative:
"Q. You have heard the matter discussed over the years?
"A. In the past few years I haven't heard too much about it.
"Q. In 1966 when the matter came up before you knew about it then?
"A. Yes sir.
"Q. And just recently when this matter was coming up again, I
presume?
"A. What I have read in the paper again.
"Q. And you have heard other people discuss it?
"A. Not too many so far.
"Q. You have heard other people express opinions about it?
"A. Not too many of those so far too.
"Q. Back around '66, did you?
"A. Yes in '66.

! "Q. . .. I assume you had an opinion as to [Mr. Yount's] guilt or innocence [in 1966]?
"A. I had an opinion yes.
"Q. Do you have a opinion today as to his guilt or innocence?
"A. It's been a long time ago and I'm not sure now. It was in the paper
he plead [sic] not guilty.
"Q. Let me ask you this then. In case you do have an opinion, could you
wipe it out of your mind-erase it out of your mind before you would take a
seat in the jury box and hear whatever evidence you might hear?
"A. As it is right now I have no opinion now-four or five years ago I
probably did but right now I don't.
"Q. What happened Mr. Karetski, between then and now to eliminate
that opinion if you can tell me?
"A. Well, as far as I'm concerned there wasn't much in the paper about
it and it sort of slipped away from thought." App. 98a-100a.
•Jurors were sequestered as they were chosen.
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the publicity. E. g., App. 176a-177a, 150a-151a; Tr. 771,
959, 1027.
That time soothes and erases is a perfectly natural phenomenon, familiar to all. See Irvin v. Dowd, 271 F. 2d 552,
561 (CA7 1959) (Duffy, J., dissenting) (A continuance should
have been granted be_gause "[t]he passage of time is a great
healer," and public prejudice might have "subsid[ed]."),
rev'd, 366 U. S. 717 (1961); see also Murphy, supra, at 802;
Beck v. Washington, 369 U. S. 541, 556 (1962). Not all
members of the venire had put aside earlier prejudice, as the
voir dire disclosed. They retained their fixed opinions, and
were disqualified. But. the testimony suggests that the voir
dire resulted in selecting those who had forgotten or would
need to be persuaded again. 10
The Court of Appeals below thought that the fact that the
great majority of veniremen "remembered the case" showed
that time had not served "to erase highly unfavorable publicity from the memory of the community." 710 F. 2d, at 969.
This conclusion, without more, is essentially irrelevant. The
relevant question is not whether the community remembered
the case, but whether the jurors at Yount's trial had such
fixed opinions that they could not judge impartially the guilt
of the defendant. Irvin, supra, at 723. It is not unusual
As noted, the voir dire in this case was particularly extensive. It took
10 days to pick 14 jurors from 167 veniremen. In Irvin it took 8 days to
pick 14 jurors from 430 veniremen.
Contrary to Judge Garth's surmise, 710 F. 2d, at 979, however, the voir
dire interviews quoted in the petitioner's brief in Irvin do not appear to be
significantly less probing than those here. See Brief for Petitioner in
Irvin v. Dowd, 0. T. 1960, No. 41, pp. 18-59. It should also be noted that
the voir dire in Irvin, like that here, was conducted largely by counsel for
each side, rather than the judge. The only significant difference in the
procedures followed here and in Irvin is that the veniremen here were
brought into the courtroom alone for questioning, while it appears that
those in Irvin were questioned in front of all those remaining in the panel.
This is not an insubstantial distinction, as the Court suggested in Irvin,
supra, at 728, but we do not find it controlling.
10

..
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that one's recollection of the fact that a notorious crime was
committed lingers long after the feelings of revulsion that
create prejudice have passed. It would be fruitless to attempt to identify any particular lapse of time that in itself
would distinguish the situation that existed in lrvin. 11 But it
is clear that the passage of time between a first and a second
trial can be a highly .relevant fact. In the circumstances of
this case, we hold that it clearly rebuts any presumption of
partiality or prejudice that existed at the time of the initial
trial. There was fair, even abundant, support for the trial
court's findings that between the two trials of this case there
had been "practically no publicity given to this matter
through the news media," and that there had not been "any
great effect created by any publicity." App. 268a, 265a.

III
Yount briefly argues here that juror Hrin, as well as the
two alternates, were erroneously seated over his challenges
for cause. Brief for Respondent 32. There is substantial
doubt whether Yount properly raised in his petition for habeas corpus the claim that the trial court erroneously denied
his challenge for cause to juror Hrin. Compare 710 F. 2d, at
966, n. 18, with id., at 977, and n. 4 (Garth, J., concurring).
And there is no evidence that the alternate jurors, who did
not sit in judgment, actually talked with the other jurors during the four-day trial. But Judge Garth in the court below
based his concurrence on the view that Hrin would have required Yount to produce evidence to overcome his inclination
to think the accused was guilty, and the majority of the panel
11
In Murphy v. Florida, 421 U. S. 794 (1974), the defendant-widely
known as "Murph the Surf"-relied heavily on Irvin. The record of damaging publicity preceding his trial was at least as extreme as that in this
case. Nevertheless, we found the record there distinguishable from Irvin.
We noted that the extensive publication of news articles about Murphy
largely had ceased some seven months before the jury was selected. I d.,
at 802. Murphy involved a lapse in publicity prior to the defendant's first
trial; there was no second trial in that case.

..
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thought that the four-day association between the alternates
and the other jurors "operate[d] to subvert the requirement
that the jury's verdict be based on evidence developed from
the witness stand," id., at 971, n. 25. Therefore, we will
consider briefly the claims as to all three jurors.
It was the view of all three Court of Appeals judges that
the question wheth'e r jurors have opinions that disqualify
them is a mixed question of law and fact. See 710 F. 2d, at
968, n. 20, 981. Thus, they concluded that the presumption
of correctness due a state court's factual findings under 28
U. S. C. § 2254(d) does not apply. The opinions below relied
for this proposition on Irvin v. Dowd, supra, at 723. Irvin
addressed the partiality of the trial jury as a whole, a question we discuss in Part II, supra. We do not think its analysis can be extended to a federal habeas corpus case in which
the partiality of an individual juror is placed in issue. That
question is not one of mixed law and fact. Rather it is
plainly one of historical fact: did a juror swear that he could
set aside any opinion he might hold and decide the case on the
evidence, and should the juror's protestation of impartiality
have been believed. Cf. Rushen v. Spain,-- U.S.--,
- - (1983) (state court determination that jury's deliberations were not biased by ex parte communications is a finding
of fact). 12
There are good reasons to apply the statutory presumption
of correctness to the trial court's resolution of these ques12

There are, of course, factual and legal questions to be considered in deciding whether a juror is qualified. The constitutional standard that a juror is impartial only if he can lay aside his opinion and render a verdict
based on the evidence presented in court is a question of federal law, see
Irvin, supra, at 723; whether a juror can in fact do that is a determination
to which habeas courts owe special deference. Cf. Marshall v. Lonberger,
459 U. S. 422, 431-432 (1983) (similar analysis as to whether a guilty plea
was voluntary). See also Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145, 156
(1879) (whether a juror should be disqualified is a question involving both a
legal standard and findings of fact, which may be set aside only for manifest error).
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tions. First, the determmation has been made only after an
often extended voir dire proceeding designed specifically to
identify biased veniremen. It is fair to assume that the
method we have relied on since the beginning, e. g., United
States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 51 (C. C. D. Va. 1807) (Marshall, C. J.), usually works. 13 Second, the determination is
essentially one of credibility, and therefore largely one of demeanor. As we have said on numerous occasions, the trial
court's resolution of such questions is entitled, even on direct
appeal, to "special deference." E. g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U. S., Inc., - - U. S. - - , - - (1984).
The respect paid such findings in a habeas proceeding certainly can be no less. See Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U. S.
422, 434435 (1983). 14
Thus the question is whether there is fair support in the
record for the state courts' conclusion that the jurors here
would be impartial. See 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(8). The testimony of each of the three challenged jurors is ambiguous and
at times contradictory. This is not unusual on voir dire
examination, particularly in a highly publicized criminal case.
It is well to remember that the lay persons on the panel may
never have been subjected to the type of leading questions
11
Accord In reApplication of National Broadcasting Co., 653 F. 2d 609,
617 (CADC 1981) ("[V]oir dire has long been recognized as an effective
method of rooting out such bias, especially when conducted in a careful and
thoroughgoing manner."); United States v. Duncan, 598 F. 2d 839, 865
(CA4), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 871 (1979); Calley v. Callaway, 519 F. 2d
184, 209, n. 45 (CA5 1975) (en bane) (citing cases), cert. denied, 425 U. S.
911 (1976). But cf. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U. S. 209, 222, and n. * (1982)
(O'CONNOR, J., concurring) (describing situations in which state procedures are inadequate to uncover bias); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U. S. 723
(1963) (same).
•• Demeanor plays a fundamental role not only in determining juror credibility, but also in simply understanding what a potential juror is saying.
Any complicated voir dire calls upon lay persons to think and express
themselves in unfamiliar terms, as a reading of any transcript of such a
proceeding will reveal. Demeanor, inflection, the flow of the questions
and answers can make confused and conflicting utterances comprehensible.
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and cross-examination tactics that frequently are employed,
and that were evident in this case. Prospective jurors represent a cross-section of the community, and their education
and experience vary widely. Also, unlike witnesses, prospective jurors have had no briefing by lawyers prior to taking the stand. Juror~ thus cannot be expected invariably to
express themselves carefully or even consistently. Every
trial judge understands this, and under our system it is that
judge who is best situated to determine competency to serve
impartially. The trial judge properly may choose to believe
those statements that were the most fully articulated or that
appeared to have been least influenced by leading.
The voir dire examination of juror Hrin was carefully scrutinized by the state courts and the federal District Court, as
he was challenged for cause and was a member of the jury
that convicted the defendent. We think that the trial
judge's decision to seat Hrin, despite early ambiguity in his
testimony, was confirmed after he initially denied the challenge. Defense counsel sought and obtained permission to
resume cross-examination. In response to a question
whether Hrin could set his opinion aside before entering the
jury box or would need evidence to change his mind, the juror clearly and forthrightly stated, "I think I could enter it
[the jury box] with a very open mind. I think I could very
easily. To say this is a requirement for some of the things
you have to do every day." App. 89a. Mter this categorical answer, defense counsel did not renew their challenge for
cause. Similarly, in the case of alternate juror Pyott, we
cannot fault the trial judge for crediting her earliest testimony, in which she said that she could put her opinion aside
"[i]f [she] had to," rather than the later testimony in which
defense counsel persuaded her that logically she would need
evidence to discard any opinion she might have. App. 246a,
250a-252a. Alternate juror Chincharick's testimony is the
most ambiguous, as he appears simply to have answered
"yes" to almost any question put to him. It is here that the

·I
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federal court's deference must operate, for while the cold
record arouses some concern, only the trial judge could tell
which of these answers was said with the greatest comprehension and certainty.
IV
We conclude that the voir dire testimony and the record of
publicity do not reveal the kind of "wave of public passion"
that would have made a fair trial unlikely by the jury that
was empanelled as a whole. We also conclude that the ambiguity in the testimony of the cited jurors who were challenged for cause is insufficient to overcome the presumption
of correctness owed to the trial court's findings. We therefore reverse.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE MARSHALL
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 83-95

ERNEST S. PATTON, SUPERINTENDENT, SCI-CAMP
HILL AND LEROY S. ZIMMERMAN, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF PENNSYLVANIA, PETITIONERS v.
JON E. YOUNT
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
[June-, 1984]

JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.
On page 1 of its opinion the Court carefully states certain
facts that give the reader a strong feeling about how this case
should be decided. In 1966, Jon Yount confessed that he
was responsible for the brutal killing of an 18-year-old highschool student. At his first trial in 1966 he testified that he
had been temporarily insane at the time, but the jury did not
believe him. He was found guilty of rape, as well as murder.
These facts were not admissible in evidence at his
ond
trial.
at 1mpact, 1 any, 1 ese ma m1ss1 le acts have
upon 12 jurors, the 2 alternate jurors, and indeed the trial
judge, who listened to the evidence at Yount's second trial in
1970? The Court is satisfied that "community sentiment had
softened," ante, at 7, and that the trial judge "did not commit
manifest error in finding that the jury as a whole was impartial," ante, at 7, because of the passage oftime between 1966
and 1970, and because we all know that "time soothes and
erases," ante, at 9.
In order to explain why I disagree with the Court's assessment of the case, it is necessary to enlarge upon its summary
of the news coverage of the crime and its aftermath, to supplement its discussion of the examination of the jurors, and to
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explain why the Court of Appeals properly rejected the trial
judge's conclusion that the jury as a whole was impartial.
Next, I will discuss my disagreement with the Court's conclusion regarding Juror Hrin. Finally, I shall add a word
about the more profound issue that a case of this kind raises.
I

Because the Court places such great emphasis on the fact
that "this lapse in time had a profound effect on the community and, more important, on the jury, in softening or effacing opinion," ante, at 7, it is important to note that there
were, in effect, three chapters in the relevant news coverage:
the stories about the crime itself and t e first trial in
1966; the stories and events surrounding the State Supreme
Court's reversal of the first conviction in 1969; and the stories
that were published in 1970 immediately before the trial began and while the jury was being selected.
The relevant events all occurred in Clearfield County,
Pennsylvania, where both Yount and the victim lived. It is
a rural county, with a population of about 70,000, served by
two newspapers with a combined circulation of about 25,000.
Not surprisingly, both newspapers gave front-page coverage
to the homicide, the pretrial proceedings and the trial itself.
In numerous editions of the DuBois Courier Express, the
newspaper carried banner headlines on the front page, news
stories and feature articles. App. 520a-641a; Ex. Pl-a,
Pl-b, Pl-d, Pl-f to Pl-t. The Clea eld Progess evaluated
the trial as the o news story of 1966. Ex. P-2. Both
papers reported t at public in ere m the proceedings was
"unprecedented." Yount v. Patton, 710 F. 2d 956, 962 (CA3
1983). Moreover, the case also received radio and television
coverage, see, e. g., Tr. 64 (juror number 1), 142, 220, 277,
and, according to the Court of Appeals, was publicized in outof-state and national publications. 710 F. 2d, at 962, n. 6.
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The articles were extremely detailed. 1 As the Court of
Appeals noted, they "related in full [Yount's] detailed written
confessions as well as his testimony at trial retelling the homicide. They also detailed [Yount's] defense of temporary
insanity, the charge and evidence of rape, and finally
[Yount's] conviction on October 7, 1966, of both rape and
first-degree murder." Id., at 963; see, e. g., App. 538a540a, 603a-606a. As this Court notes, "[T]he extensive adverse publicity and the community's sense of outrage were at
their height prior to Yount's first trial in 1966," ante, at 6.
In 1969, a divided Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed Yount's conviction and ordered a new trial. Commonwealth v. Yount, 435 Pa. 276, 256 A. 2d 464 (1969), cert.
denied, 397 U. S. 925 (1970). This event did not pass unnoticed in Clearfield County. To the contrary, banner headlines announced the reversal. App. 642a; Ex. Pl-v. The
local press reprinted the entire dissenting opinion. App.
644a; Ex. Pl-x. And, as the Court of Appeals stated, "[A]
local radio program became a forum in which callers expressed their hostility to [Yount]." 710 F. 2d, at 963. This
evidence contradicts the easy assumption that "community
sentiment had softened," ante, at 7.
In 1970, Yount was returned to Clearfield County for aretrial in the same courtroom before the same judge who had
presided at the first trial-the judge whose erroneous rulings
had made the second trial necessary. Yount moved for a
change of venue on the ground that the continuing discussion
The "details" of the articles prompted two citizens to write letters to
the Courier Express. One letter complained that the paper had "fanned
the already poisoned atmosphere of malicious gossip" by putting a picture
of the corpse on the front page and by the "repetitive use of gory details."
The author added that he thought he "was looking at the National
Enquirer." The second letter noted that "[e]motional editorializing most
certainly has it's [sic] place in reporting, but I strenuously object to such
when it appears in headline stories . . . . [D]escriptive words that do much
to sell newspapers and stir emotions discredit headline reporting and tend
to prejudice the suspect regardless of degree of guilt." Ex. Pl-€.
1
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of the case among local residents made it impossible for him
to receive a fair trial in Clearfield County. In response the
prosecutor argued that a change of venue would be pointless
because the case had been so widely publicized throughout
the State. The trial court denied the motion, explaining that
the recent newspaper items had consisted of purely factual
reporting "without editorial comment of any kind." App.
260a. This venue ruling generated a front-page article.
App. 654a; Ex. Pl-gg. Additionally, during the subsequent
voir dire, the selection of jurors merited numerous articles
and sometimes merited a profile on the juror selected. App.
658a-659a, 661a-663a, 664a-671a; Ex. Pl-ll, Pl-nn to Pl-vv;
P-2.
The voir dire testimony of one prospective juror, the wife
of a minister, sheds a revelatory light on the character of
local sentiment on the eve of the second trial. After
acknowledging that she had heard many opinions about the
case, she was asked:
"Q. Would your presence in serving as a juror create a
difficulty in your parish?
"A. Why yes-when people heard my name on for
this-countless people of the church have come to me
and said they hoped I would take-the stand I would
take in case I was called. I have had a prejudice built
up from the people in the church.
"Q. Is this prejudice, had it been adverse to Mr.
Yount?
"A. Yes it was. They all say he had a fair trial and he
got a fair sentence. He's lucky he didn't get the chair.

[T]he church people-! haven't asked for any of this
but they discuss it in every group-but they say now
since you are chosen and you will be there we expect you
to follow through-
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"Q. Notwithstanding what the Court would tell you,
you feel you be subject to the retributions or retaliation
of these people"A. I think I would hear about it." App. 25a-27a.
The minister's wife was excused. Her testimony, as well
as that of other veniremen who were excused, not only repudiates the notion that the community had all but forgotten
the Yount case, but also suggests that some veniremen might
have been tempted to understate their recollection of the
case because they felt they had a duty to their neighbors "to
follow through." 2 In all events, the record clearly establishes that the case was still a "cause celebre" in Clearfield
County in 1970.
II
Even if all the voir dire testimony is accepted at face value,
it is difficult to understand how a neutral observer could condude that the jury as a whcle was impartial. Before referring to the 12-Jurors and 2 alternates who were selected, it is
useful to describe the attitude that pervaded the entire
venire.
The jury selection took 10 days. App. 745a; 710 F. 2d, at
963, 975. Out of an original total of 292 veniremen, the court
dismissed 129 because they had been chosen improperly, Tr.
685-686, or had a valid reason for not serving. Tr. 117-118,
492, 1039, 1060-1061. Of the remaining 163 who were questioned, all but 2 had read or heard about the case, Tr.
127a-128a, 370a-371a (juror number 4); all but 42 were dismissed for cause. 710 F. 2d, at 963. Of the 121 dismissed
for cause, 96 testified that they had firm opinions that could
not be changed regardless of what evidence might be presented. Twenty-one others testified that they could only
change their opinion if Yount could convince them to do so.
2

As the Court of Appeals pointed out, another prospective juror testified that his opinion had been erased by the passage of time, but his daughter-in-law testified that he had left for jury duty voicing great animosity
toward Yount. 710 F. 2d, at 964; App. 766a.
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In addition, there were 9 veniremen who were unsuccessfully
challenged for cause who also testified that they had opinions
that they could change only if Yount could convince them to
do so. 3 ld., at 963-964. Thus, as Judge Hunter summarized for the Court of Appeals:
"When we combine those nine with the 117 veniremen
dismissed for cause, we find that a total of 126 out of the
163 veniremen questioned on the case were willing to admit on voir dire that they would carry their opinion[s]
into the jury box." 4 I d., at 964.

Tu~ ~ ffi~{ui.ors who were actually selected, Judge

Hunter~a~curately noted that "the publicity had reached all
but one of the twelve jurors and two alternates finally
empanelled." ld. (footnote omitted); App. 32a, 43a, 71a,
83a, 98a, 120a, 149a, 163a, 176a, 193a, 210a, 235a, 250a. Juror No. 1 noted that "it was pretty hard to be here in
Clearfield County and not read something in the paper"
about the case; that she had read newspaper stories and listened to radio and television stories about the case; and that
she had heard the case being discussed by other people.
App. 32a. Juror No. 2 testified that he had read about the
case in the newspapers; that "[y]ou could hardly miss it on
[radio and televison] news"; and that he had formed an opinion about the case. App. 43a-44a. The person seated as JuThe Court of Appeals added:
"Petitioner peremptorily challenged six of those nine veniremen, one was
seated as a juror, and the remaining two were seated as alternates after
petitioner had exhausted his peremptory challenges." 710 F. 2d, at 964,
n. 13.
• At this point, the Court of Appeals added the following footnote:
"In addition, we note that twelve other veniremen stated that they had had
an opinion at one time but claimed they would not carry it into the jury
box. One of the twelve veniremen was dismissed for cause, six were
peremtorily challenged by petitioner, and five were seated as jurors." 710
F. 2d, at 964, n. 14.
3

\
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ror No. 3 5 stated that he had read about the case in the
newspapers years before the voir dire but that he had not
formed an opinion. App. 210a-211a. Juror No. 4, a newcomer to the area, had never heard of the case. App.
57a-58a. Juror No. 5 "remembered that they said he was
guilty before" and wondered why they were having another
trial. App. 73a. James F. Hrin, Juror No.6, testified that
he had an opinion about the case and that he would require
the presentation of evidence to change it. App. 83a, 85a.
He noted that "[i]t's rather difficult to live in DuBois and get
the paper and find out what people are talking about-at
least the local people without having some opinion or at least
reserving some opinion." App. 88a. Juror No. 7 stated
that he had read about the case; that he had formed an opinion; and that he was not sure whether he still had an opinion.
App. 98a-99a. Juror No. 8 testified that she had heard others express opinions concerning the case and she only had an
opinion "on just what he said himself-that he was guilty."
App. 120a, 125a. Juror No. 9 stated that she had felt that
petitioner was guilty but that presently she would have to
hear both sides before forming an opinion. App. 150a. Juror No. 10 had heard people express their opinions and had
on occasion expressed his own opinion about the case. He
also stated that he would listen to both sides before forming a
present opinion. App. 164a-165a. Juror No. 11 testified
that he had read newspaper accounts of the case but that he
had formed no opinion. App. 177a. Juror No. 12 had read
about the case but she had formed no opinion. App.
193a-194a. Two alternates were seated over Yount's challenges for cause. Alternate No. 1 stated that he had heard
people express opinions and ideas about the case; that he had
expressed an opinion; that he still had a firm and fixed opinion based on what he read in the newspapers; and that he
would require evidence to be presented before he could put
5

The person initially selected as Juror No. 3 was not able to sit because
of personal reasons. Tr. 1060-1061.
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his opinion out of his mind. App. 235a-240a. Alternate No.
2 stated that she had formed a definite opinion and that she
would require the production of evidence to change her mind.
App. 251a-252a.
The totality of these circumstances convinces me that the
trial judge committed manifest error in determining that the
jury as a w o e was 1mpartial. The trial judge's comment
that t ere was it e a m public about the second trial,
App. at 264a, is plainly inconsistent with the evidence adduced during the voir dire. Similarly, the trial court's statement that "there was practically no publicity given to this
matter through the news media . . . except to report that a
new trial had been granted by the Supreme Court," App.
268a, simply ignores at least 55 front-page articles that are in
the record. Ex. P-1, P-2. Further, the trial judge's statement that "almost all, if not all, [of the first 12] jurors ...
had no prior or present fixed opinion," App. 264a, is manifestly erroneous; a review of the record reveals that 5 of the
12 had acknowledged either a prior or a present opinion.
App. 43a-44a; 83a; 98a-99a; 150a; 164a-165a. The trial
judge's "practically no publicity" statement also ignores the
first-trial details within the news stories. These included
Yount's confessions, testimony and conviction of rape--all of
which were outside of the evidence presented at the second
trial. See App. 643a-644a, 650a, 655a; Ex. Pl-w, Pl-x, Pl-z,
Pl-cc, Pl-hh. Under these circumstances, · I do not believe
that the jury was capable of deciding the case solely on the
evidence before it. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U. S. 209, 217
(1982)("[d]ue process means a jury capable and willing to decide the issue solely on the evidence before it").

III
The Court today also rejects Yount's claim that juror Hrin
was erroneously seated over his challenge for cause. Before
explaining why I disagree with this conclusion, it is necessary
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to set forth a ore complete version of Hrin's oir dire testimony than is se fo
y e Court.
Hrin, in response to the prosecution's questioning, gave
the following testimony:
"Q. Have you formed any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of Mr. Yount?
"A. To the degree it was written up in the papers,
yes.
"Q. Is this a fixed opinion on your part?
"A. This is sort of difficult to answer. Fixed?
"Q. Let me ask-if you were to be selected as a juror
in this case and take the jury box, could you erase or remove the opinion you now hold and render a verdict
solely on the evidence and law produced at this trial?
"A. It is very possible. I wouldn't say for sure.
"Q. Do you think you could?
"A. I think I possibly could.
"Q. Then the opin_ion you hold is not necessarily a
fixed and immobile opinion?
"A. I would say not, because I work at a job where I
have to change my mind constantly.
"Q. Would you be able to change your mind regarding
your opinion before becoming a juror in this case.
That's the way I must have you answer the question.
"A. If the facts were so presented I definitely could
change my mind.
"Q. Would you say you could enter the jury box presuming him to be innocent?
"A. It would be rather difficult for me to answer.
"Q. Can you enter the jury box with an open mind
prepared to find your verdict on the evidence as presented at trial and the law presented by the Judge?
"A. That I could do." App. 83a-84a.

Yount's counsel elicited further testimony through cross
examination:

'

-
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"Q. Did I understand Mr. Hrin you would require

some-you would require evidence or something before
you could change your opinion you now have?
"A. Definitely. If the facts show a difference from
what I had originally-had been led to believe, I would
defintely change my mind.
"Q. But until you're shown those facts, you would not
change your mind-is that your positon?
"A. Well-! have nothing else to go on.
"Q. I understand. Then the answer is yes-you
would not change your mind until you were presented
facts?
"A. Right, but I would enter with an open mind.
"Q. In other words, you're saying that while facts
were presented you would keep an open mind and after
that you would feel free to change your mind?
"A. Definitely.
"Q. But you would not change your mind until the
facts were presented?
"A. Right .... " App. 85a-86a.
Yount's counsel subsequently challenged for cause; the court
denied the challenge because Hrin "said he could go in with
an open mind." App. 86a.
First, even if we regard the relevant rulings as findings of
fact, Hrin's testimony clearly is sufficient to overcome the ~
presumption of correctness due a state court's factual findings under 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d). The state court's determination is not fairly supported by the record. Hrin not only
indicated that he had a previous opinion as to Yount's guilt or
innocence, but that he required evidence produced at trial to
dispel that opinion. Further, he stated-pursuant to the
prosecution's questioning-that "[i]t would be rather difficult
... to answer" whether he could enter the jury box presuming Yount's innocence. Under these circumstances, I am
convinced that the trial court improperly impaneled Hrin.
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More important, however, I believe the Court's analysis
regarding whether a juror has a disqualifying opinion is
flawed. The Court begins by stating that such a question is
one of historical fact, ante, at 11. It then concludes, simply,
that this factual finding is entitled to 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)'s
presumption of correctness. Finally, it acknowledges that
"[t]here are, of course, factual and legal questions to be considered in deciding whether a juror is qualified," ante, at 11,
n. 12, and cites as one authority ~eynolds v. United States,
98 u. s. 145 (1879). 6
Contrary to the Court, I believe that whether a juror has a
disq~on is a mixea question of law and fact.
The prope s
mg pomt o ana ys1s 1s eynolds v. United
States, supra. In that case, the defendant excepted to the
trial court's decision to reject several challenges for cause
that were based on juror testimony during voir dire. I d., at
146-147. This Court upheld the trial court's decision. Id.,
at 157. Before reaching its ultimate conclusion, the Court
stated:
"The theory of law is that a juror who has formed an
opinion cannot be impartial. Every opinion which he
may entertain need not necessarily have this effect. In
these days of newspaper enterprise and universal education, every case of public interest is almost, as a matter
of necessity, brought to the attention of all the intelligent people in the vicinity, and scarcely any one can be
found among the best fitted for jurors who has not read
or heard of it, and who has not some impression or some
opinion in respect to the merits. It is clear, therefore,
6
The Court also cites as authority Rushen v. Spain, U. S. (1983) (per curiam), and Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U. S. 422 (1983).
Neither of those cases was correctly decided. Moreover, the latter case is
plainly inapplicable because it involved the voluntariness of guilty pleas,
not juror partiality. The former involved an allegation of juror partiality
that arose after the trial began.
trial.
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that upon the trial of the issue of fact raised by a challenge for such cause the court will practically be called
upon to determine whether the nature and strength of
the opinion formed are such as in law necessarily to raise
the presumption of partiality. The question thus presented is one of mixed law and fact, and to be tried,. as
far as the facts are concerned, like any other issue of that
character,li'poill:lie eViOence. The finding of the trial
court tipon that issue ought not to be set aside bya reviewmg court, unless the error is manifest." I d., at
155-156.
I~, 366 U.S. 717 (1961), extended Reynolds to
habeas corpus proceedings. Initially, Irvin noted that a presumption of a prospective juror's impartiality is not rebutted
"if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court." I d.,
at 723. Next, the Court affirmed that a proper inquiry may
demonstrate "'whether the nature and strength of the opinion formed are such as in law necessarily . . . raise the presumption of partiality,"' id. (quoting Reynolds v. United
States, supra, at 156), and that this inquiry is "'one of mixed
\
law and fact.'" Ibid.
Thus, Reynolds and Irvin teach that the question whether
a juror has an opinion that disqualifies is a mixed one of law
and fact. Therefore, one cannot apply the presumption of
correctness found in 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d) because the statutory language by definition applies only to the factual determinations of state courts. Applying the proper analytical
framework, I believe that Hrin's testimony clearly raised a
presumption of partiality. Therefore, the trial judge committed manifest error by improperly impaneling Hrin. 7

The Court states that it "does not think [Irvin's] analysis can be extended to a federal habeas corpus case in which the partiality of an individual juror is placed in issue." Ante, at 11. The validity of Irvin (habeas
corpus case) and of Reynolds (individual jurors), and the inapplicability of
28 U. S. C. § 2254(d), dispose of any meaningful reason not to "extend"
7
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There is a special reason to require independent review in
a case that arouses the passions of the local community in
which an elected judge is required to preside. Unlike an appointed federal judge with life tenure, an elected judge has
reason to be concerned about the community's reaction to his
dispositon of highly publicized cases. Even in the federal judiciary, some circuits have determined that it is sound practice to have the retrial of a case assigned to a different judge
than the one whose erroneous ruling made another trial necessary; for though the risk that a judge will subconsciously
strive to vindicate the result reached at the first trial may be
remote, as long as human beings preside at trials, that possibility cannot be ignored entirely.
IV

Two additional and somewhat disturbing questions merit
comment: (1) why did this Court exercise its discretionary jurisdiction to review this case; and (2) even if the Court of Appeals' analysis of the case is entirely correct, why should
those federal judges order the great writ of habeas corpus to
issue for the benefit of a prisoner like Yount, who, it would
seem, is guilty of a heinous offense?
The answer to the question why the Court grants certiorari in any given case usually involves considerations of both
fact and law. It appears that the facts motivated the Court
to select this case for plenary review. The facts that had
such a motivating impact on this Court-that the conviction
of a confessed murderer of a high-school student had been set
aside by an appellate court-also, I believe, must have had an
emotional and unforgettable impact on the residents of Clearfield County. The desire to "follow through"-to do somethese cases to federal-habeas-corpus cases in which the partiality of individual jurors is placed in issue.
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thing about such an apparent miscarriage of justice-is difficult for judges as well as laymen to resist. 8
It should not be forgotten that Yount has already been incarcerated for 18 years. If, as the Court of Appeals held, he
has not yet been found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a
fair trial, the possibility remains that he has already received
a greater punishment than is warranted. Of much greater
importance is our dedication to the principle that guilt or innocence of a criminal offense in our society is not to be decided by executive fiat or by popular vote. This is a principle that affords protection for every citizen in the United
States. Justice Frankfurter stated this point in his concurrence in Irvin v. Dowd:
"More than one student of society has expressed the
view that not the least significant test of the quality of a
civilization is it treatment of those charged with crime,
particularly with offenses which arouse the passions of a
community. One of the rightful boasts of Western civilization is that the State has the burden of establishing
guilt solely on the basis of evidence produced in court
and under circumstances assuring an accused all the
safeguards of a fair procedure. These rudimentary conditions for determining guilt are inevitably wanting if the
jury which is to sit in judgment on a fellow human being
comes to its task with its mind ineradicably poisoned
against him." 366 U. S., at 729 (Justice Frankfurter,
concurring).
I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

8

As I recently noted, in 19 consecutive cases in which the Court exercised its discretion to decide a criminal case summarily, the Court made
sure that an apparently guilty defendant was not given too much protection
by the law. See Florida v. Meyers, 104 S. Ct. 1852, 1855 (1984). The
string of consecutive summary victories for the prosecution now stands at
20. See Massachusetts v. Upton, U. S. (1984) (per curiam).
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standard was applied--and a question of fact.
Whether an opinion expressed by a juror w~s
such as to meet the legal standard for
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fact as to which deference was due to the
trial court's determination. This is apparent both from the language quoted hy the dissent, and from the followi.nq passage:
"{T]he manner of the juror while testifying
is oftentimes more indicative of the real
character of his opinion than his words.
That is seen below, but cannot always be
spread upon the record. Care should, therefore, be taken in the reviewing court not to
reverse the ruling below upon such a guestion
of fact, except in a clear case." 98 u.s.,
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SUPREME CO
No. 83-95
ERNEST S. PATTON, SUPERINTENDENT, SCI-CAMP
HILL AND LEROY S. ZIMMERMAN, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF PENNSYLVANIA, PETITIONERS v.
JON E. YOUNT
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
[June-, 1984]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case brings before us a claim that pretrial publicity so
infected a state criminal trial as to deny the defendant his
Sixth Amendment right to an "impartial jury."
I
On April 28, 1966, the body of Pamela Rimer, an 18-yearold high school student, was found in a wooded area near
her home in Luthersburg, Clearfield County, Pennsylvania.
There were numerous wounds about her head and cuts on her
throat and neck. An autopsy revealed that she died of strangulation when blood from her wounds was drawn into her
lungs. The autopsy showed no indication that she had been
sexually assaulted.
At about 5:45 a. m. the following morning, respondent
Yount appeared at the State Police Substation in nearby DuBois. Yount, who had been the victim's high school mathematics teacher, proceeded to give the police oral and written
confessions to the murder. The police refused to release the
confession to the press, and it was not published until after it
was read at Yount's arraignment three days later. Ex.
Pl-a, Pl-<1. At his trial in 1966, the confessions were admitted into evidence. Yount took the stand and claimed tempo-
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rary insanity. The jury convicted him of first-degree murder and rape, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment.
On direct appeal the Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined that under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966),
police had given Yount inadequate notice of his right to an
attorney prior to his confession. The court remanded for a
new trial. Commonwealth v. Yount, 435 Pa. 276, 256 A. 2d
464 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U. S. 925 (1970).
Prior to the second trial in 1970, the trial court ordered
suppression of Yount's written confessions and that portion
of the oral confession that was obtained after he was legally
in custody. The prosecution dismissed the rape charge.
There followed an extensive voir dire that is now at the heart
of this case. Jury selection began on November 4, 1970, and
took 10 days, seven jury panels, 292 veniremen, and 1,186
pages of testimony. Yount moved for a change of venue before, and several times during, the voir dire. He argued
that the widespread dissemination of prejudicial information
could not be eradicated from the minds of potential jurors,
and cited in support the difficulty of the voir dire and numerous newspaper and other articles about the case. The motions were denied. The trial court noted that the articles
merely reported events without editorial comment; that the
length of the voir dire resulted in part from the court's leniency in allowing examinations and challenges of the jurors;
that "almost all, if not all," the jurors seated had "no prior or
present fixed opinion"; and that there had been "little, if any,
talk in public" between the two trials. The court also observed that the voir dire of the second trial had been sparsely
attended.
Ultimately, twelve jurors and two alternates were seated.
At the second trial, Yount did not take the stand and did not
claim temporary insanity. Instead he relied upon crossexamination and character witnesses in an attempt to undermine the State's proof of his intent. The jury convicted him
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again of first-degree murder, and he was resentenced to life
imprisonment. The trial court denied a motion for a new
trial, finding that practically no publicity had been given to
the case between the two trials, and that little public interest
was shown during the second trial. App. 268a. In addition,
the court concluded that the jury was without bias. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and the
trial court's findings. Commonwealth v. Yount, 455 Pa. 303,
311-314, 314 A. 2d 242, 247-248 (1974).
In January 1981, Yount filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in United States District Court. He claimed, inter
alia, that his conviction had been obtained in violation of his
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial by an
impartial jury. The case was assigned to a magistrate, who
conducted a hearing and recommended that the petition be
granted. The District Court rejected the magistrate's recommendation. 537 F. Supp. 873 (W. D. Pa. 1982). It held
that the pretrial publicity was not vicious, excessive, nor officially sponsored, and that the jurors were able to set aside
any preconceived notions of guilt. · It noted that the percentage of jurors excused for cause was "not remarkable to anyone familiar with the difficulty in selecting a homicide jury in
Pennsylvania." /d., at 882. In addition, the court reviewed
the instances in which the state trial court had denied a challenge for cause, and upheld the trial court's view that the
jury was impartial.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. 710
F. 2d 956 (1983). The court relied primarily on the analysis
set out in Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U. S. 717 (1961), and found that
pretrial publicity had made a fair trial impossible in
Clearfield County. It independently examined the nature of
the publicity surrounding the second trial, the testimony at
voir dire of the venire as a whole, and the voir dire testimony
of the jurors eventually seated. The publicity revealed
Yount's prior conviction for murder, his confession, and his
prior plea of temporary insanity, information not admitted

t
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into evidence at trial. 1 The voir dire showed that all but two
of 163 veniremen questioned about the case 2 had heard of it,
and that, 126, or 77%, admitted they would carry an opinion
into the jury box. This was a higher percentage than in
Irvin, where 62% of the 430 veniremen were dismissed for
cause because they had fixed opinions concerning the petitioner's guilt. Finally, the Court of Appeals found that eight
of the fourteen jurors and alternates actually seated admitted
that at some time they had formed an opinion as to Yount's
guilt. 3 The court thought that many of the jurors had given
equivocal responses when asked whether they could set aside
these opinions, and that one juror, a Mr. Hrin, and both alternates would have required evidence to overcome their beliefs. The court concluded that "despite their assurances of
impartiality, the jurors could not set aside their opinions and
render a verdict based solely on the evidence presented."
710 F. 2d, at 972. 4
1
The Court of Appeals rejected as without fair support in the record the
trial court's conclusion that there was practically no publicity given to the
case between the first and second trials. See 710 F. 2d, at 969, n. 21.
The federal court suggested that the record on habeas of the publicity after
the first trial and during the second was more complete than the record
considered by the trial court. Ibid.
The Court of Appeals also suggested that the trial court's view that
there was little talk in public concerning the second trial was undermined
by the voir dire testimony that there had been public discussion of the case,
particularly in the last weeks before retrial. !d., at 969, n. 22. The court
discounted, as of limited significance, the trial court's point that few spectators had attended the trial, since Yount did not allege prejudice arising
from the " 'circus atmosphere' " in the courtroom. Ibid.
2
One hundred twenty-five of the original 292 veniremen were excused
because they had not been chosen properly. Four others were dismissed
for cause before they were questioned on the case.
3
The Court of Appeals noted that in Irvin eight of twelve jurors had
formed opinions of guilt.
'Judge Stern wrote a separate concurring opinion in which he suggested
that "the constitutional standard which for 175 years has guided the lower
courts" in this area be rejected. 710 F. 2d, at 972. Rather than hinge
disqualification of a juror on whether he has a fixed opinion of guilt that he
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Judge Garth concurred in the judgment. He declined to
join the court's view that actual prejudice on the part of the
jury might be inferred from pretrial publicity and the answers at voir dire of veniremen not selected for the jury. He
wrote that "[a] thorough and skillfully conducted voir dire
should be adequate to identify juror bias, even in a community saturated with publicity adverse to the defendant." /d.,
at 979. 5 Judge Garth nevertheless concurred because in his
view juror Hrin stated at voir dire that he would have required
evidence to change his mind about Yount's guilt. This
stripped the defendant of the presumption of innocence. 6
We granted certiorari,-- U. S. - - (1983), to consider,
in the context of this case, the problem of pervasive media
publicity that now arises so frequently in the trial of sensational criminal cases. We reverse the judgment of the Court
of Appeals.
II

As noted, the Court of Appeals rested its decision that the
jury was not impartial on this Court's decision in Irvin v.
Dowd, supra. That decision, a leading one at the time, held
cannot lay aside, Judge Stem would bar any juror who admitted any opinion as to guilt. Moreover, no jury could be empanelled where more than
25% of the veniremen state that they held an opinion concerning the defendant's guilt. This would raise such doubts as to the sincerity of those
who claimed no opinion as to suggest concealed bias, Judge Stem wrote.
5
Judge Garth thought Irvin was distinguishable, because there ''the
trial court (which itself questioned the jurors challenged for cause) did not
engage in a searching and thorough voir dire." 710 F. 2d, at 979.
Rather, it merely credited the jurors' subjective opinions that each could
render an impartial verdict notwithstanding his or her opinion. Judge
Garth also noted that Yount challenged for cause only three of the actual
jurors. In Irvin, the defendant challenged each of his twelve jurors for
cause. Irvin v. Dowd, 359 U. S. 394, 398 (1959).
6
Judge Garth stated that whether juror Hrin was unconstitutionally biased was a mixed question of law and fact under Irvin. 710 F. 2d, at 981.
He therefore did not apply the presumption of correctness that is applicable to the factual findings of a state court in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d).
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that adverse pretrial publicity can create such a presumption
of prejudice in a community that the jurors' claims that they
can be impartial should not be believed. The Court in I T!Jin
reviewed a number of factors in determining whether the totality of the circumstances raised such a presumption. The
Court noted, however, that the trial court's findings of
impartiality might pe overturned only for "manifest error."
366 U. S., at 723. The Court of Appeals in this case did not
address this aspect of the IT!Jin decision. 7 Moreover, the
court below, in concentrating on the factors discussed at
length in IT!Jin, failed to give adequate weight to other significant circumstances in this case. In IT!Jin, the Court observed that it was during the six or seven months immediately preceding trial that "a barrage of newspaper headlines,
articles, cartoons and pictures was unleashed against [the defendant]." 366 U. S., at 725. In this case, the extensive adverse publicity and the community's sense of outrage were at
their height prior to Yount's first trial in 1966. The jury selection for Yount's second trial, at issue here, did not occur
until four years later, at a time when prejudicial publicity
was greatly diminished and community sentiment had soft7
The Court of Appeals appears to have thought that two statements in
Irvin-that a federal court must ''independently evaluate" the voir dire
testimony, and that the question of juror partiality is a mixed question of
law and fact, 366 U. S., at 7~meant that there is no presumption of correctness owed to the trial court's finding that a jury as a whole is impartial.
We note that Irvin was decided five years before Congress added to the
habeas corpus statute an explicit presumption of correctness for state court
factual findings, see Pub. L. 89-711, 80 Stat. 1105-1106, and two years before this Court's opinion in Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293 (1963), provided the guidelines that were later codified. It may be that there is little
practical difference between the Irvin ''manifest error" standard and the
"fairly supported by the record" standard of the amended habeas statute.
See 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d). In any case, we do not think the habeas standard is any less stringent. Since we uphold the state court's findings in this
case under Irvin's ''manifest error" standard, we do not need to determine
whether the subsequent development of the law of habeas corpus might
have required a different analysis or result in that case.
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ened. In these circumstances, we hold that the trial court
did not commit manifest error in finding that the jury as a
whole was impartial.
The record reveals that in the year and a half from the reversal of the first conviction to the start of the second voir
dire each of the two Clearfield County daily newspapers published an average of less than one article per month. App.
642a-657a; Ex. P1-v to P1-kk, P-2. More important, many
of these were extremely brief announcements of the trial
dates and scheduling such as are common in rural newspapers. E. g., Ex. P1-ff, P1-ii, P1-jj. The transcript of the
voir dire contains numerous references to the sparse publicity and minimal public interest prior to the second trial.
E. g., App. 43a, 98a, 100a; Tr. 27-28, 90, 191, 384, 771, 829,
1142. It is true that during the voir dire the newspapers
published articles on an almost daily basis, but these too were
purely factual articles generally discussing not the crime or
prior prosecution, but the prolonged process of jury selection. App. 658a-671a. In short, the record of publicity in
the months preceding, and at the time of, the second trial
does not reveal the "barrage of inflammatory publicity immediately prior to trial," Murphy v. Florida, 421 U. S. 794, 798
(1975), amounting to a "huge ... wave of public passion,"
Irvin, supra, at 728, that the Court found in Irvin.
The voir dire testimony revealed that this lapse in time had
a profound effect on the community and, more important, on
the jury, in softening or effacing opinion. Many veniremen,
of course, simply had let the details of the case slip from their
mind. E. g., App. 194a; Tr. 33, 284, 541-544, 991. In addition, while it is true that a number of jurors and veniremen
testified that at one time they had held opinions, for many,
time had weakened or eliminated any conviction they had
had. See, e. g., App. 98a-100a (juror number 7), 128a (juror
number 8); Tr. 384-385, 398-399, 831, 897 (semble), 1075-
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1076, 1144; see also App. 164a-166a (juror number 10). 8 The
same is true of the testimony of the jurors and veniremen
who were seated late in the process and therefore were subjected to some of the articles and broadcasts disseminated
daily during the voir dire 9: the record suggests that their
passions had not been inflamed nor their thoughts biased by
8
The testimony of juror number seven, Martin Karetski, during examination by defense counsel is illustrative:
"Q. You have heard the matter discussed over the years?
"A. In the past few years I haven't heard too much about it.
"Q. In 1966 when the matter came up before you knew about it then?
"A. Yes sir.
"Q. And just recently when this matter was coming up again, I
presume?
"A. What I have read in the paper again.
"Q. And you have heard other people discuss it?
"A. Not too many so far.
"Q. You have heard other people express opinions about it?
"A. Not too many of those so far too.
"Q. Back around '66, did you?
"A. Yes in '66.

"Q. . .. I assume you had an opinion as to [Mr. Yount's] guilt or innocence [in 1966]?
"A. I had an opinion yes.
"Q. Do you have a opinion today as to his guilt or innocence?
"A. It's been a long time ago and I'm not sure now. It was in the paper
he plead [sic] not guilty.

"Q. Let me ask you this then. In case you do have an opinion, could you
wipe it out of your mind-erase it out of your mind before you would take a
seat in the jury box and hear whatever evidence you might hear?
"A. As it is right now I have no opinion now-four or five years ago I
probably did but right now I don't.
"Q. What happened Mr. Karetski, between then and now to eliminate
that opinion if you can tell me?
"A. Well, as far as I'm concerned there wasn't much in the paper about
it and it sort of slipped away from thought." App. 98a-100a.
'Jurors were sequestered as they were chosen.
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the publicity. E. g., App. 176a-177a, 150a-151a; Tr. 771,
959, 1027.
That time soothes and erases is a perfectly natural phenomenon, familiar to all. See Irvin v. Dowd, 271 F. 2d 552,
561 (CA7 1959) (Duffy, J., dissenting) (A continuance should
have been granted because "[t]he passage of time is a great
healer," and public prejudice might have "subsid[ed]."),
rev'd, 366 U. S. 717 (1961); see also Murphy, supra, at 802;
Beck v. Washington, 369 U. S. 541, 556 (1962). Not all
members of the venire had put aside earlier prejudice, as the
voir dire disclosed. They retained their fixed opinions, and
were disqualified. But the testimony suggests that the voir
dire resulted in selecting those who had forgotten or would
need to be persuaded again. 10
The Court of Appeals below thought that the fact that the
great majority of veniremen "remembered the case" showed
that time had not served "to erase highly unfavorable publicity from the memory of the community." 710 F. 2d, at 969.
This conclusion, without more, is essentially irrelevant. The
relevant question is not whether the community remembered
the case, but whether the jurors at Yount's trial had such
fixed opinions that they could not judge impartially the guilt
of the defendant. Irvin, supra, at 723. It is not unusual
As noted, the voir dire in this case was particularly extensive. It took
10 days to pick 14 jurors from 167 veniremen. In Irvin it took 8 days to
pick 14 jurors from 430 veniremen.
Contrary to Judge Garth's sunnise, 710 F. 2d, at 979, however, the voir
dire interviews quoted in the petitioner's brief in Irvin do not appear to be
significantly less probing than those here. See Brief for Petitioner in
Irvin v. Dowd, 0. T. 1960, No. 41, pp. 18-59. It should also be noted that
the voir dire in Irvin, like that here, was conducted largely by counsel for
each side, rather than the judge. The only significant difference in the
procedures followed here and in Irvin is that the veniremen here were
brought into the courtroom alone for questioning, while it appears that
those in Irvin were questioned in front of all those remaining in the panel.
This is not an insubstantial distinction, as the Court suggested in Irvin,
supra, at 728, but we do not find it controlling.
10

'

'
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that one's recollection of the fact that a notorious crime was
committed lingers long after the feelings of revulsion that
create prejudice have passed. It would be fruitless to attempt to identify any particular lapse of time that in itself
would distinguish the situation that existed in Irvin. 11 But it
is clear that the. passage of time between a first and a second
trial can be a highly relevant fact. In the circumstances of
this case, we hold that it clearly rebuts any presumption of
partiality or prejudice that existed at the time of the initial
trial. There was fair, even abundant, support for the trial
court's findings that between the two trials of this case there
had been "practically no publicity given to this matter
through the news media," and that there had not been "any
great effect created by any publicity." App. 268a, 265a.

III
Yount briefly argues here that juror Hrin, as well as the
two alternates, were erroneously seated over his challenges
for cause. Brief for Respondent 32. There is substantial
doubt whether Yount properly raised in his petition for habeas corpus the claim that the trial court erroneously denied
his challenge for cause to juror Hrin. Compare 710 F. 2d, at
966, n. 18, with id., at 977, and n. 4 (Garth, J., concurring).
And there is no evidence that the alternate jurors, who did
not sit in judgment, actually talked with the other jurors during the four-day trial. But Judge Garth in the court below
based his concurrence on the view that Hrin would have required Yount to produce evidence to overcome his inclination
to think the accused was guilty, and the majority of the panel
11
In Murphy v. Florida, 421 U. S. 794 (1974), the defendant-widely
lmown as "Murph the Surf"-relied heavily on Irvin. The record of damaging publicity preceding his trial was at least as extreme as that in this
case. Nevertheless, we found the record there distinguishable from Irvin.
We noted that the extensive publication of news articles about Murphy
largely had ceased some seven months before the jury was selected. I d.,
at 802. Murphy involved a lapse in publicity prior to the defendant's first
trial; there was no second trial in that case.
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thought that the four-day association between the alternates
and the other jurors "operate[d] to subvert the requirement
that the jury's verdict be based on evidence developed from
the witness stand," id., at 971, n. 25. Therefore, we will
consider briefly the claims as to all three jurors.
It was the view of all three Court of Appeals judges that
the question whether jurors have opinions that disqualify
them is a mixed question of law and fact. See 710 F. 2d, at
968, n. 20, 981. Thus, they concluded that the presumption
of correctness due a state court's factual findings under 28
U. S. C. § 2254(d) does not apply. The opinions below relied
for this proposition on Irvin v. Dowd, supra, at 723. Irvin
addressed the partiality of the trial jury as a whole, a question we discuss in Part II, supra. We do not think its analysis can be extended to a federal habeas corpus case in which
the partiality of an individual juror is placed in issue. That
question is not one of mixed law and fact. Rather it is
plainly one of historical fact: did a juror swear that he could
set aside any opinion he might hold and decide the case on the
evidence, and should the juror's protestation of impartiality
have been believed. Cf. Rushen v. Spain, - - U. S. - - ,
- - (1983) (state court determination that juror's deliberations were not biased by ex parte communications is a finding
of fact). 12
12

There are, of course, factual and legal questions to be considered in deciding whether a juror is qualified. The constitutional standard that a juror is impartial only if he can lay aside his opinion and render a verdict
based on the evidence presented in court is a question of federal law, see
Irvin, supra, at 723; whether a juror can in fact do that is a determination
to which habeas courts owe special deference, see Rushen, supra, a t - .
Cf. Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U. S. 422, 431-432 (1983) (similar analysis
as to whether a guilty plea was voluntary). See also Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U. S. 145, 156 (1879) (whether a juror should be disqualified is a
question involving both a legal standard and findings of fact; the latter may
be set aside only for manifest error). The dissent misreads the Court's
opinion in United States v. Reynolds. Post, at 10-11, and n. 7. The
Court clearly did not attach the same significance to the phrase "a question

I
~
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There are good reasons to apply the statutory presumption
of correctness to the trial court's resolution of these questions. First, the determination has been made only after an
often extended voir dire proceeding designed specifically to
identify biased veniremen. It is fair to assume that the
method we have relied on since the beginning, e. g., United
States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 51 (C. C. D. Va. 1807) (Marshall, C. J.), usually identifies bias. 13 Second, the determination is essentially one of credibility, and therefore
largely one of demeanor. As we have said on numerous occasions, the trial court's resolution of such questions is entitled, even on direct appeal, to "special deference." E. g.,
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc.,-- U.S.
- - , - - (1984). The respect paid such findings in a habeas
proceeding certainly should be no less. See Marshall v.
of mixed law and fact" that we do today under modern habeas law. It recognized that juror-disqualification questions may raise both a question of
law-whether the correct standard was applied-and a question of fact.
Whether an opinion expressed by a juror was such as to meet the legal
standard for disqualification was viewed as a question of fact as to which
deference was due to the trial court's determination. This is apparent
both from the language quoted by the dissent, and from the following
passage:
"[T]he manner of the juror while testifying is oftentimes more indicative of
the real character of his opinion than his words. That is seen below, but
cannot always be spread upon the record. Care should, therefore, be
taken in the reviewing court not to reverse the ruling below upon such a
question of fact, except in a clear case." 98 U. S., at 156-157 (emphasis
added).
13
Accord In reApplication of National Broadcasting Co., 653 F. 2d 609,
617 (CADC 1981) ("[V]oir dire has long been recognized as an effective
method of rooting out such bias, especially when conducted in a careful and
thoroughgoing manner."); United States v. Duncan, 598 F. 2d 839, 865
(CA4), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 871 (1979); Calley v. Callaway, 519 F. 2d
184, 209, n. 45 (CA5 1975) (en bane) (citing cases), cert. denied, 425 U. S.
911 (1976). But cf. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U. S. 209, 222, and n. * (1982)
(O'CONNOR, J., concurring) (describing situations in which state procedures are inadequate to uncover bias); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U. S. 723
(1963) (same).
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Lonberger, 459 U. S. 422, 434-435 (1983). 14
Thus the question is whether there is fair support in the
record for the state courts' conclusion that the jurors here
would be impartial. See 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(8). The testimony of each of the three challenged jurors is ambiguous and
at times contradictory. This is not unusual on voir dire
examination, particularly in a highly publicized criminal case.
It is well to remember that the lay persons on the panel may
never have been subjected to the type of leading questions
and cross-examination tactics that frequently are employed,
and that were evident in this case. Prospective jurors represent a cross-section of the community, and their education
and experience vary widely. Also, unlike witnesses, prospective jurors have had no briefing by lawyers prior to taking the stand. Jurors thus cannot be expected invariably to
express themselves carefully or even consistently. Every
trial judge understands this, and under our system it is that
judge who is best situated to determine competency to serve
impartially. The trial judge properly may choose to believe
those statements that were the most fully articulated or that
appeared to have been least influenced by leading.
The voir dire examination of juror Hrin was carefully scrutinized by the state courts and the federal District Court, as
he was challenged for cause and was a member of the jury
that convicted the defendent. We think that the trial
judge's decision to seat Hrin, despite early ambiguity in his
testimony, was confirmed after he initially denied the challenge. Defense counsel sought and obtained permission to
resume cross-examination.
In response to a question
whether Hrin could set his opinion aside before entering the
14

Demeanor plays a fundamental role not only in determining juror credibility, but also in simply understanding what a potential juror is saying.
Any complicated voir dire calls upon lay persons to think and express
themselves in unfamiliar terms, as a reading of any transcript of such a
proceeding will reveal. Demeanor, inflection, the flow of the questions
and answers can make confused and conflicting utterances comprehensible.
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jury box or would need evidence to change his mind, the juror clearly and forthrightly stated, "I think I could enter it
[the jury box] with a very open mind. I think I could very
easily. To say this is a requirement for some of the things
you have to do every day." App. 89a. After this categorical answer, defense counsel did not renew their challenge for
cause. Similarly, in the case of alternate juror Pyott, we
cannot fault the trial judge for crediting her earliest testimony, in which she said that she could put her opinion aside
"[i]f [she] had to," rather than the later testimony in which
defense counsel persuaded her that logically she would need
evidence to discard any opinion she might have. App. 246a,
250a-252a. Alternate juror Chincharick's testimony is the
most ambiguous, as he appears simply to have answered
"yes" to almost any question put to him. It is here that the
federal court's deference must operate, for while the cold
record arouses some concern, only the trial judge could tell
which of these answers was said with the greatest comprehension and certainty.
IV
We conclude that the voir dire testimony and the record of
publicity do not reveal the kind of "wave of public passion"
that would have made a fair trial unlikely by the jury that
was empaneled as a whole. We also conclude that the ambiguity in the testimony of the cited jurors who were challenged for cause is insufficient to overcome the presumption
of correctness owed to the trial court's findings. We therefore reverse.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE MARSHALL

decision of this case.
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~u.prenu

arautt d tire ~tt~ ~htttg
,rulfi:n:ghtn. ~. ar. 2ll.;t'!'

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

June 20, 1984

Re:

83-95 - Patton v. Yount

Dear Lewis:

~;

In response to your most recent change, I will be
adding the following to the beginning of footnote 6:
The Court attempts to justify its disregard
5
of Reynolds and Irvin by quoting from a passage in ~ ~
Reynolds that begins with: "fT]he manner of the
juror while testifying is oftentimes more
indicative of the real character of his opinion
than his words." Ante, at 11 n. 12 (quoting 98
u.s., at 156-157). That passage refers to a
situation involving a juror falsely seeking to
excuse himself on the ground that he has formeo a
disqualifying opinion, when he has no
disqualifying opinion. Obviously, that situation
is not involved here as Hrin was not falsely
seeking to disqualify himself. The fully quoted
relevant passage of Reynolds demonstrates this
point:
The reading of the evidence leaves the
impression that the juror has some
hypothetical opinion about the case, but it
falls far short of raising a manifest
presumption of partiality. In considering
such questions in a reviewing court, we ought
not to be unmindful of the fact we have so
often observed in our experience, that jurors
not unfrequently seek to excuse themselves on
the ground of having formed an opinion, when
on examination, it turns out that no
disqualification exists. In such cases the
manner of the juror while testifying is
oftentimes more indicative of the real
character of his opinion than his words.
~hat is seen below, but cannot always be
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spread upon the record. Care should,
therefore, be taken in the reviewing court
not to reverse the ruling below upon such a
question of fact except in a clear case. 98
U.S., at 156-157 (emphasis added).
Respectfully,
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After a jury trial in a Pennsylvania state court in 1966, respondent was
convicted of first-degree murder and rape, and was sentenced to life
imprisonment. However, on direct appeal the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that the police had violated respondent's constitutional rights
in securing confessions that had been admitted in evidence, and remanded the case for a new trial. Before and during an extensive voir
dire examination of potential jurors at the second trial in 1970, respondent moved for a change of venue, arguing that publicity concerning the
case had resulted in dissemination of prejudicial information that could
not be eradicated from the potential jurors' minds. The trial court denied the motions, and respondent was convicted again of first-degree
murder. He was resentenced to life imprisonment, and the trial court
denied a motion for a new trial, finding that practically no publicity had
been given to the case between the two trials, that little public interest
was shown during the second trial, and that the jury was without bias.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and the trial
court's findings. Respondent then sought habeas corpus relief in Federal District Court, claiming that his conviction had been obtained in violation of his right under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to a
fair trial by an impartial jury. Upholding the state trial court's view
that the jury was impartial, the District Court denied relief, but the
Court of Appeals reversed. Relying primarily on Irvin v. Dowd, 366
U. S. 717, the court found that pretrial publicity had made a fair trial
impossible in the county.
Held:
1. The voir dire testimony and the record of publicity do not reveal the
kind of "wave of public passion" that would have made a fair trial unlikely by the empaneled jury as a whole. Although Irvin v. Dowd,
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Syllabus
supra, held that adverse publicity can create such a presumption of prej-

udice in a community that the jurors' claims that they can be impartial
should not be believed, it also recognized that the trial court's findings of
impartiality may be overturned only for "manifest error." In this case,
the extensive adverse publicity and the community's sense of outrage
were at their height prior to respondent's first trial. The record shows
that prejudicial publicity was greatly diminished and community sentiment had softened when the jury for the second trial was selected four
years later. Thus the trial court did not commit manifest error in finding that the jury as a whole was imp~ial. Potential jurors who had
retained fixed opinions as to respondent's guilt were disqualified, and the
fact that the great majority of veniremen "remembered the case," without more, is essentially irrelevant. The relevant question is whether
the jurors at respondent's second trial had such fixed opinions that they
could not judge impartially respondent's guilt. The passage of time between the first and second trial clearly rebutted any presumption of partiality or prejudice that existed at the time of the initial trial. Pp. 5-10.
2. There is no merit in respondent's argument that one of the selected
jurors, as well as the two alternates, had been erroneously seated over
his challenges for cause. The ambiguity in the testimony of the cited
jurors was insufficient to overcome the presumption of correctness,
under 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d), owed to the trial court's findings. The
question of an individual juror's partiality is plainly one of historical fact,
and there is fair support in the record for the state courts' conclusion
that the jurors here would be impartial. Pp. 10-14.
710 F. 2d 956, reversed.
POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J.,
and WHITE, BLACKMUN, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, J., joined. MARSHALL, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 83-95
ERNEST S. PATTON, SUPERINTENDENT, SCI-CAMP
HILL AND LEROY S. ZIMMERMAN, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF PENNSYLVANIA, PETITIONERS v.
JON E. YOUNT
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
[June-, 1984]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case brings before us a claim that pretrial publicity so
infected a state criminal trial as to deny the defendant his
Sixth Amendment right to an "impartial jury."
I
On April 28, 1966, the body of Pamela Rimer, an 18-yearold high school student, was found in a wooded area near
her home in Luthersburg, Clearfield County, Pennsylvania.
There were numerous wounds about her head and cuts on her
throat and neck. An autopsy revealed that she died of strangulation when blood from her wounds was drawn into her
lungs. The autopsy showed no indication that she had been
sexually assaulted.
At about 5:45 a. m. the following morning, respondent
Yount appeared at the State Police Substation in nearby DuBois. Yount, who had been the victim's high school mathematics teacher, proceeded to give the police oral and written
confessions to the murder. The police refused to release the
confession to the press, and it was not published until after
it was read at Yaunt's arraignment three days later. Ex.
P1-a, P1-d. At his trial in 1966, the confessions were admitted into evidence. Yount took the stand and claimed tempo-
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rary insanity. The jury convicted him of first-degree murder and rape, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment.
On direct appeal the Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined that under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966),
police had given Yount inadequate notice of his right to an
attorney prior to his confession. The court remanded for a
new trial. Commonwealth v. Yount, 435 Pa. 276, 256 A. 2d
464 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U. S. 925 (1970).
Prior to the second trial in 1970, the trial court ordered
suppression of Yount's written confessions and that portion
of the oral confession that was obtained after he was legally
in custody. The prosecution dismissed the rape charge.
There followed an extensive voir dire that is now at the heart
of this case. Jury selection began on November 4, 1970, and
took 10 days, seven jury panels, 292 veniremen, and 1,186
pages of testimony. Yount moved for a change of venue before, and several times during, the voir dire. He argued
that the widespread dissemination of prejudicial information
could not be eradicated from the minds of potential jurors,
and cited in support the difficulty of the voir dire and numerous newspaper and other articles about the case. The motions were denied. The trial court noted that the articles
merely reported events without editorial comment; that the
length of the voir dire resulted in part from the court's leniency in allowing examinations and challenges of the jurors;
that "almost all, if not all," the jurors seated had "no prior or
present fixed opinion"; and that there had been "little, if any,
talk in public" between the two trials. The court also observed that the voir dire of the second trial had been sparsely
attended.
Ultimately, twelve jurors and two alternates were seated.
At the second trial, Yount did not take the stand and did not
claim temporary insanity. Instead he relied upon crossexamination and character witnesses in an attempt to undermine the State's proof of his intent. The jury convicted him
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again of first-degree murder, and he was resentenced to life
imprisonment. The trial court denied a motion for a new
trial, finding that practically no publicity had been given to
the case between the two trials, and that little public interest
was shown during the second trial. App. 268a. In addition,
the court concluded that the jury was without bias. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and the
trial court's findings. Commonwealth v. Yount, 455 Pa. 303,
311-314, 314 A. 2d 242, 247-248 (1974).
In January 1981, Yount filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in United States District Court. He claimed, inter
alia, that his conviction had been obtained in violation of his
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial by an
impartial jury. The case was assigned to a magistrate, who
conducted a hearing and recommended that the petition be
granted. The District Court rejected the magistrate's recommendation. 537 F. Supp. 873 (W. D. Pa. 1982). It held
that the pretrial publicity was not vicious, excessive, nor officially sponsored, and that the jurors were able to set aside
any preconceived notions of guilt. It noted that the percentage of jurors excused for cause was "not remarkable to anyone familiar with the difficulty in selecting a homicide jury in
Pennsylvania." I d., at 882. In addition, the court reviewed
the instances in which the state trial court had denied a challenge for cause, and upheld the trial court's view that the
jury was impartial.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. 710
F. 2d 956 (1983). The court relied primarily on the analysis
set out in Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U. S. 717 (1961), and found that
pretrial publicity had made a fair trial impossible in Clearfield County. It independently examined the nature of the
publicity surrounding the second trial, the testimony at voir
dire of the venire as a whole, and the voir dire testimony of
the jurors eventually seated. The publicity revealed
Yount's prior conviction for murder, his confession, and his
prior plea of temporary insanity, information not admitted
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into evidence at trial. 1 The voir dire showed that all but two
of 163 veniremen questioned about the case 2 had heard of it,
and that, 126, or 77%, admitted they would carry an opinion
into the jury box. This was a higher percentage than in
Irvin, where 62% of the 430 veniremen were dismissed for
cause because they had fixed opinions concerning the petitioner's guilt. Finally, the Court of Appeals found that eight
of the fourteen jurors and alternates actually seated admitted
that at some time they had formed an opinion as to Yount's
guilt. 3 The court thought that many of the jurors had given
equivocal responses when asked whether they could set aside
these opinions, and that one juror, a Mr. Hrin, and both alternates would have required evidence to overcome their beliefs. The court concluded that "despite their assurances of
impartiality, the jurors could not set aside their opinions and
render a verdict based solely on the evidence presented."
710 F. 2d, at 972. 4
1
The Court of Appeals rejected as without fair support in the record the
trial court's conclusion that there was practically no publicity given to the
case between the first and second trials. See 710 F. 2d, at 969, n. 21.
The federal court suggested that the record on habeas of the publicity after
the first trial and during the second was more complete than the record
considered by the trial court. Ibid.
The Court of Appeals also suggested that the trial court's view that
there was little talk in public concerning the second trial was undermined
by the voir dire testimony that there had been public discussion of the case,
particularly in the last weeks before retrial. !d., at 969, n. 22. The court
discounted, as of limited significance, the trial court's point that few spectators had attended the trial, since Yount did not allege prejudice arising
from the "'circus atmosphere' " in the courtroom. Ibid.
2
One hundred twenty-five of the original 292 veniremen were excused
because they had not been chosen properly. Four others were dismissed
for cause before they were questioned on the case.
3
The Court of Appeals noted that in Irvin eight of twelve jurors had
formed opinions of guilt.
• Judge Stern wrote a separate concurring opinion in which he suggested
that ''the constitutional standard which for 175 years has guided the lower
courts" in this area be rejected. 710 F. 2d, at 972. Rather than hinge
disqualification of a juror on whether he has a fixed opinion of guilt that he
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Judge Garth concurred in the judgment. He declined to
join the court's view that actual prejudice on the part of the
jury might be inferred from pretrial publicity and the answers at voir dire of veniremen not selected for the jury. He
wrote that "[a] thorough and skillfully conducted voir dire
should be adequate to identify juror bias, even in a community saturated with publicity adverse to the defendant." I d.,
at 979. 5 Judge Garth nevertheless concurred because in his
view juror Hrin stated at voir dire that he would have required
evidence to change his mind about Yount's guilt. This
stripped the defendant of the presumption of innocence. 6
We granted certiorari,-- U. S. - - (1983), to consider,
in the context of this case, the problem of pervasive media
publicity that now arises so frequently in the trial of sensational criminal cases. We reverse the judgment of the Court
of Appeals.
II
As noted, the Court of Appeals rested its decision that the
jury was not impartial on this Court's decision in Irvin v.
Dowd, supra. That decision, a leading one at the time, held
cannot lay aside, Judge Stern would bar any juror who admitted any opinion as to guilt. Moreover, no jury could be empanelled where more than
25% of the veniremen state that they held an opinion concerning the defendant's guilt. This would raise such doubts as to the sincerity of those
who claimed no opinion as to suggest concealed bias, Judge Stern wrote.
5
Judge Garth thought I ruin was distinguishable, because there "the
trial court (which itself questioned the jurors challenged for cause) did not
engage in a searching and thorough voir dire." 710 F. 2d, at 979.
Rather, it merely credited the jurors' subjective opinions that each could
render an impartial verdict notwithstanding his or her opinion. Judge
Garth also noted that Yount challenged for cause only three of the actual
jurors. In Irvin, the defendant challenged each of his twelve jurors for
cause. Irvin v. Dowd, 359 U. S. 394, 398 (1959).
'Judge Garth stated that whether juror Hrin was unconstitutionally biased was a mixed question of law and fact under Irvin. 710 F. 2d, at 981.
He therefore did not apply the presumption of correctness that is applicable to the factual findings of a state court in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d).
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that adverse pretrial publicity can create such a presumption
of prejudice in a community that the jurors' claims that they
can be impartial should not be believed. The Court in Irvin
reviewed a number of factors in determining whether the totality of the circumstances raised such a presumption. The
Court noted, however, that the trial court's findings of
impartiality might be overturned only for "manifest error."
366 U. S., at 723. The Court of Appeals in this case did not
address this aspect of the Irvin decision. 7 Moreover, the
court below, in concentrating on the factors discussed at
length in Irvin, failed to give adequate weight to other significant circumstances in this case. In Irvin, the Court observed that it was during the six or seven months immediately preceding trial that "a barrage of newspaper headlines,
articles, cartoons and pictures was unleashed against [the defendant]." 366 U. S., at 725. In this case, the extensive adverse publicity and the community's sense of outrage were at
their height prior to Yount's first trial in 1966. The jury selection for YoUJit's second trial, at issue here, did not occur
until four years later, at a time when prejudicial publicity
was greatly diminished and community sentiment had soft7

The Court of Appeals appears to have thought that two statements in
Irvin-that a federal court must "independently evaluate" the voir dire
testimony, and that the question of juror partiality is a mixed question of
law and fact, 366 U. S., at 723-meant that there is no presumption of correctness owed to the trial court's finding that a jury as a whole is impartial.
We note that Irvin was decided five years before Congress added to the
habeas corpus statute an explicit presumption of correctness for state court
factual findings, see Pub. L. 89-711, 80 Stat. 1105-1106, and two years before this Court's opinion in Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293 (1963), provided the guidelines that were later codified. It may be that there is little
practical difference between the Irvin ''manifest error" standard and the
"fairly supported by the record" standard of the amended habeas statute.
See 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d). In any case, we do not think the habeas standard is any less stringent. Since we uphold the state court's findings in this
case under Irvin's "manifest error" standard, we do not need to determine
whether the subsequent development of the law of habeas corpus might
have required a different analysis or result in that case.
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ened. In these circumstances, we hold that the trial court
did not commit manifest error in finding that the jury as a
whole was impartial.
The record reveals that in the year and a half from the reversal of the first conviction to the start of the second voir
dire each of the two Clearfield County daily newspapers published an average of less than one article per month. App.
642a-657a; Ex. P1-v to P1-kk, P-2. More important, many
of these were extremely brief announcements of the trial
dates and scheduling such as are common in rural newspapers. E. g., Ex. P1-ff, P1-ii, P1-jj. The transcript of the
voir dire contains numerous references to the sparse publicity and minimal public interest prior to the second trial.
E. g., App. 43a, 98a, 100a; Tr. 27-28, 90, 191, 384, 771, 829,
1142. It is true that during the voir dire the newspapers
published articles on an almost daily basis, but these too were
purely factual articles generally discussing not the crime or
prior prosecution, but the prolonged process of jury selection. App. 658a-671a. In short, the record of publicity in
the months preceding, and at the time of, the .second trial
does not reveal the "barrage of inflammatory publicity immediately prior to trial," Murphy v. Florida, 421 U. S. 794, 798
(1975), amounting to a "huge ... wave of public passion,"
Irvin, supra, at 728, that the Court found in Irvin.
The voir dire testimony revealed that this lapse in time had
a profound effect on the community and, more important, on
the jury, in softening or effacing opinion. Many veniremen,
of course, simply had let the details of the case slip from their
mind. E. g., App. 194a; Tr. 33, 284, 541-544, 991. In addition, while it is true that a number of jurors and veniremen
testified that at one time they had held opinions, for many,
time had weakened or eliminated any conviction they had
had. See, e. g., App. 98a-100a (juror number 7), 128a (juror
number 8); Tr. 384-385, 398-399, 831, 897 (semble), 1075-
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1076, 1144; see also App. 164a-166a (juror number 10). 8
The same is true of the testimony of the jurors and veniremen who were seated late in the process and therefore were
subjected to some of the articles and broadcasts disseminated
daily during the voir dire 9: the record suggests that their
passions had not been inflamed nor their thoughts biased by
1
The testimony of juror number seven, Martin Karetski, during examination by defense counsel is illustrative:
"Q. You have heard the matter discussed over the years?
"A. In the past few years I haven't heard too much about it.
"Q. In 1966 when the matter came up before you knew about it then?
"A. Yes sir.
"Q. And just recently when this matter was coming up again, I
presume?
"A. What I have read in the paper again.
"Q. And you have heard other people discuss it?
"A. Not too many so far.
"Q. You have heard other people express opinions about it?
"A. Not too many of those so far too.
"Q. Back around '66, did you?
"A. Yes in '66.

"Q. . . . I assume you had an opinion as to [Mr. Yount's] guilt or innocence [in 1966]?
"A. I had an opinion yes.
"Q. Do you have a opinion today as to his guilt or innocence?
"A. It's been a long time ago and I'm not sure now. It was in the paper
he plead [sic] not guilty.

"Q. Let me ask you this then. In case you do have an opinion, could you
wipe it out of your mind-erase it out of your mind before you would take a
seat in the jury box and hear whatever evidence you might hear?
"A. As it is right now I have no opinion now-four or five years ago I
probably did but right now I don't.
"Q. What happened Mr. Karetski, between then and now to eliminate
that opinion if you can tell me?
"A. Well, as far as I'm concerned there wasn't much in the paper about
it and it sort of slipped away from thought." App. 98a-100a.
'Jurors were sequestered as they were chosen.

'f
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the publicity. E. g., App. 176a-177a, 150a-151a; Tr. 771,
959, 1027.
That time soothes and erases is a perfectly natural phenomenon, familiar to all. See Irvin v. Dowd, 271 F. 2d 552,
561 (CA7 1959) (Duffy, J., dissenting) (A continuance should
have been granted because "[t]he passage of time is a great
healer," and public prejudice might have "subsid[ed]."),
rev'd, 366 U. S. 717 (1961); see also Murphy, supra, at 802;
Beck v. Washington, 369 U. S. 541, 556 (1962). Not all
members of the venire had put aside earlier prejudice, as the
voir dire disclosed. They retained their fixed opinions, and
were disqualified. But the testimony suggests that the voir
dire resulted in selecting those who had forgotten or would
need to be persuaded again. 10
The Court of Appeals below thought that the fact that the
great majority of veniremen "remembered the case" showed
that time had not served "to erase highly unfavorable publicity from the memory of the community." 710 F. 2d, at 969.
This conclusion, without more, is essentially irrelevant. The
relevant question is not whether the community remembered
the case, but whether the jurors at Yount's trial had such
fixed opinions that they could not judge impartially the guilt
of the defendant:· Irvin, supra, at 723. It is not unusual
As noted, the voir dire in this case was particularly extensive. It took
10 days to pick 14 jurors from 167 veniremen. In Irvin it took 8 days to
pick 14 jurors from 430 veniremen.
Contrary to Judge Garth's surmise, 710 F. 2d, at 979, however, the voir
dire interviews quoted in the petitioner's brief in Irvin do not appear to be
significantly less probing than those here. See Brief for Petitioner in
Irvin v. Dowd, 0. T. 1960, No. 41, pp. 18-59. It should also be noted that
the voir dire in Irvin, like that here, was conducted largely by counsel for
each side, rather than the judge. The only significant difference in the
procedures followed here and in Irvin is that the veniremen here were
brought into the courtroom alone for questioning, while it appears that
those in Irvin were questioned in front of all those remaining in the panel.
This is not an insubstantial distinction, as the Court suggested in Irvin,
supra, at 728, but we do not find it controlling.
10

83-9~PINION

PATTON v. YOUNT

10

that one's recollection of the fact that a notorious crime was
committed lingers long after the feelings of revulsion that
create prejudice have passed. It would be fruitless to attempt to identify any particular lapse of time that in itself
would distinguish the situation that existed in Irvin. 11 But it
is clear that the passage of time between a first and a second
trial can be a highly relevant fact. In the circumstances of
this case, we hold that it clearly rebuts any presumption of
partiality or prejudice that existed at the time of the initial
trial. There was fair, even abundant, support for the trial
court's findings that between the two trials of this case there
had been "practically no publicity given to this matter
through the news media," and that there had not been "any
great effect created by any publicity." App. 268a, 265a.

III
Yount briefly argues here that juror Hrin, as well as the
two alternates, were erroneously seated over his challenges
for cause. Brief for Respondent 32. There is substantial
doubt whether Yount properly raised in his petition for habeas corpus the claim that the trial court erroneously denied
his challenge for cause to juror Hrin. Compare 710 F. 2d, at
966, n. 18, with id., at 977, and n. 4 (Garth, J., concurring).
And there is no evidence that the alternate jurors, who did
not sit in judgment, actually talked with the other jurors during the four-day trial. But Judge Garth in the court below
based his concurrence on the view that Hrin would have required Yount to produce evidence to overcome his inclination
to think the accused was guilty, and the majority of the panel
In Murphy v. Florida, 421 U. S. 794 (1974), the defendant-widely
known as "Murph the Surf"-relied heavily on Irvin. The record of damaging publicity preceding his trial was at feast as extreme as that in this
case. Nevertheless, we found the record there distinguishable from Irvin.
We noted that the extensive publication of news articles about Murphy
largely had ceased some seven months before the jury was selected. I d.,
at 802. Murphy involved a lapse in publicity prior to the defendant's first
trial; there was no second trial in that case.
11

,.
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thought that the four-day association between the alternates
and the other jurors "operate[d] to subvert the requirement
that the jury's verdict be based on evidence developed from
the witness stand," id., at 971, n. 25. Therefore, we will
consider briefly the claims as to all three jurors.
It was the view of all three Court of Appeals judges that
the question whether jurors have opinions that disqualify
them is a mixed question of law and fact. See 710 F. 2d, at
968, n. 20, 981. Thus, they concluded that the presumption
of correctness due a state court's factual findings under 28
U. S. C. § 2254(d) does not apply. The opinions below relied
for this proposition on Irvin v. Dowd, supra, at 723. Irvin
addressed the partiality of the trial jury as a whole, a question we discuss in Part II, supra. We do not think its analysis can be extended to a federal habeas corpus case in which
the partiality of an individual juror is placed in issue. That
question is not one of mixed law and fact. Rather it is
plainly one of historical fact: did a juror swear that he could
set aside any opinion he might hold and decide the case on the
evidence, and should the juror's protestation of impartiality
have been believed. Cf. Rushen v. Spain,-- U. S. - - ,
- - (1983) (state court detennination that juror's deliberations were not biased by ex parte communications is a finding
of fact). 12
uThere are, of course, factual and legal questions to be considered in deciding whether a juror is qualified. The constitutional standard that a juror is impartial only if he can lay aside his opinion and render a verdict
based on the evidence presented in court is a question of federal law, see
Irvin, supra, at 723; whether a juror can in fact do that is a determination
to which habeas courts owe special deference, see Rushen, supra, a t - .
Cf. Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U. S. 422, 431-432 (1983) (similar analysis
as to whether a guilty plea was voluntary). See also Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145, 156 (1879) (whether a juror should be disqualified is a
question involving both a legal standard and findings of fact; the latter may
be set aside only for manifest error). The dissent misreads the Court's
opinion in United States v. Reynolds. Post, at 10-11, and n. 7. Reynolds
was decided some 87 years before the presumption of correctness for fac-
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There are good reasons to apply the statutory presumption
of correctness to the trial court's resolution of these questions. First, the determination has been made only after an
often extended voir dire proceeding designed specifically to
identify biased veniremen. It is fair to assume that the
method we have relied on since the beginning, e. g., United
States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 51 (C. C. D. Va. 1807) (Marshall, C. J.), usually identifies bias. 13 Second, the detertual findings was added to 28 U. S. C. § 2254. The Court clearly did not
attach the same significance to the phrase "a question of mixed law and
fact" that we do today under modern habeas law. It recognized that jurordisqualification questions may raise both a question of law-whether the
correct standard was applied-and a question of fact. Whether an opinion
expressed by a juror was such as to meet the legal standard for disqualification was viewed as a question of fact as to which deference was due to
the trial court's determination. This is apparent from the language quoted
by the dissent, which notes that while the question is a one of "mixed law
and fact," it is "to be tried, as far as the facts are concerned, like any other
issue of that character, upon the evidence. The finding of the trial court
upon that issue ought not to be set aside by a reviewing court, unless the
error is manifest." 98 U. S., at 156. Plainly, ctual findin s were to be o..
considered separately from the legal standard app e , and deference was
due to those findings. This is also apparent from the following passage:
"[T]he manner of the juror while testifying is oftentimes more indicative of
the real character of his opinion than his words. That is seen below, but
cannot always be spread upon the record. Care should, therefore, be
taken in the reviewing court not to reverse the ruling below upon such a
question of fact, except in a clear case." 98 U.S., at 156-157 (emphasis
added). The dissent claims this passage should be read to mean that the
question of whether a juror was impartial was a question of fact if he indicated he was partial, but a mixed question of law and fact if he claimed
impartiality. Ante, at 10, n. 6. We cannot attribute such incoherence to
the Court's opinion.
13
Accord In reApplication of National Broadcasting Co., 653 F. 2d 609,
617 (CADC 1981) ("[V]oir dire has long been recognized as an effective
method of rooting out such bias, especially when conducted in a careful and
thoroughgoing manner."); United States v. Duncan, 598 F. 2d 839, 865
(CA4), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 871 (1979); Calley v. Callaway, 519 F. 2d
184, 209, n. 45 (CA5 1975) (en bane) (citing cases), cert. denied, 425 U. S.
911 (1976). But cf. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U. S. 209, 222, and n. * (1982)
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mination is essentially one of credibility, and therefore
largely one of demeanor. As we have said on numerous occasions, the trial court's resolution of such questions is entitled, even on direct appeal, to "special deference." E. g.,

Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U. S., Inc., - - U. S.
- - , - - (1984). The respect paid such findings in a habeas
proceeding certainly should be no less. See Marshall v.
Lonberger, 459 U. S. 422, 434-435 (1983). 14
Thus the question is whether there is fair support in the
record for the state courts' conclusion that the jurors here
would be impartial. See 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(8). The testimony of each of the three challenged jurors is ambiguous and
at times contradictory. This is not unusual on voir dire
examination, particularly in a highly publicized criminal case.
It is well to remember that the lay persons on the panel may
never have been subjected to the type of leading questions
and cross-examination tactics that frequently are employed,
and that were evident in this case. Prospective jurors represent a cross-section of the community, and their education
and experience vary widely. Also, unlike witnesses, prospective jurors have had no briefing by lawyers prior to taking the stand. Jurors thus cannot be expected invariably to
express themselves carefully or even consistently. Every
trial judge understands this, and under our system it is that
judge who is best situated to determine competency to serve
impartially. The trial judge properly may choose to believe
those statements that were the most fully articulated or that
appeared to have been least influenced by leading.
(O'CONNOR, J., concurring) (describing situations in which state procedures are inadequate to uncover bias); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U. S. 723
(1963) (same).
1
' Demeanor plays a fundamental role not only in determining juror credibility, but also in simply understanding what a potential juror is saying.
Any complicated voir dire calls upon lay persons to think and express
themselves in unfamiliar terms, as a reading of any transcript of such a
proceeding will reveal. Demeanor, inflection, the flow of the questions
and answers can make confused and conflicting utterances comprehensible.
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The voir dire examination of juror Hrin was carefully scrutinized by the state courts and the federal District Court, as
he was challenged for cause and was a member of the jury
that convicted the defendent. We think that the trial
judge's decision to seat Hrin, despite early ambiguity in
his testimony, was confinned after he initially denied the
challenge. Defense counsel sought and obtained permission
to resume cross-examination. In response to a question
whether Hrin could set his opinion aside before entering the
jury box or would need evidence to change his mind, the juror clearly and forthrightly stated, "I think I could enter it
[the jury box] with a very open mind. I think I could very
easily. To say this is a requirement for some of the things
you have to do every day." App. 89a. Mter this categorical answer, defense counsel did not renew their challenge for
cause. Similarly, in the case of alternate juror Pyott, we
cannot fault the trial judge for crediting her earliest testimony, in which she said that she could put her opinion aside
"[i]f [she] had to," rather than the later testimony in which
defense counsel persuaded her that logically she would need
evidence to discard any opinion she might have. App. 246a,
250a-252a. Alternate juror Chincharick's testimony is the
most ambiguous, as he appears simply to have answered
"yes" to almost any question put to him. It is here that the
federal court's deference must operate, for while the cold
record arouses some concern, only the trial judge could tell
which of these answers was said with the greatest comprehension and certainty.
IV
We conclude that the voir dire testimony and the record of
publicity do not reveal the kind of "wave of public passion"
that would have made a fair trial unlikely by the jury that
was empaneled as a whole. We also conclude that the ambiguity in the testimony of the cited jurors who were challenged for cause is insufficient to overcome the presumption
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of correctness owed to the trial court's findings. We therefore reverse.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE MARSHALL
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No. 83-95

ERNEST S. PATTON, SUPERINTENDENT, SCI-CAMP
HILL AND LEROY S. ZIMMERMAN, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF PENNSYLVANIA, PETITIONERS v.
JON E. YOUNT
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
[June 26, 1984]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case brings before us a claim that pretrial publicity so
infected a state criminal trial as to deny the defendant his
Sixth Amendment right to an "impartial jury."
I
On April 28, 1966, the body of Pamela Rimer, an 18-yearold high school student, was found in a wooded area near
her home in Luthersburg, Clearfield County, Pennsylvania.
There were numerous wounds about her head and cuts on her
throat and neck. An autopsy revealed that she died of strangulation when blood from her wounds was drawn into her
lungs. The autopsy showed no indication that she had been
sexually assaulted.
At about 5:45 a. m. the following morning, respondent
Yount appeared at the State Police Substation in nearby DuBois. Yount, who had been the victim's high school mathematics teacher, proceeded to give the police oral and written
confessions to the murder. The police refused to release the
confession to the press, and it was not published until after
it was read at Yount's arraignment three days later. E x.
P1-a, P1-d. At his trial in 1966, the confessions were admitted into evidence. Yount took the stand and claimed tempo-
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rary insanity. The jury convicted him of first-degree murder and rape, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment.
On direct appeal the Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined that under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966),
police had given Yount inadequate notice of his right to an
attorney prior to his confession. The court remanded for a
new trial. Commonwealth v. Yount, 435 Pa. 276, 256 A. 2d
464 (1969), cert. denied , 397 U. S. 925 (1970).
Prior to the second trial in 1970, the trial court ordered
suppression of Yaunt's written confessions and that portion
of the oral confession that was obtained after he was legally
in custody. The prosecution dismissed the rape charge.
There followed an extensive voir dire that is now at the heart
of this case. Jury selection began on November 4, 1970, and
took 10 days, seven jury panels, 292 veniremen, and 1,186
pages of testimony. Yount moved for a change of venue before, and several times during, the voir dire. He argued
that the widespread dissemination of prejudicial information
could not be eradicated from the minds of potential jurors,
and cited in support the difficulty of the voir dire and numerous newspaper and other articles about the case. The motions were denied. The trial court noted that the articles
merely reported events without editorial comment; that the
length of the voir dire resulted in part from the court's leniency in allowing examinations and challenges of the jurors;
that "almost all, if not all," the jurors seated had "no prior or
present fixed opinion"; and that there had been "little, if any,
talk in public" between the two trials. The court also observed that the voir dire of the second trial had been sparsely
attended.
Ultimately, twelve jurors and two alternates were seated.
At the second trial, Yount did not take the stand and did not
claim temporary insanity. Instead he relied upon crossexamination and character witnesses in an attempt to undermine the State's proof of his intent. The jury convicted him
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again of first-degree murder, and he was resentenced to life
imprisonment. The trial court denied a motion for a new
trial, finding that practically no publicity had been given to
the case between the two trials , and that little public interest
was shown during the second trial. App. 268a. In addition,
the court concluded that the jury was without bias. The
Pennsylvania Supr eme Court affirmed the conviction and the
trial court's findings. Commonwealth v. Yount, 455 Pa. 303,
311-314, 314 A. 2d 242, 247-248 (1974).
In January 1981, Yaunt filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in United States District Court. He claimed, inter
alia, that his conviction had been obtained in violation of his
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial by an
impartial jury. The case was assigned to a magistrate, who
conducted a hearing and recommended that the petition be
granted. The District Court rejected the magistrate's recommendation. 537 F. Supp. 873 (WD Pa. 1982). It held
that the pretrial publicity was not vicious, excessive, nor officially sponsored, and that the jurors were able to set aside
any preconceived notions of guilt. It noted that the percentage of jurors excused for cause was "not remarkable to anyone familiar with the difficulty in selecting a homicide jury in
Pennsylvania." I d., at 882. In addition, the court reviewed
the instances in which the state trial court had denied a chal~
lenge for cause, and upheld the trial court's view that the
jury was impartial.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. 710
F. 2d 956 (1983). The court relied primarily on the analysis
set out in Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U. S. 717 (1961), and found that
pretrial publicity had made a fair trial impossible in Clearfield County. It independently examined the nature of the
publicity surrounding the second trial, the testimony at voir
dire of the venire as a whole, and the voir dire testimony of
the jurors eventually seated.
The publicity revealed
Yount's prior conviction for murder, his confession, and his
prior plea of temporary insanity, information not admitted
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into evidence at trial. 1 The voir dire showed that all but two
of 163 veniremen questioned about the case 2 had heard of it,
and that, 126, or 77%, admitted they would carry an opinion
into the jury box. This was a higher percentage than in
Irvin, where 62% of the 430 veniremen were dismissed for
cause because they had fixed opinions concerning the petitioner's guilt. Finally, the Court of Appeals found that eight
of the fourteen jurors and alternates actually seated admitted
that at some time they had formed an opinion as to Yount's
guilt. 3 The court thought that many of the jurors had given
equivocal responses when asked whether they could set aside
these opinions, and that one juror, a Mr. Hrin, and both alternates would have required evidence to overcome their beliefs. The court concluded that "despite their assurances of
impartiality, the jurors could not set aside their opinions and
render a verdict based solely on the evidence presented."
710 F. 2d, at 972. 4
'The Court of Appeals rejected as without fair support in the record the
trial court's conclusion that there was practically no publicity given to the
case between the first and second trials. See 710 F . 2d, at 969, n. 21.
The federal court suggested that the record on habeas of the publicity after
the first trial and during the second was more complete than the record
considered by the trial court. Ibid.
The Court of Appeals also suggested that the trial court's view that
there was little talk in public concerning the second trial was undermined
by the voir dire testimony that there had been public discussion of the case,
particularly in the last weeks before retrial. I d., at 969, n. 22. The court
discounted, as of limited significance, the trial court's point that few spectators had attended the trial, since Yount did not allege prejudice arising
from the "'circus atmosphere' " in the courtroom. Ibid.
2
One hundred twenty-five of the original 292 veniremen were excused
because they had not been chosen properly. Four others were dismissed
for cause before they were questioned on the case.
8
The Court of Appeals noted that in Irvin eight of twelve jurors had
formed opinions of guilt.
' Judge Stern wrote a separate concurring opinion in which he suggested that "the constitutional standard which for 175 years has guided the
lower courts" in this area be rejected. 710 F. 2d, at 972. Rather than
hinge disqualification of a juror on whether he has a fixed opinion of guilt
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Judge Garth concurred in the judgment. He declined to
join the court's view that actual prejudice on the part of the
jury might be inferred from pretrial publicity and the answers at voir dire of veniremen not selected for the jury. He
wrote that "[a] thorough and skillfully conducted voir dire
should be adequate to identify juror bias, even in a community saturated with publicity adverse to the defendant." !d.,
at 979. 5 Judge Garth nevertheless concurred because in his
view juror Hrin stated at voir dire that he would have required
evidence to change his mind about Yount's guilt. This
stripped the defendant of the presumption of innocence. 6
We granted certiorari,-- U. S. - - (1983), to consider,
in the context of this case, the problem of pervasive media
publicity that now arises so frequently in the trial of sensational criminal cases. We reverse the judgment of the Court
of Appeals.
II
As noted, the Court of Appeals rested its decision that the
jury was not impartial on this Court's decision in Irvin v.
that he cannot lay aside, Judge Stern would bar any juror who admitted
any opinion as to guilt. Moreover, no jury could be empanelled where
more than 25% of the veniremen state that they held an opinion concerning
the defendant's guilt. This would raise such doubts as to the sincerity of
those who claimed no opinion as to suggest concealed bias, Judge Stern
wrote.
•Judge Garth thought Irvin was distinguishable, because there "the
trial court (which itself questioned the jurors challenged for cause) did not
engage in a searching and thorough voir dire." 710 F. 2d, at 979.
Rather, it merely credited the jurors' subjective opinions that each could
render an impartial verdict notwithstanding his or her opinion. Judge
Garth also noted that Yount challenged for cause only three of the actual
jurors. In Irvin, the defendant challenged each of his twelve jurors for
cause. Irvin v. Dowd, 359 U. S. 394, 398 (1959).
6
Judge Garth stated that whether juror Hrin was unconstitutionally biased was a mixed question of law and fact under Irvin. 710 F. 2d, at 981.
He therefore did not apply the presumption of correctness that is applicable to the factual findings of a state court in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d).
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Dowd, supra. That decision, a leading one at the time, held
that adverse pretrial publicity can create such a presumption
of prejudice in a community that the jurors' claims that they
can be impartial should not be believed. The Court in Irvin
reviewed a number of factors in determining whether the totality of the circumstances raised such a presumption. The
Court noted, however, that the trial court's findings of
impartiality might be overturned only for "manifest error."
366 U. S., at 723. The Court of Appeals in this case did not
address this aspect of the Irvin decision. 7 Moreover, the
court below, in concentrating on the factors discussed at
length in Irvin, failed to give adequate weight to other significant circumstances in this case. In Irvin, the Court observed that it was during the six or seven months immediately preceding trial that "a barrage of newspaper headlines,
articles, cartoons and pictures was unleashed against [the defendant]." 366 U. S., at 725. In this case, the extensive adverse publicity and the community's sense of outrage were at
their height prior to Yount's first trial in 1966. The jury selection for Yount's second trial, at issue here, did not occur
until four years later, at a time when prejudicial publicity
7
The Court of Appeals appears to have thought that two statements in
Irvin--that a federal court must "independently evaluate" the voir dire
testimony, and that the question of juror partiality is a mixed question of
law and fact, 366 U. S., at 723--meant that there is no presumption of correctness owed to the trial court's finding that a jury as a whole is impartial.
We note that Irvin was decided five years before Congress added to the
habeas corpus statute an explicit presumption of correctness for state court
factual findings, see Pub. L. 89-711, 80 Stat. 1105-1106, and two years before this Court's opinion in Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293 (1963), provided the guidelines that were later codified. It may be that there is little
practical difference between the Irvin "manifest error" standard and the
"fairly supported by the record" standard of the amended habeas statute.
See 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d). In any case, we do not think the habeas standard is any less stringent. Since we uphold the state court's findings in this
case under Irvin's "manifest error" standard, we do not need to determine
whether the subsequent development of the law of habeas corpus might
have required a different analysis or result in that case.
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was greatly diminished and community sentiment had softened. In these circumstances, we hold that the trial court
did not commit manifest error in finding that the jury as a
whole was impartial.
The record reveals that in the year and a half from the reversal of the first conviction to the start of the second voir
dire each of the two Clearfield County daily newspapers published an average of less than one article per month. App.
642a-657a; Ex. P1-v to P1-kk, P-2. More important, many
of these were extremely brief announcements of the trial
dates and scheduling such as are common in rural newspapers. E. g., Ex. P1-ff, P1-ii, P1-jj. The transcript of the
voir dire contains numerous references to the sparse publicity and minimal public interest prior to the second trial.
E. g., App. 43a, 98a, 100a; Tr. 27-28, 90, 191, 384, 771, 829,
1142. It is true that during the voir dire the newspapers
published articles on an almost daily basis, but these too were
purely factual articles generally discussing not the crime or
prior prosecution, but the prolonged process of jury selection. App. 658a-671a. In short, the record of publicity in
the months preceding, and at the time of, the second trial
does not reveal the "barrage of inflammatory publicity immediately prior to trial," Murphy v. Florida, 421 U. S. 794, 798
(1975), amounting to a "huge ... wave of public passion,"
Irvin, supra, at 728, that the Court found in Irvin.
The voir dire testimony revealed that this lapse in time had
a profound effect on the community and, more important, on
the jury, in softening or effacing opinion. Many veniremen,
of course, simply had let the details of the case slip from their
mind. E. g., App. 194a; Tr. 33, 284, 541-544, 991. In addition, while it is true that a number of jurors and veniremen
testified that at one time they had held opinions, for many,
time had weakened or eliminated any conviction they had
had. See, e. g., App. 98a-100a (juror number 7), 128a (juror
number 8); Tr. 384-385, 398-399, 831, 897 (semble), 1075-
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1076, 1144; see also App. 164a-166a (juror number 10). 8
The same is true of the testimony of the jurors and veniremen who were seated late in the process and therefore were
subjected to some of the articles and broadcasts disseminated
daily during the voir dire 9: the record suggests that their
passions had not been inflamed nor their thoughts biased by
8

The testimony of juror number seven, Martin Karetski, during examination by defense counsel is illustrative:
"Q. You have heard the matter discussed over the years?
"A. In the past few years I haven't heard too much about it.
"Q. In 1966 when the matter came up before you knew about it then?
"A. Yes sir.
"Q. And just recently when this matter was coming up again, I
presume?
"A. What I have read in the paper again.
"Q. And you have heard other people discuss it?
"A. Not too many so far.
"Q. You have heard other people express opinions about it?
"A. Not too many of those so far too.
"Q. Back around '66, did you?
"A. Yes in '66.
"Q. . .. I assume you had an opinion as to [Mr. Yount's] guilt or innocence [in 1966]?
"A. I had an opinion yes.
"Q. Do you have a opinion today as to his guilt or innocence?
"A. It's been a long time ago and I'm not sure now. It was in the paper
he plead [sic] not guilty.
"Q. Let me ask you this then. In case you do have an opinion, could you
wipe it out of your mind-erase it out of your mind before you would take a
seat in the jury box and hear whatever evidence you might hear?
"A. As it is right now I have no opinion now-four or five years ago I
probably did but right now I don't.
"Q. What happened Mr. Karetski, between then and now to eliminate
that opinion if you can tell me?
"A. Well, as far as I'm concerned there wasn't much in the paper about
it and it sort of slipped away from thought." App. 98a-100a.
9
Jurors were sequestered as they were chosen.
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the publicity. E. g., App. 176a-177a, 150a-151a; Tr. 771,
959, 1027.
That time soothes and erases is a perfectly natural phenomenon, familiar to all. See Irvin v. Dowd, 271 F. 2d 552,
561 (CA7 1959) (Duffy, J., dissenting) (A continuance should
have been granted because "[t]he passage of time is a great
healer," and public prejudice might have "subsid[ed]."),
rev'd, 366 U. S. 717 (1961); see also Murphy, supra, at 802;
Beck v. Washington, 369 U. S. 541, 556 (1962). Not all
members of the venire had put aside earlier prejudice, as the
voir dire disclosed. They retained their fixed opinions, and
were disqualified. But the testimony suggests that the voir
dire resulted in selecting those who had forgotten or would
need to be persuaded again. 10
The Court of Appeals below thought that the fact that the
great majority of veniremen "remembered the case" showed
that time had not served "to erase highly unfavorable publicity from the memory of the community." 710 F. 2d, at 969.
This conclusion, without more, is essentially irrelevant. The
relevant question is not whether the community remembered
the case, but whether the jurors at Yount's trial had such
fixed opinions that they could not judge impartially the guilt
of the defendant. Irvin, supra, at 723. It is not unusual
10
As noted, the voir dire in this case was particularly extensive. It took
10 days to pick 14 jurors from 167 veniremen. In Irvin it took 8 days to
pick 14 jurors from 430 veniremen.
Contrary to Judge Garth's surmise, 710 F. 2d, at 979, however, the voir
dire interviews quoted in the petitioner's brief in Irvin do not appear to be
significantly less probing than those here. See Brief for Petitioner in
Irvin v. Dowd, 0. T. 1960, No. 41, pp. 18-59. It should also be noted that
the voir dire in Irvin, like that here, was conducted largely by counsel for
each side, rather than the judge. The only significant difference in the
procedures followed here and in Irvin is that the veniremen here were
brought into the courtroom alone for questioning, while it appears that
those in Irvin were questioned in front of all those remaining in the panel.
This is not an insubstantial distinction, as the Court suggested in Irvin,
supra, at 728, but we do not find it controlling.
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that one's recollection of the fact that a notorious crime was
committed lingers long after the feelings of revulsion that
create prejudice have passed. It would be fruitless to attempt to identify any particular lapse of time that in itself
would distinguish the situation that existed in Irvin. 11 But it
is clear that the passage of time between a first and a second
trial can be a highly relevant fact. In the circumstances of
this case, we hold that it clearly rebuts any presumption of
partiality or prejudice that existed at the time of the initial
trial. There was fair, even abundant, support for the trial
court's findings that between the two trials of this case there
had been "practically no publicity given to this matter
through the news media," and that there had not been "any
great effect created by any publicity." App. 268a, 265a.

III
Yount briefly argues here that juror Hrin, as well as the
two alternates, were erroneously seated over his challenges
for cause. Brief for Respondent 32. There is substantial
doubt whether Yount properly raised in his petition for habeas corpus the claim that the trial court erroneously denied
his challenge for cause to juror Hrin. Compare 710 F. 2d, at
966, n. 18, with id., at 977, and n. 4 (Garth, J., concurring).
And there is no evidence that the alternate jurors, who did
not sit in judgment, actually talked with the other jurors during the four-day trial. But Judge Garth in the court below
based his concurrence on the view that Hrin would have required Yount to produce evidence to overcome his inclination
to think the accused was guilty, and the majority of the panel
11
In Murphy v. Florida, 421 U. S. 794 (1974), the defendant-widely
known as "Murph the Surf"-relied heavily on Irvin. The record of damaging publicity preceding his trial was at least as extreme as that in this
case. Nevertheless, we found the record there distinguishable from Irvin.
We noted that the extensive publication of news articles about Murphy
largely had ceased some seven months before the jury was selected. I d.,
at 802. Murphy involved a lapse in publicity prior to the defendant's first
trial; there was no second trial in that case.
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thought that the four-day association between the alternates
and the other jurors "operate[d] to subvert the requirement
that the jury's verdict be based on evidence developed from
the witness stand," id., at 971, n. 25. Therefore, we will
consider briefly the claims as to all three jurors.
It was the view of all three Court of Appeals judges that
the question whether jurors have opinions that disqualify
them is a mixed question of law and fact. See 710 F. 2d, at
968, n. 20, 981. Thus, they concluded that the presumption
of correctness due a state court's factual findings under 28
U. S. C. § 2254(d) does not apply. The opinions below relied
for this proposition on Irvin v. Dowd, supra, at 723. Irvin
addressed the partiality of the trial jury as a whole, a question we discuss in Part II, supra. We do not think its analysis can be extended to a federal habeas corpus case in which
the partiality of an individual juror is placed in issue. That
question is not one of mixed law and fact. Rather it is
plainly one of historical fact: did a juror swear that he could
set aside any opinion he might hold and decide the case on the
evidence, and should the juror's protestation of impartiality
have been believed. Cf. Rushen v. Spain,-- U.S.--,
- - (1983) (state court determination that juror's deliberations were not biased by ex parte communications is a finding
of fact). 12
12

There are, of course, factual and legal questions to be considered in
deciding whether a juror is qualified. The constitutional standard that a
juror is impartial only if he can lay aside his opinion and render a verdict
based on the evidence presented in court is a question of federal law, see
Irvin, supra, at 723; whether a juror can in fact do that is a determination
to which habeas courts owe special deference, see Rushen, supra, a t - .
Cf. Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U. S. 422, 431-432 (1983) (similar analysis
as to whether a guilty plea was voluntary). See also Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U. S. 145, 156 (1879) (whether a juror should be disqualified is a
question involving both a legal standard and findings of fact; the latter may
be set aside only for manifest error).
The dissent misreads the Court's opinion in United States v. Reynolds.
Post, at 11-13, and nn. 6 and 7. Reynolds was decided some 87 years be-
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There are good reasons to apply the statutory presumption
of correctness to the trial court's resolution of these questions. First, the determination has been made only after an
often extended voir dire proceeding designed specifically to
identify biased veniremen. It is fair to assume that the
method we have relied on since the beginning, e. g., United
States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 51 (CCD Va. 1807) (Mar. shall, C. J.), usually identifies bias. 13 Second, the deterfore the presumption of correctness for factual findings was added to 28
U. S. C. § 2254. The Court clearly did not attach the same significance to
the phrase "a question of mixed law and fact" that we do today under modern habeas law. It recognized that juror-disqualification questions may
raise both a question of law-whether the correct standard was appliedand a question of fact. Whether an opinion expressed by a juror was such
as to meet the legal standard for disqualification was viewed as a question
of fact as to which deference was due to the trial court's determination.
This is apparent from the language quoted by the dissent, which notes that
while the question is one of"mixed law and fact," it is "to be tried, as far as
the facts are concerned, like any other issue of that character, upon the
evidence. The finding of the trial court upon that issue ought not to be set
aside by a reviewing court, unless the error is manifest." 98 U. S., at 156.
Plainly, factual findings were to be considered separately from the legal
standard applied, and deference was due to those findings. This is also
apparent from the following passage:
"[T]he manner of the juror while testifying is oftentimes more indicative
of the real character of his opinion than his words. That is seen below, but
cannot always be spread upon the record. Care should, therefore, be
taken in the reviewing court not to reverse the ruling below upon such a
question of fact, except in a clear case." 98 U. S., at 156-157 (emphasis
added).
Taken together, these passages plainly show that the "character of [a juror's] opinion" was considered a question of fact. Contrary to the suggestion of the dissent, ante, at 11, n. 6, the factual question was not limited to
whether the juror was telling the truth, but included discovering the "real
character" of any opinion held. Deference was due to the trial court's conclusions on that question.
13
Accord In reApplication of National Broadcasting Co., 653 F. 2d 609,
617 (CADC 1981) ("[V]oir dire has long been recognized as an effective
method of rooting out such bias, especially when conducted in a careful and
thoroughgoing manner"); United States v. Duncan, 598 F. 2d 839, 865
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mination is essentially one of credibility, and therefore
largely one of demeanor. As we have said on numerous occasions, the trial court's resolution of such questions is entitled, even on direct appeal, to "special deference." E. g.,
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U. S., Inc., - - U. S.
- - , - - (1984). The respect paid such findings in a habeas
proceeding certainly should be no less. See Marshall v.
Lonberger, 459 U. S. 422, 434-435 (1983). 14
Thus the question is whether there is fair support in the
record for the state courts' conclusion that the jurors here
would be impartial. See 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(8). The testimony of each of the three challenged jurors is ambiguous and
at times contradictory. This is not unusual on voir dire
examination, particularly in a highly publicized criminal case.
It is well to remember that the lay persons on the panel may
never have been subjected to the type of leading questions
and cross-examination tactics that frequently are employed,
and that were evident in this case. Prospective jurors represent a cross-section of the community, and their education
and experience vary widely. Also, unlike witnesses, prospective jurors have had no briefing by lawyers prior to taking the stand. Jurors thus cannot be expected invariably to
express themselves carefully or even consistently. Every
trial judge understands this, and under our system it is that
judge who is best situated to determine competency to serve
(CA4), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 871 (1979); Calley v. Callaway, 519 F. 2d
184, 209, n. 45 (CA5 1975) (en bane) (citing cases), cert. denied, 425 U. S.
911 (1976). But cf. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U. S. 209, 222, and n. * (1982)
(O'CONNOR, J., concurring) (describing situations in which state procedures are inadequate to uncover bias); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U. S. 723
(1963) (same).
14
Demeanor plays a fundamental role not only in determining juror credibility, but also in simply understanding what a potential juror is saying.
Any complicated voir dire calls upon lay persons to think and express
themselves in unfamiliar terms, as a reading of any transcript of such a
proceeding will reveal. Demeanor, inflection, the flow of the questions
and answers can make confused and conflicting utterances comprehensible.
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impartially. The trial judge properly may choose to believe
those statements that were the most fully articulated or that
appeared to have been least influenced by leading.
The voir dire examination of juror Hrin was carefully scrutinized by the state courts and the federal District Court, as
he was challenged for cause and was a member of the jury
that convicted the defendent. We think that the trial
judge's decision to seat Hrin, despite early ambiguity in
his testimony, was confirmed after he initially denied the
challenge. Defense counsel sought and obtained permission
to resume cross-examination. In response to a question
whether Hrin could set his opinion aside before entering the
jury box or would need evidence to change his mind, the juror clearly and forthrightly stated, "I think I could enter it
[the jury box] with a very open mind. I think I could very
easily. To say this is a requirement for some of the things
you have to do every day." App. 89a. After this categorical answer, defense counsel did not renew their challenge for
cause. Similarly, in the case of alternate juror Pyott, we
cannot fault the trial judge for crediting her earliest testimony, in which she said that she could put her opinion aside
"[i]f [she] had to," rather than the later testimony in which
defense counsel persuaded her that logically she would need
evidence to discard any opinion she might have. App. 246a,
250a-252a. Alternate juror Chincharick's testimony is the
most ambiguous, as he appears simply to have answered
"yes" to almost any question put to him. It is here that the
federal court's deference must operate, for while the cold
record arouses some concern, only the trial judge could tell
which of these answers was said with the greatest comprehension and certainty.
IV
We conclude that the voir dire testimony and the record of
publicity do not reveal the kind of "wave of public passion"
that would have made a fair trial unlikely by the jury that
was empaneled as a whole. We also conclude that the ambi-
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guity in the testimony of the cited jurors who were challenged for cause is insufficient to overcome the presumption
of correctness owed to the trial court's findings. We therefore reverse.

It is so ordered.
J USTICE MARSHALL
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 83-95

ERNEST S. PATTON, SUPERINTENDENT, SCI-CAMP
HILL AND LEROY S. ZIMMERMAN, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF PENNSYLVANIA, PETITIONERS v.
JON E. YOUNT
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
[June 26, 1984]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case brings before us a claim that pretrial publicity so
infected a state criminal trial as to deny the defendant his
Sixth Amendment right to an "impartial jury."
I
On April 28, 1966, the body of Pamela Rimer, an 18-yearold high school student, was found in a wooded area near
her home in Luthersburg, Clearfield County, Pennsylvania.
There were numerous wounds about her head and cuts on her
throat and neck. An autopsy revealed that she died of strangulation when blood from her wounds was drawn into her
lungs. The autopsy showed no indication that she had been
sexually assaulted.
At about 5:45 a. m. the following morning, respondent
Yount appeared at the State Police Substation in nearby DuBois. Yount, who had been the victim's high school mathematics teacher, proceeded to give the police oral and written
confessions to the murder. The police refused to release the
confession to the press, and it was not published until after
it was read at Yount's arraignment three days later. Ex.
P1-a, P1-d. At his trial in 1966, the confessions were admitted into evidence. Yount took the stand and claimed tempo-
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rary insanity. The jury convicted him of first-degree murder and rape, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment.
On direct appeal the Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined that under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966),
police had given Yount inadequate notice of his right to an
attorney prior to his confession. The court remanded for a
new trial. Commonwealth v. Yount, 435 Pa. 276, 256 A. 2d
464 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U. S. 925 (1970).
Prior to the second trial in 1970, the trial court ordered
suppression of Yount's written confessions and that portion
of the oral confession that was obtained after he was legally
in custody. The prosecution dismissed the rape charge.
There followed an extensive voir dire that is now at the heart
of this case. Jury selection began on November 4, 1970, and
took 10 days, seven jury panels, 292 veniremen, and 1,186
pages of testimony. Yount moved for a change of venue before, and several times during, the voir dire. He argued
that the widespread dissemination of prejudicial information
could not be eradicated from the minds of potential jurors,
and cited in support the difficulty of the voir dire and numerous newspaper and other articles about the case. The motions were denied. The trial court noted that the articles
merely reported events without editorial comment; that the
length of the voir dire resulted in part from the court's leniency in allowing examinations and challenges of the jurors;
that "almost all, if not all," the jurors seated had "no prior or
present fixed opinion"; and that there had been "little, if any,
talk in public" between the two trials. The court also observed that the voir dire of the second trial had been sparsely
attended.
Ultimately, twelve jurors and two alternates were seated.
At the second trial, Yount did not take the stand and did not
claim temporary insanity. Instead he relied upon crossexamination and character witnesses in an attempt to undermine the State's proof of his intent. The jury convicted him
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again of first-degree murder, and he was resentenced to life
imprisonment. The trial court denied a motion for a new
trial, finding that practically no publicity had been given to
the case between the two trials, and that little public interest
was shown during the second trial. App. 268a. In addition,
the court concluded that the jury was without bias. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and the
trial court's findings. Commonwealth v. Yount, 455 Pa. 303,
311-314, 314 A. 2d 242, 247-248 (1974).
In January 1981, Yount filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in United States District Court. He claimed, inter
alia, that his conviction had been obtained in violation of his
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial by an
impartial jury. The case was assigned to a magistrate, who
conducted a hearing and recommended that the petition be
granted. The District Court rejected the magistrate's recommendation. 537 F. Supp. 873 (WD Pa. 1982). It held
that the pretrial publicity was not vicious, excessive, nor officially sponsored, and that the jurors were able to set aside
any preconceived notions of guilt. It noted that the percentage of jurors excused for cause was "not remarkable to anyone familiar with the difficulty in selecting a homicide jury in
Pennsylvania." I d., at 882. In addition, the court reviewed
the instances in which the state trial court had denied a chal~
lenge for cause, and upheld the trial court's view that the
jury was impartial.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. 710
F. 2d 956 (1983). The court relied primarily on the analysis
set out in Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U. S. 717 (1961), and found that
pretrial publicity had made a fair trial impossible in Clearfield County. It independently examined the nature of the
publicity surrounding the second trial, the testimony at voir
dire of the venire as a whole, and the voir dire testimony of
the jurors eventually seated. The publicity revealed
Yount's prior conviction for murder, his confession, and his
prior plea of temporary insanity, information not admitted
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into evidence at trial. 1 The voir dire showed that all but two
of 163 veniremen questioned about the case 2 had heard of it,
and that, 126, or 77%, admitted they would carry an opinion
into the jury box. This was a higher percentage than in
Irvin, where 62% of the 430 veniremen were dismissed for
cause because they had fixed opinions concerning the petitioner's guilt. Finally, the Court of Appeals found that eight
of the fourteen jurors and alternates actually seated admitted
that at some time they had formed an opinion as to Yount's
guilt. 3 The court thought that many of the jurors had given
equivocal responses when asked whether they could set aside
these opinions, and that one juror, a Mr. Hrin, and both alternates would have required evidence to overcome their beliefs. The court concluded that "despite their assurances of
impartiality, the jurors could not set aside their opinions and
render a verdict based solely on the evidence presented."
710 F. 2d, at 972. 4
The Court of Appeals rejected as without fair support in the record the
trial court's conclusion that there was practically no publicity given to the
case between the first and second trials. See 710 F. 2d, at 969, n. 21.
The federal court suggested that the record on habeas of the publicity after
the first trial and during the second was more complete than the record
considered by the trial court. Ibid.
The Court of Appeals also suggested that the trial court's view that
there was little talk in public concerning the second trial was undermined
by the voir dire testimony that there had been public discussion of the case,
particularly in the last weeks before retrial. I d., at 969, n. 22. The court
discounted, as of limited significance, the trial court's point that few spectators had attended the trial, since Yount did not allege prejudice arising
from the "'circus atmosphere'" in the courtroom. Ibid.
2
One hundred twenty-five of the original 292 veniremen were excused
because they had not been chosen properly. Four others were dismissed
for cause before they were questioned on the case.
8
The Court of Appeals noted that in Irvin eight of twelve jurors had
formed opinions of guilt.
'Judge Stern wrote a separate concurring opinion in which he suggested that "the constitutional standard which for 175 years has guided the
lower courts" in this area be rejected. 710 F. 2d, at 972. Rather than
hinge disqualification of a juror on whether he has a fixed opinion of guilt
1
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Judge Garth concurred in the judgment. He declined to
join the court's view that actual prejudice on the part of the
jury might be inferred from pretrial publicity and the answers at voir dire of veniremen not selected for the jury. He
wrote that "[a] thorough and skillfully conducted voi1· dire
should be adequate to identify juror bias, even in a community saturated with publicity adverse to the defendant. " !d.,
at 979. 5 Judge Garth nevertheless concurred because in his
view juror Hrin stated at voir dire that he would have required
evidence to change his mind about Yaunt's guilt. This
stripped the defendant of the presumption of innocence. 6
We granted certiorari,-- U. S. - - (1983), to consider,
in the context of this case, the problem of pervasive media
publicity that now arises so frequently in the trial of sensational criminal cases. We reverse the judgment of the Court
of Appeals.
II
As noted, the Court of Appeals rested its decision that the
jury was not impartial on this Court's decision in Irvin v.
that he cannot lay aside, Judge Stern would bar any juror who admitted
any opinion as to guilt. Moreover, no jury could be empanelled where
more than 25% of the veniremen state that they held an opinion concerning
the defendant's guilt. This would raise such doubts as to the sincerity of
those who claimed no opinion as to suggest concealed bias, Judge Stern
wrote.
6
Judge Garth thought Irvin was distinguishable , because there "the
trial court (which itself questioned the jurors challenged for cause) did not
engage in a searching and thorough voir dire." 710 F. 2d, at 979.
Rather, it merely credited the jurors' subjective opinions that each could
render an impartial verdict notwithstanding his or her opinion. Judge
Garth also noted that Yount challenged for cause only three of the actual
jurors. In Irvin, the defendant challenged each of his twelve jurors for
cause. Irvin v. Dowd, 359 U. S. 394, 398 (1959).
6
Judge Garth stated that whether juror Hrin was unconstitutionally biased was a mixed question of law and fact under Irvin. 710 F. 2d, at 981.
He therefore did not apply the presumption of correctness that is applicable to the factual findings of a state court in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d).
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Dowd, supra. That decision, a leading one at the time, held
that adverse pretrial publicity can create such a presumption
of prejudice in a community that the jurors' claims that they
can be impartial should not be believed. The Court in lTvin
reviewed a number of factors in determining whether the totality of the circumstances raised such a presumption. The
Court noted, however, that the trial court's findings of
impartiality might be overturned only for "manifest error."
366 U. S., at 723. The Court of Appeals in this case did not
address this aspect of the !Tvin decision. 7 Moreover, the
court below, in concentrating on the factors discussed at
length in Iroin, failed to give adequate weight to other significant circumstances in this case. In Iroin, the Court observed that it was during the six or seven months immediately preceding trial that "a barrage of newspaper headlines,
articles, cartoons and pictures was unleashed against [the defendant]." 366 U. S., at 725. In this case, the extensive adverse publicity and the community's sense of outrage were at
their height prior to Yount's first trial in 1966. The jury selection for Yount's second trial, at issue here, did not occur
until four years later, at a time when prejudicial publicity
7
The Court of Appeals appears to have thought that two statements in
Irvin-that a federal court must "independently evaluate" the voir dire
testimony, and that the question of juror partiality is a mixed question of
law and fact, 366 U. S., at 723-meant that there is no presumption of correctness owed to the trial court's finding that a jury as a whole is impartial.
We note that Irvin was decided five years before Congress added to the
habeas corpus statute an explicit presumption of correctness for state court
factual findings, see Pub. L. 89-711, 80 Stat. 1105-1106, and two years before this Court's opinion in Toumsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293 (1963), provided the guidelines that were later codified. It may be that there is little
practical difference between the Irvin "manifest error" standard and the
"fairly supported by the record" standard of the amended habeas statute.
See 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d). In any case, we do not think the habeas standard is any less stringent. Since we uphold the state court's findings in this
case under Irvin's ''manifest error" standard, we do not need to determine
whether the subsequent development of the law of habeas corpus might
have required a different analysis or result in that case.
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was greatly diminished and community sentiment had softened. In these circumstances, we hold that the trial court
did not commit manifest error in finding that the jury as a
whole was impartial.
The record reveals that in the year and a half from the reversal of the first conviction to the start of the second voir
dire each of the two Clearfield County daily newspapers published an average of less than one article per month. App.
642a-657a; Ex. Pl-v to P1-kk, P-2. More important, many
of these were extremely brief announcements of the trial
dates and scheduling such as are common in rural newspapers. E. g., Ex. P1-ff, P1-ii, P1-jj. The transcript of the
voir dire contains numerous references to the sparse publicity and minimal public interest prior to the second trial.
E. g., App. 43a, 98a, 100a; Tr. 27-28, 90, 191, 384, 771, 829,
1142. It is true that during the voir dire the newspapers
published articles on an almost daily basis, but these too were
purely factual articles generally discussing not the crime or
prior prosecution, but the prolonged process of jury selection. App. 658a-671a. In short, the record of publicity in
the months preceding, and at the time of, the second trial
does not reveal the "barrage of inflammatory publicity immediately prior to trial," Murphy v. Florida, 421 U. S. 794, 798
(1975), amounting to a "huge ... wave of public passion,"
Irvin, supra, at 728, that the Court found in Irvin.
The voir dire testimony revealed that this lapse in time had
a profound effect on the community and, more important, on
the jury, in softening or effacing opinion. Many veniremen,
of course, simply had let the details of the case slip from their
mind. E. g., App. 194a; Tr. 33, 284, 541-544, 991. In addition, while it is true that a number of jurors and veniremen
testified that at one time they had held opinions, for many,
time had weakened or eliminated any conviction they had
had. See, e. g., App. 98a-100a (juror number 7), 128a (juror
number 8); Tr. 384-385, 398-399, 831, 897 (semble), 1075-
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1076, 1144; see also App. 164a-166a (juror number 10). 8
The same is true of the testimony of the jurors and veniremen who were seated late in the process and therefore were
subjected to some of the articles and broadcasts disseminated
daily during the voir dire 9: the record suggests that their
passions had not been inflamed nor their thoughts biased by
8

The testimony of juror number seven, Martin Karetski, during examination by defense counsel is illustrative:
"Q. You have heard the matter discussed over the years?
"A. In the past few years I haven't heard too much about it.
"Q. In 1966 when the matter came up before you knew about it then?
"A. Yes sir.
"Q. And just recently when this matter was coming up again, I
presume?
"A. What I have read in the paper again.
"Q. And you have heard other people discuss it?
"A. Not too many so far.
"Q. You have heard other people express opinions about it?
"A. Not too many of those so far too.
"Q. Back around '66, did you?
"A. Yes in '66.
"Q. . .. I assume you had an opinion as to [Mr. Yount's] guilt or innocence [in 1966]?
"A. I had an opinion yes.
"Q. Do you have a opinion today as to his guilt or innocence?
"A. It's been a long time ago and I'm not sure now. It was in the paper
he plead [sic] not guilty.
"Q. Let me ask you this then. In case you do have an opinion, could you
wipe it out of your mind~rase it out of your mind before you would take a
seat in the jury box and hear whatever evidence you might hear?
"A. As it is right now I have no opinion now-four or five years ago I
probably did but right now I don't.
"Q. What happened Mr. Karetski, between then and now to eliminate
that opinion if you can tell me?
"A. Well, as far as I'm concerned there wasn't much in the paper about
it and it sort of slipped away from thought." App. 98a-100a.
•Jurors were sequestered as they were chosen.
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the publicity. E. g., App. 176a-177a, 150a-151a; Tr. 771,
959, 1027.
That time soothes and erases is a perfectly natural phenomenon, familiar to all. See Irvin v. Dowd, 271 F. 2d 552,
561 (CA7 1959) (Duffy, J., dissenting) (A continuance should
have been granted because "[t]he passage of time is a great
healer," and public prejudice might have "subsid[ed]."),
rev'd, 366 U. S. 717 (1961); see also Murphy, supra, at 802;
Beck v. Washington, 369 U. S. 541, 556 (1962). Not all
members of the venire had put aside earlier prejudice, as the
voir dire disclosed. They retained their fixed opinions, and
were disqualified. But the testimony suggests that the voir
dire resulted in selecting those who had forgotten or would
need to be persuaded again. 10
The Court of Appeals below thought that the fact that the
great majority of veniremen "remembered the case" showed
that time had not served "to erase highly unfavorable publicity from the memory of the community." 710 F. 2d, at 969.
This conclusion, without more, is essentially irrelevant. The
relevant question is not whether the community remembered
the case, but whether the jurors at Yount's trial had such
fixed opinions that they could not judge impartially the guilt
of the defendant. Irvin, supra, at 723. It is not unusual
As noted , the voir dire in this case was particularly extensive. It took
10 days to pick 14 jurors from 167 veniremen. In /ruin it took 8 days to
pick 14 jurors from 430 veniremen.
Contrary to Judge Garth's surmise, 710 F . 2d, at 979, however, the voir
dire interviews quoted in the petitioner's brief in Irvin do not appear to be
significantly less probing than those here. See Brief for Petitioner in
Irvin v. Dowd, 0. T. 1960, No. 41, pp. 18-59. It should also be noted that
the voir dire in Irvin, like that here, was conducted largely by counsel for
each side, rather than the judge. The only significant difference in the
procedures followed here and in Irvin is that the veniremen here were
brought into the courtroom alone for questioning, while it appears that
those in Irvin were questioned in front of all those remaining in the panel.
This is not an insubstantial distinction, as the Court suggested in Irvin ,
supra, at 728, but we do not find it controlling.
10
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that one's recollection of the fact that a notorious crime was
committed lingers long after the feelings of revulsion that
create prejudice have passed. It would be fruitless to attempt to identify any particular lapse of time that in itself
would distinguish the situation that existed in lrvin. 11 But it
is clear that the passage of time between a first and a second
trial can be a highly relevant fact. In the circumstances of
this case, we hold that it clearly rebuts any presumption of
partiality or prejudice that existed at the time of the initial
trial. There was fair, even abundant, support for the trial
court's findings that between the two trials of this case there
had been "practically no publicity given to this matter
through the news media," and that there had not been "any
great effect created by any publicity." App. 268a, 265a.

III
Yount briefly argues here that juror Hrin, as well as the
two alternates, were erroneously seated over his challenges
for cause. Brief for Respondent 32. There is substantial
doubt whether Yount properly raised in his petition for habeas corpus the claim that the trial court erroneously denied
his challenge for cause to juror Hrin. Compare 710 F. 2d, at
966, n. 18, with id., at 977, and n. 4 (Garth, J., concurring).
And there is no evidence that the alternate jurors, who did
not sit in judgment, actually talked with the other jurors during the four-day trial. But Judge Garth in the court below
based his concurrence on the view that Hrin would have required Yount to produce evidence to overcome his inclination
to think the accused was guilty, and the majority of the panel
In Murphy v. Florida, 421 U. S. 794 (1974), the defendant-widely
known as "Murph the Surf"-relied heavily on Irvin. The record of damaging publicity preceding his trial was at least as extreme as that in this
case. Nevertheless, we found the record there distinguishable from Irvin.
We noted that the extensive publication of news articles about Murphy
largely had ceased some seven months before the jury was selected. Id.,
at 802. Murphy involved a lapse in publicity prior to the defendant's first
trial; there was no second trial in that case.
11
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thought that the four-day association between the alternates
and the other jurors "operate[d] to subvert the requirement
that the jury's verdict be based on evidence developed from
the witness stand," id., at 971, n. 25. Therefore, we will
consider briefly the claims as to all three jurors.
It was the view of all three Court of Appeals judges that
the question whether jurors have opinions that disqualify
them is a mixed question of law and fact. See 710 F. 2d, at
968, n. 20, 981. Thus, they concluded that the presumption
of correctness due a state court's factual findings under 28
U.S. C. §2254(d) does not apply. The opinions below relied
for this proposition on Irvin v. Dowd, supra, at 723. Irvin
addressed the partiality of the trial jury as a whole, a question we discuss in Part II, supra. We do not think its analysis can be extended to a federal habeas corpus case in which
the partiality of an individual juror is placed in issue. That
question is not one of mixed law and fact. Rather it is
plainly one of historical fact: did a juror swear that he could
set aside any opinion he might hold and decide the case on the
evidence, and should the juror's protestation of impartiality
have been believed. Cf. Rushen v. Spain,-- U.S.--,
- - (1983) (state court determination that juror's deliberations were not biased by ex parte communications is a finding
of fact). 12
12

There are, of course, factual and legal questions to be considered in
deciding whether a juror is qualified. The constitutional standard that a
juror is impartial only if he can Jay aside his opinion and render a verdict
based on the evidence presented in court is a question of federal law, see
Irvin, supra, at 723; whether a juror can in fact do that is a detennination
to which habeas courts owe special deference, see Rushen, supra, a t - .
Cf. Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U. S. 422, 431-432 (1983) (similar analysis
as to whether a guilty plea was voluntary). See also Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145, 156 (1879) (whether a juror should be disqualified is a
question involving both a legal standard and findings of fact; the latter may
be set aside only for manifest error).
The dissent misreads the Court's opinion in United States v. Reynolds.
Post, at 11-13, and nn. 6 and 7. Reynolds was decided some 87 years be-
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There are good reasons to apply the statutory presumption
of correctness to the trial court's resolution of these questions. First, the determination has been made only after an
often extended voir dire proceeding designed specifically to
identify biased veniremen. It is fair to assume that the
method we have relied on since the beginning, e. g., United
States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 51 (CCD Va. 1807) (Mar. shall, C. J. ), usually identifies bias. 13 Second, the deterfore the presumption of correctness for factual findings was added to 28
U. S. C. § 2254. The Court clearly did not attach the same significance to
the phrase "a question of mixed law and fact" that we do today under modern habeas law. It recognized that juror-disqualification questions may
raise both a question of law-whether the correct standard was appliedand a question of fact. Whether an opinion expressed by a juror was such
as to meet the legal standard for disqualification was viewed as a question
of fact as to which deference was due to the trial court's determination.
This is apparent from the language quoted by the dissent, which notes that
while the question is one of "mixed law and fact," it is "to be tried, as far as
the facts are concerned, like any other issue of that character, upon the
evidence. The finding of the trial court upon that issue ought not to be set
aside by a reviewing court, unless the error is manifest." 98 U. S., at 156.
Plainly, factual findings were to be considered separately from the legal
standard applied, and deference was due to those findings. This is also
apparent from the following passage:
"[T]he manner of the juror while testifying is oftentimes more indicative
of the real character of his opinion than his words. That is seen below, but
cannot always be spread upon the record. Care should, therefore, be
taken in the reviewing court not to reverse the ruling below upon such a
question of fact, except in a clear case." 98 U. S., at 156-157 (emphasis
added).
Taken together, these passages plainly show that the "character of [a juror's] opinion" was considered a question of fact. Contrary to the suggestion of the dissent, ante, at 11, n. 6, the factual question was not limited to
whether the juror was telling the truth, but included discovering the "real
character" of any opinion held. Deference was due to the trial court's conclusions on that question.
13
Accord In reApplication of National Broadcasting Co., 653 F. 2d 609,
617 (CADC 1981) ("[V]oir dire has long been recognized as an effective
method of rooting out such bias, especially when conducted in a careful and
thoroughgoing manner"); United States v. Duncan, 598 F. 2d 839, 865
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mination is essentially one of credibility, and therefore
largely one of demeanor. As we have said on numerous occasions, the trial court's resolution of such questions is entitled, even on direct appeal, to "special deference." E. g.,
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U. S., Inc.,-- U. S.
- - , - - (1984). The respect paid such findings in a habeas
proceeding certainly should be no less. See Marshall v.
Lonberger, 459 U. S. 422, 434-435 (1983). 14
Thus the question is whether there is fair support in the
record for the state courts' conclusion that the jurors here
would be impartial. See 28 U.S. C. §2254(d)(8). The testimony of each of the three challenged jurors is ambiguous and
at times contradictory. This is not unusual on voir dire
examination, particularly in a highly publicized criminal case.
It is well to remember that the lay persons on the panel may
never have been subjected to the type of leading questions
and cross-examination tactics that frequently are employed,
and that were evident in this case. Prospective jurors represent a cross-section of the community, and their education
and experience vary widely. Also, unlike witnesses, prospective jurors have had no briefing by lawyers prior to taking the stand. Jurors thus cannot be expected invariably to
express themselves carefully or even consistently. Every
trial judge understands this, and under our system it is that
judge who is best situated to determine competency to serve
(CA4), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 871 (1979); Calley v. Callaway, 519 F . 2d
184, 209, n. 45 (CA5 1975) (en bane) (citing cases), cert. denied , 425 U. S.
911 (1976). But cf. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U. S. 209, 222, and n. * (1982)
(O'CONNOR, J., concurring) (describing situations in which state procedures are inadequate to uncover bias); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U. S. 723
(1963) (same).
"Demeanor plays a fundamental role not only in determining juror credibility, but also in simply understanding what a potential juror is saying.
Any complicated voir dire calls upon lay persons to think and express
themselves in unfamiliar terms, as a reading of any transcript of such a
proceeding will reveal. Demeanor, inflection, the flow of the questions
and answers can make confused and conflicting utterances comprehensible.

83-95--0PINION

14

PATTON v. YOUNT

impartially. The trial judge properly may choose to believe
those statements that were the most fully articulated or that
appeared to have been least influenced by leading.
The voir dire examination of juror Hrin was carefully scrutinized by the state courts and the federal District Court, as
he was challenged for cause and was a member of the jury
that convicted the defendent. We think that the trial
judge's decision to seat Hrin, despite early ambiguity in
his testimony, was confirmed after he initially denied the
challenge. Defense counsel sought and obtained permission
to resume cross-examination. In response to a question
whether Hrin could set his opinion aside before entering the
jury box or would need evidence to change his mind, the juror clearly and forthrightly stated, "I think I could enter it
[the jury box] with a very open mind. I think I could very
easily. To say this is a requirement for some of the things
you have to do every day." App. 89a. After this categorical answer, defense counsel did not renew their challenge for
cause. Similarly, in the case of alternate juror Pyott, we
cannot fault the trial judge for crediting her earliest testimony, in which she said that she could put her opinion aside
"[i]f [she] had to," rather than the later testimony in which
defense counsel persuaded her that logically she would need
evidence to discard any opinion she might have. App. 246a,
250a-252a. Alternate juror Chincharick's testimony is the
most ambiguous, as he appears simply to have answered
"yes" to almost any question put to him. It is here that the
federal court's deference must operate, for while the cold
record arouses some concern, only the trial judge could tell
which of these answers was said with the greatest comprehension and certainty.
IV
We conclude that the voir dire testimony and the record of
publicity do not reveal the kind of "wave of public passion"
that would have made a fair trial unlikely by the jury that
was empaneled as a whole. We also conclude that the ambi-
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guity in the testimony of the cited jurors who were challenged for cause is insufficient to overcome the presumption
of correctness owed to the trial court's findings. We therefore reverse.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE MARSHALL
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